INEQUALITY IN SCHOOL FINANCING:

THE ROLE OF LAW

U. S. Commission on Civil Rights
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The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is a temporary independent, bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957 and directed to:

Investigate complaints alleging that citizens are being deprived of their right to vote by reason of their race, color, religion, or national origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices;

Study and collect information concerning legal developments constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution;

Appraise Federal laws and policies with respect to equal protection of the laws;

Serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to denials of equal protection of the laws; and

Submit reports, findings, and recommendations to the President and the Congress.

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of educational opportunities available to Mexican Americans in the public schools of the Southwest.

The fourth of a series of reports on Mexican American Education: *Mexican American Education in Texas: A Function of Wealth* was released on the same day as this Survey of the Law. Report IV focuses on the impact which the financing of education in Texas has on the Mexican American community. This Survey was originally prepared as a legal appendix to Report IV. Because the subject matter has implications far beyond the education of Mexican American children in Texas, the Commission decided to publish it separately as part of its Clearinghouse function.

This Survey was prepared by Howard A. Glickstein and William L. Want.* It gives a brief history of the movement toward equality of educational opportunity in the United States; it reviews recent court decisions mandating equality in educational expenditures; and raises some of the critical questions thus far unanswered by either the courts or the legislatures regarding ramifications of these decisions.

Moreover, it suggests that the recent court decisions striking down State systems of school finance because of intrastate inequality may

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not be the panacea for minority group school children that had originally been envisioned. Because children of minority groups are increasingly concentrated in urban areas, the decisions will tend to benefit minority group children to the extent they benefit the cities they live in. The outcome depends on whether cities as a whole will benefit from the decisions.

The proportion of minority group persons living in the major cities has grown rapidly in recent years. Except for the very poor who cannot afford to leave, large numbers of white persons have fled to the suburbs leaving the central cities largely inhabited by the minority and low-income groups. This means that tremendous demands are being made on cities for health, welfare, and protective services as well as for education. If the education system is to offer all children an equal opportunity to succeed in life, a means of financing it must be developed which takes into consideration the additional burdens such school districts must bear. By merely assuring that each school district has an equal amount of money to spend on each child, an equal education is not automatically assured.

This is the challenge with which the courts and legislators must struggle if equality of education is to become a reality in this country. This is the challenge this Survey attempts to define.
CHAPTER I. INEQUITY IN SYSTEMS OF SCHOOL FINANCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

Discrimination against minority students in the Nation's public schools is rapidly giving cause for real alarm among all those concerned with equal opportunity and with the entire future of this country. Inequality in school financing is increasingly recognized as a major factor in perpetuating this educational and social dilemma.

Systems found to be using inequitable methods of financing their educational programs have been struck down by courts in California, Texas, Minnesota, Arizona, and New Jersey. Appeals from some of these cases are now progressing to the Supreme Court of the United States. On March 6, 1972, the President's Commission on School Finance issued its Final Report calling for numerous reforms. A number of State legislatures are in the process of making substantial changes in their systems of school finance. In the wake of all these developments, the Administration is showing increasing interest in providing

1/ See Coons, Clune, and Sugimura, "A First Appraisal of Serrano," 22 Yale Rev. of Law and Social Action 111, 112 (Winter 1971) in which the authors predict that it is likely that one of the school finance cases will reach the United States Supreme Court in the next 18 months. See also note infra.

2/ See, e.g., Washington Post, Mar. 15, 1972 § B at 1, cols. 6-7 which reports that the Ways and Means Committee of the Maryland House of Delegates has approved a bill "radically redistributing state aid to public schools in Maryland...." The Committee agreed to withdraw its proposal after it was assured by the Governor that he will introduce his own bill next year. Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1972 § C at 1, col. 8.
large-scale Federal aid to assist in reorganizing school finance systems. The United States Commissioner of Education, Sidney P. Marland, has recently said that he believed the Federal Government should pay 25 to 30 percent of the cost of public education rather than the 8 percent it now pays. \(^{3/}\)

The focus of the Commission Report is on inequities in the Texas system of school finance. This Report unravels three separate cumulative methods in which the Texas system functions to provide grossly inequitable funding for predominantly Chicano school districts.

The first source of inequity was found to lie in the minimum foundation formula, nominally an equalizing device of State aid, which operates in such a way that it provides less money for the predominantly Chicano school districts. The second source of inequity was revealed in the formula by which the local district fund assignment is computed. Although presumably representing a fair measure of the share that districts are financially able to contribute to the minimum foundation plan, Commission findings showed the local fund assignment formula to be replete with discriminatory features. The third source of inequity was seen in the use of local property taxes to supplement the minimum foundation plan. The cumulative effect of these inequities is that, despite the minimum equalizing effect of State aid and the higher tax rates prevalent among predominantly Chicano school districts, per

pupil expenditures from State and local revenue sources are below those in predominantly Anglo districts. They range from a high of about $675 in districts 20 to 30 percent Mexican American to $340 in districts 80 percent or more Mexican American.

Texas may be an exception in that its system of finance clearly operates to the financial detriment of minority group children (in this case Chicano). 4/

4/ This Report points out that, in contrast to Texas, in the other Southwestern States - California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado - the majority of Chicano pupils are in predominantly Anglo districts. This made it very complex to separate the effect of the State finance systems on Mexican Americans, as distinguished from Anglos, who attend school in the same district. In California, it appears that a majority of minority group pupils reside in districts that are not financially disadvantaged. See Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 356-57, n. 47 (1970). (Hereafter referred to as Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wealth.) Coons, Clune, and Sugarman discount the relationship between race and financial inequities: "There is an understandable tendency to treat the school finance issue as an outrider of the racial problems of public education...." The fact is otherwise. There is no reason to suppose that the system of district-based school finance embodies a racial basis. The districts which contain the great masses of black children ordinarily also contain great masses of white children. There well may be very significant racial/dollar discrimination within districts, but that is another problem: to lump it with interdistrict discrimination is totally misleading." (emphasis added) Id. at 355-57. Cf. Levin, et.al., Paying for Public Schools: Issues of School Finance in California (Urban Institute, 1972) at 26-27 where the authors find that districts with more than 50 percent minority students have by far the highest non-federal expenditure levels. "When blacks and Spanish surnamed students are viewed separately, however, different expenditure patterns for these two largest minorities emerge. In general, the districts with the highest proportion of black students are spending more per pupil than districts with the highest proportion of Spanish surnamed students. The reverse is true, however, in the middle ranges--the districts with from 10 to 20 percent minority enrollment. There the districts with concentrations of Spanish surnamed students spend more per student than those with concentrations of blacks."
The inequalities in school finance between rich and poor school districts found in Texas, however, are the rule throughout the country. 5/

A view of inequality on the national level begins with a look at the disparities among the States where average per pupil expenditures currently range from a high of approximately $1,400 in Alaska to a low of less than $500 in Alabama. 6/ Nor do State expenditures necessarily reflect the relative importance a State places on education. For example, Mississippi and Alabama, which rank 49th and 50th in terms of per pupil expenditures devote 39.7 percent and 40.2 percent respectively of their public expenditures to education. Alaska and New York, on the other hand, which rank first and second in terms of per pupil expenditures, devote only 32.1 percent and 33.9 percent respectively of their public expenditures to education. 7/

State averages, by definition, mask the wide range of disparities within the States. 8/ In Wyoming, expenditures range from a low of $618 per pupil to a high of $14,554; in Kansas, from $454 to $1,831; in Vermont, from $357


6/ See Appendix A.


8/ See Appendix B.
to $1,517; in Washington, from $434 to $3,406; in Oklahoma, from $342 to $2,566; in Colorado, from $444 to $2,801; and in Pennsylvania, from $484 to $1,401. 9/

In California per pupil expenditures for Emery Unified and Newark Unified school districts, both in Alameda County, were $2,223 and $616 respectively. 10/ In New Jersey 14 districts with a total of 13,391 pupils spent less than $700 per pupil while 16 districts with 29,653 pupils spent more than $1,500 per pupil. 11/ In New York, two Long Island school districts within 10 miles of each other--Great Neck and Levittown--spent $2,078 and $1,189 respectively per pupil. 12/

Not only does the current system of school finance produce spectacular divergencies in expenditures for students in different school districts, but it also results in inequalities in terms of the taxes paid to finance education. Local funds, derived almost exclusively from the real property tax, provide better than one-half the revenue for elementary and secondary education in the Nation as a whole. 13/ The amount that can be obtained through a

9/ Ibid.


13/ In 1970-71 local district revenues provided 52 percent of the funds for public education; States provided 44.1 percent and the Federal Government provided 6.9 percent. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972 § E at 2 (table).
property tax is a function of the tax rate employed and the value of the property taxed. Use of the property tax, therefore, subjects educational financing to the massive disparities in tax base that characterize American local governments. Consequently, the richer a district, the less severely it need tax itself to raise funds. In other words, a man in a poor district must pay higher local rates for the same or lower per pupil expenditures.

In Alameda County, California, Emery Unified School District manages to spend $2,223 per pupil with a $2.57 tax rate while Newark Unified must tax at a rate of $5.65 to spend $616 per pupil. In Essex County, New Jersey, Millburn with a $1.43 school tax rate compared to $3.69 in Newark, has more teachers per pupil than Newark, spends more for teachers' salaries per pupil ($685 to $454), and has more professional staff per pupil.

In Arizona, Morenci Elementary School District produced $249.64 per pupil in local revenue with a tax rate of $.67. Roosevelt Elementary, however, had to use a tax rate of $4.65 to produce a mere $99.04 per student in local revenue.

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15/ An expert witness in the Rodriguez case, stated that "One of the cruel ironies in the current approach to supporting schools in Texas is that the communities which have the least money for their schools are the very districts which tax themselves most heavily to raise school revenues." See affidavit of Joel Berke (p. 13) in Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 337 F. Supp 280 (W.D. Texas 1971).

16/ These, and other discrepancies in California, are illustrated by the chart in Appendix C.

17/ Robinson v. Cahill op. cit. supra note 11 at 20.

taxable property per pupil would have to tax at $.64 to obtain the highest yield; the 4 districts below $10,000 would have to tax at $12.83. 19/

A further glaring inequity in current systems of school finance is found in variations of expenditures, which tend to be inversely related to educational need. City students, with greater than average educational needs, consistently had less money spent on their education and had higher pupil/teacher ratios to contend with than did their high-income counterparts in the favored schools of suburbia. 20/ In 1967, Los Angeles, for example, spent $601 per pupil, while its suburban Beverly Hills spent $1,192. Detroit spent $530; its suburban Grosse Point, $713. 21/ Dr. James B. Conant deplored in-

19/ The complete table from which this information was taken, included in the affidavit submitted by Dr. Joel Berke in Rodriguez v. San Antonio op. cit. supra note 15, is attached as Appendix D. Highest yield is the revenue that would be obtained by using the tax rate of the district with the highest tax rate in the sample. The table shows that the resulting burden increases at a much greater rate for poorer districts than for richer if they both seek to realize the highest return in the sample.

20/ See Berke and Kelly, "The Financial Aspects of Equality of Educational Opportunity" 10 (1971), reprinted by the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972). See also 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (1967) which discusses the problems cities face in financing their schools. "Under the system of financing, the adequacy of educational services is heavily dependent on the adequacy of each community's tax base. With the increasing loss of their more affluent white population, central cities also have suffered a pronounced erosion of their fiscal capacity. At the same time, the need for city services has increased, particularly in the older and larger cities. The combination of rising costs and a declining tax base has weakened the cities' capacity to support education at levels comparable to those in the suburbs." Id. at 25.

21/ The phenomenon of divergent expenditures in the same metropolitan area is further illustrated by the chart in Appendix E.
equities of this nature:

The contrast in the money spent per pupil in wealthy suburban schools and in slum schools of the large cities challenges the concept of equality of opportunity in American public education. 22/

The current pattern of resource allocation has been brought about by the State in two ways. First, the local districts with unequal taxable resources have been created by the States. As the court noted in Serrano v. Priest, "Governmental action drew the school district boundary lines, thus determining how much local wealth each district would contain." 23/

Secondly, although the States have made some efforts to equalize the differences through financial aid to local school districts, large disparities still remain. The States contribute approximately 44 percent of revenues for elementary and secondary education through flat grants or equalizing grants or combinations of the two. The flat grant consists of an absolute number of dollars distributed to each school district on a per pupil or other per unit standard. Plans employing equalizing grants (or foundation plans) are more complicated and have a number of variants. In its simplest form, a foundation plan consists of a State guarantee to a district of a minimum level of available dollars per student, if the district taxes itself at a specified rate.


23/ 5 Cal. 3d 584, 603 (1971). See also Schoettle, "The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education," 71 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1410 (1971): "Allocation of tax base is no less a State act than would be the distribution of dollars by the state itself in unequal and arbitrary amounts to residents of different units of local government."
The State aid makes up the difference between the guaranteed amount and local collections at the specified rate. 24/

After its original proposal in 1924, 25/ the equalizing approach became the model of numerous State adaptations. Compromises with the strict application of the equalization objectives were made in most States to accommodate: (a) the long-standing tradition of flat grants; (b) the reluctance of State officials to increase State taxes so they would fully finance equalization plans; and (c) the desire of some localities to finance truly superior schools. 26/ In most States the foundation plan ended by providing the poorest districts with basic education programs at a level well below that of the

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24/ For a full discussion of state equalization plans see Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wealth, op. cit. supra note 4 at Ch. 2. See also statement of Charles S. Benson, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the United States Senate, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 16 A, at 6709, 6712-6715 (hereinafter referred to as Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings).

25/ See Benson, op. cit. supra note 24 at 6712.

26/ See Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, State Aid to Local Government 40 (1969).
wealthier districts that were left with ample local tax leeway to exceed the minimum foundation plan level without unduly straining local resources. 27/

27/ Ibid. See Statement of National Committee for Support of the Public Schools, Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings pt. 16 D-3 at 8287, 8288 which summarized the major inadequacies of State equalization programs: "State systems of education finance distribute state funds through foundation programs which fail to correct the wealth disparities among local districts. While these programs vary widely in specifics from state-to-state they frequently suffer from three major flaws and a host of minor ones:

"Foundation amounts - the maximum amount the state assures each district - are inadequate. For instance, California's maximum amount is $355 per elementary pupil; Maryland's is $370.

"Flat or minimum grants which award money on the basis of number of pupils to all districts, wealthy or poor. When they are awarded as part of the maximum foundation amount, as in California, or are substituted for districts not qualifying for minimum amounts under an equalization program, as in Maryland, they subsidize the wealthy and attenuate the disparities.

"Districts must raise money locally to support education programs superior to those provided for in the foundation amount. This gives rise to disparities in tax effort and in expenditures. Even though poorer districts make the same or greater tax effort on behalf of their schools, they are able to purchase much less education than the rich."

'It also is noteworthy that the basis of measurement used to determine a district's allocation tends to discriminate against cities. Funds are distributed on the basis of pupil weighted average daily attendance (WADA). The WADA formula has an adverse impact on cities because of their truancy problems. See Fleishman Commission Report at 2.15, 2.38. See also Kirp, "The Poor, the Schools and Equal Protection" Equal Educational Opportunity 139, 168 (1969); 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 28 (1967): "State aid programs designed decades ago to assist the then poor suburban districts often support the now wealthier suburbs at levels comparable to or higher than the cities."
Federal educational aid programs, which make up only about 7 percent of all revenues for public education, have had some impact on equalizing resources. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, enacted in 1965, accounts for close to 40 percent of Federal funds expended on elementary and secondary education. 28/ It is designed to meet the educational needs of children from low-income families; 29/ because it is responsive to educational needs of the poor it has had an equalizing effect. 30/ Other Federal programs, however, often serve to reinforce disparities. Funds under the National Defense Education Act, for example, sometimes have gone disproportionately to suburban schools. 31/ Aid to federally impacted areas never was intended to have an equalizing effect. 32/ It is merely designed to compensate for the presence of large-scale tax exempt Federal activities; need is not a criterion. Nevertheless, "It is the small but important share of


30/ See Berke and Kelly, op. cit. supra note 20 at 27, 30; Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 73-75; 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 29 (1967).

31/ 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 28 (1967).

32/ Ibid.
educational financing that has been contributed by the Federal Government that has been the most effective fiscal contribution to equal educational opportunity in American school finance." 33/

33/ Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 73.
CHAPTER II. THE PURSUIT OF "EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY"

A. The Development of Public Education in the United States.

The fundamental relationship between education and democracy has always been a premise of our form of Government. George Washington stressed this in his Farewell Address:

Promote then as an object of primary importance, Institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened. 34/

Thomas Jefferson echoed this conviction:

I think by far the most important bill in our whole code [of Virginia] is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the people. No other sure foundation can be devised for the preservation of freedom, and happiness. 35/

Our Founding Fathers, moreover, regarded the provision of education as a public function. "It is not too much to say," wrote John Adams, "that schools for the education of all should be placed at convenient distances and maintained at the public expense." 36/

34/ Farewell Address, 35 The Writings of George Washington (Bicentennial Edition) 230. See also Id. at Vol. 28, p. 27.

35/ Letter to George Wythe, 10 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 244 (Princeton University Press 1954). See also Id. at Vol. 9, p. 151; 6 The Works of John Adams 168 (1851); 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 1-2 (1967). Early legislation reflected the importance attached to education. For example, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." 1 Documents of American History 131 (Commager ed. 1958).

36/ The Works of John Adams, op. cit. supra note 35.
The first system of public education in the United States was created by the Massachusetts School law of 1647; within a generation most of the other New England colonies had followed the example of Massachusetts. 37/ Development of public schools in the middle and southern colonies was much slower; education outside of New England was still primarily a private matter at the close of the 18th century. 38/ Public interest in public education increased during the first half of the 19th century and by 1850 "the battle for free state schools" was won in the Northern States. 39/ Progress was slower in the South but by 1918 education in every State of the Union was not only free but compulsory. 40/

Today, the duty of government to provide education is generally conceded. It has been specifically provided for in the Constitutions of


38/ Cubberley, op. cit. supra note 37 at 77.

39/ Id. at 101-115; 118-152.

40/ Id. at 246-254; Morison and Commager, II The Growth of the American Republic 306-307 (1956).
50 States of the Union and has been given eloquent recognition in numerous judicial opinions such as that of the Supreme Court of Michigan which said:

We supposed it had always been understood in this state that education, not merely in the rudiments, but in an enlarged sense, was regarded as an important practical advantage to be supplied at their option to rich and poor alike, and not as something pertaining merely to culture and accomplishment to be brought as such within the reach of those whose accumulated wealth enabled them to pay for it.

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41/ See, e.g., Constitution of Florida, Art. 12, §1; Constitution of Idaho, Art. 9, §1; Constitution of Michigan, Art. VIII §1; Constitution of North Carolina, Art. I, §27; Constitution of Rhode Island, Art. 12 §1. See also Article 26.1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."

Education was widely regarded as a means of fostering social cohesion. Samuel Lewis, first superintendent of common schools in Ohio, wrote in 1836:

Take fifty lads in a neighborhood, including rich and poor - send them in childhood to the same school - let them join in the same sports, read and spell in the same classes, until their different circumstances fix their business for life: some go to the field, some to the mechanic's shop, some to merchandise: one becomes eminent at the bar, another in the pulpit: some become wealthy; the majority live on with a mere competency - a few are reduced to beggary! But let the most eloquent orator, that ever mounted a western stump, attempt to prejudice the minds of one part against the other - and so far from succeeding, the poorest of the whole would consider himself insulted. \[43\]

But certain structural characteristics of our system of public education worked against the goal of social cohesion. For one thing, our schools were segregated by race and, in many places, by ethnic background. It was in the area of race that the first battles to achieve equal educational opportunity were fought.

B. Efforts to Eliminate School Segregation.

The attack began by efforts to insure that "separate" facilities were, in fact, "equal," as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. \[44\] Courts found violations of the equal protection clause


\[44\] 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
of the 14th amendment \(45/\) where it was shown that there were inequalities between black and white schools in buildings and other physical facilities, course offerings, length of school terms, transportation facilities, extracurricular activities, cafeteria facilities, and geographical conveniences. \(46/\)

In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada \(47/\) and in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, \(48/\) the Supreme Court — considering alleged tangible inequalities — invalidated school segregation where it was shown that the quality of the facilities provided for blacks was unequal to the quality of the

\(45/\) The 14th amendment to the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "...nor shall any State ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

\(46/\) See, e.g., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Carter v. School Board, 182 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950); Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1949); Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949); Freeman v. County School Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948), aff'd, 171 F. 2d 702 (4th Cir. 1948). See also Leflar and Davis, "Segregation in the Public Schools — 1953," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 430-35 (1954); Horowitz, "Unseparate but Unequal — The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education," 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1147, 1149 (1966). Mary E. Mebane /Liza/ a teacher at South Carolina State College, recently described what it was like to go to a separate but unequal school: "It's when you're in the second grade and your eye reads the name 'Bragtown High School' and you also see in the front of the book 'discard' and even though you're only 7 years old you know, as you turn the pages that have tears patched with a thick yellowing tape, that you're using a book that a white girl used last year and tore up, and your mother is paying book rent just like her mother paid book rent. You get the second-hand book and it gives you a thing about second-hand books that does not go away until you are teaching yourself and are able to buy all the new ones you want." N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1972, editorial page.

\(47/\) 305 U.S. 337 (1938).

\(48/\) 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
facilities afforded whites. Next, the Court considered whether intangible factors - more difficult to measure than bricks and mortar - could be considered in determining whether there had been a denial of equal educational opportunities. The Court answered affirmatively in Sweat v. Painter 49/, where it held that more than physical facilities needed to be considered in judging whether Texas was providing equal educational opportunity in separate facilities to black law students. "What is more important," the Court stressed, is the fact that the University of Texas Law School "possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." 50/ Similarly, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education 51/ the Court required that a black student admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students and not segregated within the school. Again, the Court relied upon "intangible considerations," including "his ability ... to engage in discussion and exchange views with other students ...." 52/

The fatal blow to the separate but equal doctrine was struck in 1954 with the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 53/

50/ Id. at 634.
52/ Id. at 641. See also 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 246-247 (1967); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Freedom to the Free 144-147 (1963).
Here the Court held that it was unnecessary in each case to demonstrate the harm caused by segregation. Rather, a universal rule was appropriate: 54/

In the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated ... are ... deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Of especial importance to the Court in assuring equal treatment was the significance it placed on the role of public education. The Court said: 55/

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

54/ Id., at 495.

55/ Id. at 493.
The Brown decision also has been applied to segregated schooling involving Mexican American and other minority group children. 56/


Since the Brown decision, there has been an unremitting struggle - through the courts, the legislatures, and executive action - to eliminate racial discrimination from the operation of our public schools. 57/ The increasing sensitivity created by Brown to inequalities among schools broadened the search for equality to factors other than race. 58/ A


58/ But see David K. Cohen, "The Economics of Inequality," Sat. Rev. 64, 79 (Apr. 19, 1969) who argues that "much of the interest in intrastate fiscal disparities arises precisely from despair over the evident failure of efforts to resolve" the two central problems of public education of our times - its organization along racial lines and its apparent inability to reduce racial and class disparities in school outcomes. See also Peter Milius in the Washington Post, Nov. 28, 1971 §A at 4, col 3-4 "Northern liberals who used to stand forcefully for school desegregation are suddenly finding it impolitic, and are looking for alternatives, ways to stay 'liberal' without being in favor of busing....The answer that many are tending toward is equalization for desegregation, moving dollars around instead of children. They note that, after all, the object of desegregation all along was only equal educational opportunity. If equalization sounds a little like 'separate but equal,' that has not so far bothered these Northerners."
problem of lower visibility that has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars, lawyers, and the courts is that of interdistrict financial disparities. Equal educational opportunity not only involves the elimination of invidious racial and ethnic discriminations but also requires that public money expended on education be distributed in a non discriminatory manner. What formula is appropriate for determining whether or not education funds are being dispersed in a way that will guarantee equal educational opportunities?

The answer to this question does not necessarily depend on a simple quantitative weighing of resources; at times, the attainment of equality demands unequal efforts and expenditures. An adequate definition of "equal educational opportunity" requires the consideration of varied factors. Many formulations have been advanced. 59/

The definitions generally can be categorized as those which place restraints on the State and those which impose upon the State some type of affirmative obligation. In the first category are formulations which ordain that a State's educational financing system may not discriminate

against the poor \textsuperscript{60/} on the basis of the wealth of the residents of a school district, \textsuperscript{61/} on the basis of geography, \textsuperscript{62/} or against taxpayers by imposing unequal burdens for a common State purpose. \textsuperscript{63/} Definitions of this sort are particularly suitable for the courts which usually are reluctant to inject themselves into such subjective and substantive questions as the appropriate product of an educational system. These definitions permit the State to design its educational system in a variety of ways so long as it does not violate some relatively clear formulation of equal protection. \textsuperscript{64/} Definitions in this category have the virtue of "modesty, clarity, flexibility and relative simplicity." \textsuperscript{65/}

\textsuperscript{60/} See \textit{Amici Curiae} Brief of Center for Educational Policy Research, Center for Law and Education at 2, \textit{Serrano v. Priest}.

\textsuperscript{61/} See Coons, Clune and Sugarman, "Educational Opportunity," \textit{op. cit. supra} note 5 at 311; "The quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole."

\textsuperscript{62/} See Wise, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 59 at 146: "Equality of educational opportunity exists when a child's educational opportunity does not depend upon either his parents' economic circumstances or his location within the state."

\textsuperscript{63/} See \textit{Hollins v. Shofstall}, \textit{op cit supra} note 18 (1972).

\textsuperscript{64/} Wise, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 59 at 158-159.

\textsuperscript{65/} See Coons, Clune and Sugarman, "Educational Opportunity" \textit{op. cit. supra} note 5, at 340.
The definitions of "equal educational opportunity" which impose an affirmative obligation on a State \(^{66/}\) run from the simple - "one scholar, one dollar" - \(^{67/}\) to the amorphous - "/A/ school district is constitutionally required to provide the best possible equality of opportunity..." \(^{68/}\) - to the utopian - "equal educational achievement for every child" - \(^{69/}\) to definitions which stress the distribution of funds on the basis of need and then seek to formulate some standards for defining "needs." \(^{70/}\) Some of these formulas have been advanced in school finance litigation, and we shall now turn our attention to a consideration of the cases.

\(^{66/}\) See Coleman, op. cit. supra note 59. Coleman describes the evolving role of government and educational institutions in assuring equal educational opportunities. Initially the role of the community and educational institutions were relatively passive; all that was expected was the provision of a set of free public resources. It was then up to the family and child to decide how to use these resources. Today, the responsibility to create achievement lies with the educational institution, not the child.


\(^{69/}\) Silard and White, op. cit. supra note 59 at 25-26.

CHAPTER III. THE SEARCH FOR JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A. The Appropriate Constitutional Standard.

As we have seen, the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment has been the battering ram in the pursuit of racial and ethnic equality in public education. It is this same amendment that has been chosen as the weapon of those seeking equality in educational financing. The meaning and sweep of the equal protection clause has been a frequent issue before the Supreme Court and standards have been developed for applying that clause in various situations. These standards provide the backdrop against which the recent school finance cases have been brought. We will review those standards, before turning to the recent cases.

The basis of an equal protection attack on governmental action is that two groups similarly situated have been treated differently, e.g., minority children and majority children, similarly seeking a public education, are required to go to separate schools.

The Court initially developed standards for judging equal protection violations in cases involving economic regulation. In *Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis*, the Court said that legislative classifications must always rest upon some differences which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. 71/

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71/ *Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis*, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
The Court also has emphasized that the burden of attacking a legislative act lies wholly "on him who denies its constitutionality" Brown v. Maryland. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., summarizing the rules by which equal protection arguments must be tested, the Court noted that the person attacking the statutory classification "must carry the burden of showing that it is arbitrary" and that "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,...the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed."  

But the Court has not been as solicitous of legislative enactments that were alleged to abridge rights of free speech and association, protected

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220 U. S. 61, 79-80 (1911).

The latter of these two rules, which has been stated on innumerable occasions since, see, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357 (1916); Crescent Cotton Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 137 (1921); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 255 (1922). State Board of Tax Comm. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537 (1931); Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 584 (1935); Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 509 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938); Asbury Hosp., v. Cass County, op. cit. supra note 71 at 215; Morey v. Doud, op. cit. supra note 71 at 464; Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528 (1959); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961), appears to have been first stated in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 132 (1876). In Munn, an Illinois statute seeking to regulate public warehouses and the storage and inspection of grain was challenged on equal protection grounds. In the cases just cited which repeat the Munn language, all involve the matter of taxation or economic regulation.
by the first amendment. In *Schneider v. State*, 75/ for example, the Court observed that when a State abridges

...fundamental personal rights and liberties...
the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulations directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

And in *Shelton v. Tucker* 76/, the Court used these words:

"Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."

In *Board of Education v. Barnette*, 77/ involving the constitutionality of the public school flag salute requirement, the Court said:

"The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds."

Nor is it only in the area of the first amendment that the Court gives especially close scrutiny to legislative action. Thus, in *United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.*, 78/ the Court noted that

75/ 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
78/ 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.

In time, the Court recognized that legislative classifications attacked under the 14th amendment, beyond those encroaching on rights protected by the first 10 amendments, could not be treated uniformly and subjected to a "rational basis" test. Different tests were required depending upon the nature of the classifying factor and the interest affected. Thus, the Court has concluded that legislative classifications involving "suspect" criteria or affecting "fundamental rights" will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling state interest." In *Shapiro v. Thompson*, the Court articulated this standard:

Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the... requirement that new residents to an area wait a one-year period before being eligible for welfare assistance violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Among the criteria the Court has regarded as suspect are race, *Bolling v. Sharpe*

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79/ For a summary of the different ways in which the "suspect" classification standard has been described, see Comment, "Equal Protection in the Urban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services," 46 Tul. L. Rev. 496, 508 n. 70 (1972).

80/ The "rational basis" and "compelling state interest" tests have been variously described as the "old" or "standard" test and the "new" or "strict" test. For a further discussion of these tests see Comment, "Equal Protection in the Urban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services," 46 Tul. L. Rev. 496, 497-99 (1972); Comment, "James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination by Referendum?", 39 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 115, 119-20 (1971).

("Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect"); 82/ lineage, Hirabayashi v. United States ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"); 83/ wealth, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race...are traditionally disfavored") 84/; and, possibly, illegitimacy. 85/ Compare Levy v. Louisiana 86/ and Weber v. Aetna


85/ Indicating the heightened levels of consciousness of recent years is the suggestion that sex classifications also be regarded as suspect. See Comment, "Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?" 66 N.W. L. Rev. 481 (1971).

Casualty and Surety Company 87/ with Labine v. Vincent. 88/ In sum, the Court has regarded as "suspect" classifications those which discriminate against an individual on the basis of factors over which he has no control. 89/

Included in the category of interest that the Court has regarded as fundamental are voting, 90/ procreation, 91/ interstate travel, 92/ marriage, 93/

87/ 40 L.W. 4460 (1972).
89/ Id. at 551, note 19. In more general terms, the Court has suggested that legislation which falls more harshly upon a class that exercises little control over the political process should receive "strict scrutiny." See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938) where the Court noted that: "\( P \)/rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry (citations omitted)." See also, Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507, 508 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F. 2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

political association, and the opportunity to earn a living. Some lower courts have classified education as a fundamental interest.

When a challenged classification involves a "fundamental interest," just as in the case of a "suspect" classification, the State's basis for the classification must be more than "rational"; the State has the burden of showing that it was without alternatives and had a "compelling" need to classify it as it did. Summarizing this test, one commentator has stated:

94/ See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968).

95/ See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P. 2d 529, 95 Cal Reptr. 329 (1971).


97/ Many of the cases involve both a "suspect" classification and a "fundamental interest" which interact with each other. The Court's analysis in such cases has been described as involving a "sliding scale." Under the 'sliding scale' approach, various classifications and interests are visualized as being on a gradient, with the standard of review becoming more demanding as the nature of the classifications or the value of the interests approaches the 'suspect' or 'fundamental' levels. The suspect and fundamental qualities of the classification created and the interests regulated by a specific state action are evaluated and weighed together in determining the standard of judicial review to be applied." Note, "The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge," 81 Yale L. J. 61, 71-72 (1971). See also "Developments in the Law: Equal Protection," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1020-21 (1969); Comment, "Equal Protection in the Urban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services," 46 Tul. L. Rev. 496, 525 (1972).

Application of the new equal protection doctrine involves close "judicial scrutiny" imposing upon the state a heavy burden of justification. Concomitantly, the Court has sometimes considered whether there are alternatives available to the state by which it can achieve its legitimate objective, without substantial infringement upon fundamental rights...the state may not employ a method which, though rationally related to that objective, more substantially infringes upon protected rights (footnotes omitted). 99/

In the school finance cases the courts have considered the "suspect" classification, "fundamental interests" categorizations and have employed the "rational basis," "compelling state interest" tests, all of which are now considered in detail.

B. The Initial Cases.

Attacks on State school financing schemes proved unsuccessful in *McInnis* v. *Shapiro* 100/ and *Burruss* v. *Wilkerson*. 101/

*McInnis* was a suit brought by students attending school in school districts within Cook County, Illinois. They attacked on 14th amendment grounds various State statutes dealing with school financing. They argued that the statutes permitted "wide variations in the expenditures per student from district to district, thereby providing some students with a good education and depriving others, who have equal or greater educational needs." 102/

At the time of the case, per pupil expenditures in Illinois varied between $480 and $1,000. The State guaranteed a foundation level of $400. The State contribution was made up of a flat grant for each pupil and an equalization grant awarded to each district which levied a minimum property tax. Where the local tax revenue per pupil generated by the minimum rate, plus the flat grant, was less than $400, the State provided the difference as an equalization grant. Districts taxing above the minimum rate were not penalized by having the additional revenue considered before determination of the equalization rate. Thus, all districts, regardless

of their wealth, received a flat grant. The equalization formula helped bring poorer districts up to the $400 minimum level but did not close the gap between rich and poor districts that resulted from enabling the same tax rate to produce vastly greater income in the rich districts. In fact, the court found that districts with lower property valuations usually levy higher tax rates.

A three-judge Federal court found that the Illinois school financing scheme was designed "to allow individual localities to determine their own tax burdens according to the importance which they place on public schools." 103/ The court, relying on those Supreme Court cases which shield State legislative enactments from invalidation unless they are "wholly irrelevant to the achievements of the State's objective," upheld the Illinois system. 104/

The State's objective, however, is not furthered by the method of financing schools in Illinois because the tax burdens of individual localities do not directly reflect interest in education. As the court notes, "though districts with lower tax property valuations usually levy higher taxes, there is a limit to the amount of money which they can raise, especially since they are limited by maximum indebtedness and tax rates." 105/

103/ McInnis v. Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 100 at 333.

104/ Id. at 332, quoting from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). The plaintiffs had urged that the importance of education required that the court scrutinize more closely the State regulatory scheme than is normally done when State statutes in other areas are attacked. McInnis v. Shapiro, supra at 331.

105/ Id. at 331.
Thus, tax burdens are controlled by property valuations and State imposed limitations on tax rates. A rich district can tax at a low rate and raise adequate funds to finance its schools. A poor district must impose a burdensome tax rate to obtain sufficient funds and, even then, it is limited by restraints imposed on its tax rate and indebtedness. Accordingly, the court might just as well have concluded that the manner in which school funds are distributed in Illinois is "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective" of allowing "individual localities to determine their own tax burden according to the importance which they place upon public schools."

But the court's opinion does not dwell extensively on the mechanics of the Illinois financing scheme. More attention is paid to the remedy sought by the plaintiffs. The court notes that the plaintiff's original complaint sought an order requiring the "defendants to submit...a plan to raise and apportion all monies...in such a manner that such funds available to the school districts wherein the class of plaintiffs attend school will... assure that plaintiff children receive the same educational opportunity as the children in any other
Similarly, the court observed:

While the complaining students repeatedly emphasize the importance of pupils' "educational needs," they do not offer a definition of this nebulous concept. Presumably, "educational need" is a conclusory term, reflecting the interaction of several factors such as the quality of teachers, the students' potential, prior education environmental and parental upbringing, and the school's physical plant. Evaluation of these variables necessarily requires detailed research and study, with concomitant decentralization so each school and pupil may be individually evaluated.

106/ Id. at 335 n. 34. See Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "Educational Opportunity," op. cit. supra note 5 at 339-40 which notes that in McInnis v. Ogilvie, before the Supreme Court, it was argued that the Illinois financing scheme denied equal protection in the following respects.

a....classifications upon which students will receive the benefits of a certain level of per pupil educational expenditures are not related to the educational needs of these students and are therefore arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable; b....the method of financing public education fails to consider...(ii) the added costs necessary to educate those children from culturally and economically deprived areas (iii) the variety of educational needs of the several public school districts of the State of Illinois...c....the method of financing public education fails to provide to each child an equal opportunity for an education...

107/ McInnis v. Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 100 at 329 n. 4.
Obviously, the court regarded the nature of the relief requested as an insurmountable obstacle. This is reflected in its reasons for dismissing the case:

(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes the controversy nonjusticable. 108/

The District Court's decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court 109/ and its judgment was affirmed on March 24, 1969. 110/

The Burruss case attacked Virginia's scheme for the distribution of funds for public education. The plaintiffs, resident parents and school children of Bath County, claimed that their rights to equal protection were violated by the system of finance. They further alleged that they were denied "educational opportunities substantially equal to those enjoyed by children attending public schools in many other districts of the State," 111/ that the State law failed to take

108/ Id. at 329.

109/ Since the McInnis case attacked the constitutionality of State legislation, it was heard by a three-judge Federal court, 28 U.S.C. §2281, 2284. Cases heard by three-judge courts proceed directly to the Supreme Court; jurisdiction in such cases is not discretionary. 28 U.S.C. 1253 (1964). Generally, in cases coming from Federal Courts of Appeal and State Courts, the Supreme Court has discretion as to whether or not to review the cases. 28 U.S.C. 1254, 1257 (1964).


into account "the variety of educational needs" 112/ of the different counties and cities and that the law failed to make provision for variations in expenses for public education from district to district. 113/

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument. It found that the differences existing among districts were not caused by the State, and that cities and counties were receiving funds under a "uniform and consistent plan." 114/ What was involved, the court suggested, was a local problem. "Truth is," said the court, "the inequalities suffered by the school children of Bath are due to the inability of the county to obtain locally, the moneys needed to be added to the State contribution to raise the educational provision to the level of that of some of the other counties or cities." 115/ This, the court concluded, did not involve discrimination by the State. The court also rested its conclusion on the indefiniteness of the relief sought by the plaintiffs and rejected the suggestion that a court could fashion a remedy based on educational needs. The court said:

Actually, the plaintiffs seek to obtain allocations of State funds among the cities and counties so that pupils in each of them will enjoy the same educational opportunities. This is certainly a worthy aim, commendable beyond measure. However, the courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the State. 116/

112/ Ibid.
113/ Ibid.
114/ Id. at 574.
115/ Ibid.
116/ Ibid.
The court relied on the McInnis case which it found "scarcely distinguishable" from the case before it. 117/ This decision also was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 118/

The courts were more receptive to an attack on a school finance system in Hargrave v. McKinney. 119/ This case involved Florida's school financing methods. At issue was a Florida statute which provided that any county that imposes upon itself more than a 10 mill ad valorem property tax for educational purposes would not be eligible to receive State funds for the support of its public educational system. The statute was attacked as violating the equal protection clause

... because the state limitation is fixed by reference to a standard which relates solely to the amount of property in the county, not to the educational needs of the county. Counties with high property values in relation to their school population are authorized by the state to tax themselves far more in relation to their educational needs than counties with low property values in relation to their school population. 120/

117/ Ibid. Cf. Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968) where a three-judge court held that a Virginia statute violated the equal protection clause. The law provided that children of members of the Armed Forces, or other employees of the United States, living in an impacted area or on or off Federal property, would not be counted for the purpose of distributing State educational aid to school districts.


120/ Hargrave v. McKinney, op. cit. supra note 119 at 323. The complaint cited as an example the fact that the statute under attack permitted Charlotte County to raise by its own taxes $725 per student while Bradford County is permitted to raise only $52 per student.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court had improperly dismissed the case and that the constitutional questions raised were sufficiently substantial to warrant the convening of a three-judge district court. The court noted the "novelty of the constitutional argument" advanced by the plaintiff but concluded that it merited further consideration by a three-judge court. The court said:

The equal protection argument advanced by plaintiffs is the crux of the case. Noting that lines drawn on wealth are suspect [citing McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)] and that we are here dealing with interests which may well be deemed fundamental, [citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)] we cannot say that there is no reasonably arguable theory of equal protection which would support a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

121/ Id. at 324.

122/ Ibid.
On remand, the three-judge Federal court concluded that there was no rational basis for the Florida statute. It noted that the statute has resulted in a reduction of more than $50 million in local taxes for educational purposes in 24 counties that had reduced their millage to the 10 mill limit in the 1968-69 school year. The effect of the Florida statute was to tell a county that it could not raise its taxes to improve education even if that is what the voters wanted. The State contended, however, that "the difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality of education." The court labeled this contention "unreal" and noted the disparity created when Charlotte County, using the 10 mill limit may raise $725 per pupil while Bradford County, using the same limit, only could raise $52. The court said:

What apparently is arcane to the defendants is lucid to us - that the Act prevents the poor counties from providing from their own taxes the same support for public education which the wealthy counties are able to provide. [emphasis in original] The court concluded that this distinction did not have a rational basis and could not withstand attack under the 14th amendment. "We have searched in vain," said the court, "for some legitimate state end for the discriminatory treatment imposed by the Act." Since the court struck down the Florida statute for failing to be based on rational distinctions, it concluded that

124/ Id. at 947.
125/ Id. at 948.
it did not have to consider whether education was "a basic fundamental right" which could be impinged upon - even for rational reasons - only if there were some "compelling state interest." 126/

The court recognized the relevance of the McInnis and Burruss cases but distinguished them because here the local boards were restricted in determining the extent of their tax burden for education while in the aforementioned cases this power was delegated to school districts. The court also noted that the relief requested in McInnis required an affirmative calculation of needs while

In contrast, in the instant case, the plaintiffs' argument simply stated is that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a state from allocating authority to tax by reference to a formula based on wealth. Unlike the broad relief sought in McInnis, the remedy here is simple - an injunction against state officials .... 127/

C. Serrano v. Priest

On August 30, 1971, the Supreme Court of California decided Serrano v. Priest, 128/ a decision that is certain to become a landmark school finance case. The California court characterized its decision as furthering "the cherished ideas of American education that in a democratic society free public schools shall make available to all children equally the abundant gifts of learning." 129/ The court summarized its holding in these words:

We are called upon to determine whether the California public school financing system,

126/ Ibid.
127/ Id. at 949.
129/ Id. at 626, 487 P. 2d at 1266.
with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitating the present method of financing. We have concluded, therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause. 130/

1. The California school financing scheme.

The Serrano suit was brought by Los Angeles County public school children and their parents. The children claimed that the State financing scheme created substantial disparities in the quality and extent of educational opportunities offered throughout the State. The parents claimed that as a result of the financing method they are required to pay a higher rate than taxpayers in other districts in order to obtain the same or lesser educational opportunities for their children. It was contended that this discrimination violated the equal protection clause on several grounds. 131/

130/ Id. at 604, 487 P. 2d at 1244.

131/ Among the equal protection violations claimed were the following: a) quality of education is a function of wealth of parents and neighbors as measured by tax bases; b) quality of education is a function of geography; c) failure to take into account varied educational needs; d) children in some circumstances not provided with equal educational resources; e) use of "school district" as a unit of differential allocation of funds is not reasonably related to legislative purpose to provide equal educational opportunities; f) "A disproportionate number of school children who are black children, children with Spanish surnames, children belonging to other minority groups reside in school districts in which a relatively inferior educational opportunity is provided." Id. at 604 n. 1, 487 P. 2d at 1244.
In California, over 90 percent of school funds come from two sources: local district taxes on real property (55.7%) and the State School Fund (35.5%). The amount of local taxes a district can raise depends upon its tax base - i.e., the assessed valuation of real property within its borders - and the rate of taxation within the district. In 1969-70, for example, the assessed valuation per pupil ranged from a low of $103 to a high of $952,156. Districts have great leeway in setting tax rates.

State aid is distributed under a foundation program similar to the one in Illinois, described in the McInnis case. The California program assures that each district will receive annually, from State or local funds, $355 for each elementary school pupil and $488 for each high school pupil. Every district receives "basic state aid" of $125 per pupil, regardless of the relative wealth of the district. "Equalization aid" is provided to a district if its local tax levy - computed at a hypothetical tax rate - plus its basic grant is less than the foundation minimum. Equalization aid guarantees to poorer districts a basic minimum revenue, while wealthier districts are ineligible for such assistance.

Despite State aid, wide differentials remain among districts. For example, in the 1968-69 school year, the Baldwin Park Unified School District, with assessed valuation per child of $3,706, spent $577.49 per pupil; the

132/ See text accompanying note 100-supra.

133/ To make this computation, it is assumed that each district taxes at a rate of $1 on each $100 of assessed valuation in elementary school districts and $.80 per $100 in high school districts. This is simply a "computational" tax rate used to measure the relative wealth of the district for equalization purposes. 5 Cal. 3d at 593.

Basic state aid, which is distributed on a uniform per pupil basis to all schools irrespective of wealth, widens the gap between rich and poor districts. Beverly Hills as well as Baldwin Park, receives $125 from the State for each of its students.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment Violation

In testing the California school finance structure against the equal protection clause, the California court said it would follow the two-level test used by the Supreme Court. Economic regulations have been presumed constitutional; all that is required is that the distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate State purpose. But in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching on "fundamental interests", legislative classifications are subject to a strict scrutiny. In this area, the State has the burden to show that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.

134/ As the California Supreme Court noted: "...basic aid, which constitutes about half of the state educational funds...actually widens the gap between rich and poor districts. (See Cal. Senate Fact Finding Committee on Revenue and Taxation, State and Local Fiscal Relationships in Public Education in California (1965) p. 19.)" Id. at 608, 489 P. 2d at 1248. For example, if the basic aid program were eliminated, Baldwin Park still would receive the same total amount of State assistance through the equalization program alone. Beverly Hills, however, would lose all of its basic aid grant and would not make it up through another State assistance program. Basic aid therefore, is significant only to the wealthier districts. Id. at 608, 487 P. 2d at 1248, Cf. Fleischman Commission Report op. cit. supra note 12 at 2.8.
a. Wealth as a Suspect Classification

Applying this test, the California court first considered whether it was appropriate to regard wealth as a "suspect classification." It answered affirmatively, relying principally on the Supreme Court decisions in Harper v. Virginia Board of Election and McDonald v. Board of Election. The California court found it "irrefutable" that the State financing system classifies on the basis of wealth. The court conceded that the amount of money raised locally is also a function of the tax rate and, consequently, poor districts could attempt to equalize disparities in tax basis by taxing at higher rates. Practically, however, poor districts never could levy at a rate sufficient to compete with more affluent districts. For example, Baldwin Park citizens, who paid a school tax of $5.48 per $100 of assessed valuation in 1968-69, were able to spend less than half as much on education as Beverly Hills residents, who were taxed only $2.38 per $100. "Thus," the California court said, "affluent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all." 138/

The court rejected the defendants' argument that classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the district, not the individual. The court said:

135/ Serrano v. Priest op. cit. supra note 128 at 597.
138/ Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 600.
We think that discrimination on the basis of district wealth is equally invalid. The commercial and industrial property which augments a district's tax base is distributed unevenly throughout the state. To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make the quality of a child's education dependent upon the location of private, commercial, and industrial establishments. \footnote{omitted} Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational financing. \footnote{Id. at 601.}
The defendants also argued that different levels of educational expenditure do not affect the quality of education. The plaintiffs' complaint, however, alleged that expenditures did affect the quality of education. Because of the procedural posture of the case, the California Supreme Court accepted the plaintiffs' allegation as true.

140/ The defendants had filed general demurrers to the plaintiffs' complaint asserting that none of the claims stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Id., at 605, 487 p. 2d at 1245. In these circumstances, the issue in the case is not the merits of what the plaintiffs contend but whether the situation described in the complaint, if true, would result in a legal remedy. A party demurring to a complaint—or moving to dismiss the complaint—in effect accepts everything stated in the complaint as true but contends, nevertheless, that there is no violation of the law.

141/ Id. at 591, 601 n. 16. The court noted that there is considerable controversy among educators over the relative impact of educational spending and environmental influences on school achievement. For an excellent summary of the studies on this question, see Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1378-1388. The court also noted that other courts had considered contentions similar to the defendants and had rejected them. Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 601 n. 16. In addition to the cases and authorities cited by the court, see Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, No. L-18704-69, pp. 37-39 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1971); Coleman, "A Brief Summary of the Coleman Report", Equal Educational Opportunity 253, 259 (1969); Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wealth 425-33; Bowles, "Towards Equality of Educational Opportunity", Equal Educational Opportunity 115 (1969); Testimony of David Selden, Equal Education Opportunity Hearings pt. 16B, at 6727; Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, State Aid to Local Government 44 (1969). A recent study by a group of researchers at Harvard University headed by Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan reaffirms the central findings of the Office of Education's 1966 report, Equality of Educational Opportunity--
(continued) known as the Coleman Report—that academic achievement depends more on family background than what happens in the classroom. Christopher Jencks, one of the authors of the report, contends that "the least promising approach to raising achievement is to raise expenditures, since the data gives little evidence that any widely used school policy or resource has an appreciable effect on achievement scores." On Equality of Educational Opportunity, edited by Mosteller and Moynihan 42 (1972). The study raises "the question whether a social strategy designed to increase the incomes of lower-class families by raising occupational levels or wage rates, by tax exemptions or income supplementation, might not in the end do more to raise levels of educational achievement than direct spending on schools." Id. at 50. Jencks concludes that the most promising alternative for raising achievement "...would be to alter the way in which parents deal with their children at home. Unfortunately, it is not obvious how this could be done. Income maintenance, family allowances, etc., seem a logical beginning." Id. at 43. In this regard the study names as a recommendation "...increased family-income and employment-training programs, together with plans for the evaluation of their long-run effects on education." Id. at 56.

Shortly after the President's televised address on March 16, 1972, calling for a moratorium on school busing and compensatory education to help disadvantaged children, HEW issued a publication called The Effectiveness of Compensatory Education: Summary and Review of the Evidence, which concluded "that the concentrated compensatory education program proposed by the President is a sound investment for the Nation at this time." Id. at 6. With respect to whether or not compensatory education can work the study stated that "the evidence...is definitely encouraging." Id. at 11. On the question of how closely effective compensatory education is related to increased expenditures, the report noted that "the evidence, and therefore our conclusion, is much less clear." It stated further, "that an effective compensatory education program will indeed require significant additional resources..." But the study cautioned that "there is also an upper boundary of marginal costs, beyond which one would probably be wasting money in the application of compensatory resources." Id. at 11.

C.f. Bradley v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Vir. 1972) where the court found that schools attended by a disproportionate number of black students are perceived as inferior by
The court cited evidence that "self-perception is affected by a pupil's notion of how he is being dealt with by the persons in power" (Id. at 209) and that 'teachers' conceptions of the schools in which they hold classes are affected by the racial and economic status of their schools. There is a much stronger tendency toward a negative view of school and students in the mostly black and deprived schools than in the mostly white and advantaged schools." (emphasis added) Id. at 210. Perhaps this suggests that students who attend physically inferior schools develop unfavorable self-perceptions and that teachers who teach in such schools have low expectations of their students. See also Berke and Kelly, "The Financial Aspects of Equality of Educational Opportunity" op. cit. supra note 20 at 39: "...we are firmly convinced that while more money alone will not solve the crisis in educational quality, lessening the resources available to educators is even less effective in improving education. In short, while more money by itself is not the sole answer to improving the quality of education available to all Americans, it seems to be far more effective than whatever factor may be considered second best. For money buys smaller classes, improved teaching devices, experimentation, new schools to achieve integration, counseling services or near-clinical personnel usage, or whatever other techniques research, development, and practice find to be most promising.

But even aside from the question of educational effectiveness, we have little patience with those who ask us to prove, as a condition precedent to reform, that achieving greater equity in the raising and the distribution of revenues will result in improved performance in the schools. For the end result of throwing roadblocks in the way of change is to support the maintenance of the system of educational finance we have described in this report, a system which regularly provides the most lavish educational services to those who have the highest incomes, live in the wealthiest communities, and are of majority ethnic status. In our eyes, this situation is the very definition of inequality of educational opportunity. For a Nation which has aspirations toward achieving an educated, humane, prosperous, and democratic society, reversing that inequitable pattern of educational resource distribution must be at least as high an educational priority as the development of new and more effective ways to help all children to learn." The Fleischmann Commission likewise concluded that "...The amount of money expended does make a meaningful difference in the quality of education." Fleischmann Commission Report op. cit. supra, note 12 at 2.2.
Finally, the defendants argued that whatever discrimination might exist in California was *de facto* discrimination i.e., it resulted from factors over which the State had no control or responsibility. The court, summarily rejecting this contention, noted that "...we find the case unusual in the extent to which governmental action is the cause of the wealth classifications." 142/ The court cited with approval this description of State involvement in school financing inequalities:

\[\text{The states have determined that there will be public education, collectively financed out of general taxes; they have determined that the collective financing will not rest mainly on a statewide tax base, but will be largely decentralized to districts; they have composed the district boundaries, thereby determining wealth distribution among districts; in so doing, they have not only sorted education consuming households into groups of widely varying average wealth, but they have sorted non-school - using taxpayers - households and others - quite unequally among districts; and they have made education compulsory. 143/}\]

142/ Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 603.

143/ Id. at 603 n. 19, quoting from Michelman, "The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment", 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 50, 48 (1969). For a further discussion of the responsibility of the state toward public education see, 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 260-261 (1967); Kirp, op. cit. supra note 27 at 164-65; Silard and White, op. cit. supra note 59 at 8-9; Robinson v. Cahill, op. cit. supra note 11 at 67; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958); Bradley v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 338 F. supp. 67 (E.D. Vir. 1972
b. Education as a fundamental interest

The California court held that not only was the discrimination in this case related to a "suspect classification", i.e., wealth, but it also encroached upon a "fundamental interest" i.e., education. The court recognized that there was no direct authority supporting the argument that education is a fundamental interest which may not be conditioned on wealth, although there are suggestions to that effect in some court opinions. 1447 Education, however, plays an indispensable role in the modern industrial state since

...first, education is a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social success in our competitive society; second, education is a unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in political and community life....Education is the lifeline of both the individual and society. 1457

In many respects, the court found, education may have greater social significance and a more far ranging impact than the rights of defendants in criminal cases and the right to vote - two "fundamental interests" which the Supreme Court already has protected against discrimination based on wealth. 1467 "We are convinced," the court concluded, "that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest'." 1477

1447 Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 604 n. 22.

1457 Id. at 605.

1467 The court elaborates on this proposition. Id. at 607-609.

1477 Id. at 608-609. For further discussion of education as a "fundamental interest" see, e.g. Kirp, op. cit. supra note 27 at 140: Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967).
c. The absence of a compelling State interest

The State argued that despite the discriminations involved in the California school financing system, the structure was necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, i.e., "to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public education". The court disagreed. First, it argued that no matter how public education is financed, it still would be possible to leave decision making over school policy in the hands of local districts. Second, local fiscal control is an illusion is a major determinant of how much it can spend on schools; in fact, the system deprives less wealthy districts of local fiscal control. Accordingly, the court concluded:

We find that such financing system as presently constituted is not necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest. Since it does not withstand the requisite "strict scrutiny," it denies to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated the equal protection of the laws.

Nor did the court agree that its holding was barred by the Supreme Court's summary affirmances in the McIntiiss and Burruss cases.

148/ Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 610.
149/ Ibid.
150/ Id. at 611.
151/ Id. at 614-615. The court also rejected the State's contention that the Constitution did not require territorial uniformity of State programs and that if wealth could not determine the quality of public education, the same rule must be applied to all tax-supported public services. Id. at 611-614.
152/ See discussion of McIntiiss and Burruss, supra notes 100 and 101.
The court extensively analyzed those cases and distinguished them largely on the grounds that in Serrano the court was being asked to invalidate discrimination on the basis of wealth while in McInnis and Burruss "plaintiffs repeatedly emphasized 'educational needs' as the proper standard for measuring school financing against the equal protection clause." 153/

D. Other Recent Cases 154/

1. Minnesota's system of financing public education - structurally indistinguishable from the California system - was challenged in Van Dusatz v. Hatfield. 155/ The court, resting squarely on Serrano, reached a similar conclusion. Describing the financing system in Minnesota, the court said:

To sum up the basic structure, the rich districts may and do enjoy lower tax rates and higher spending. A district with $20,000 assessed valuation per pupil and a 40 mill tax rate on local property would be able to spend $941 per pupil; to match that level of spending the district with $5,000 taxable wealth per pupil would have to tax itself at more than three times that rate, or 127.4 mills. 156/

The court recognized that there was difference of opinion among educators over the degree to which money counts but quoted from an affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs that concluded that in Minnesota:

The districts having the lowest per-pupil expenditure, which are generally the poorest districts in terms of assessed valuation per-pupil unit, offer an education that is inferior to the districts having the highest per-pupil expenditures. 157/

153/ Serrano v. Priest, op. cit. supra note 128 at 617.

154/ A full list of the cases that have been filed to challenge school financing methods, prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, is included as Appendix F. Since the Lawyers' Committee's January 1972 list of cases filed, records at the Lawyers' Committee indicated that the following additional cases have been filed:
Farmers Education Cooperative Union v. Kuddert No. 4001 (D. South Dakota 1972)

Dade County Classroom Teachers Association vs. State Board No. 1687 (Circuit Court Florida 1971)


R. I. Doorley v. Rhode Island No. 4881 (Dist. Ct.)

Spencer v. Mallory No. 20058-2 (W.D. Miss. 1972)

Bellow V. Wisconsin (Circuit Court Wisconsin 1972)

Battle v. Cherry No. 15228 (N.D. Georgia 1972) (action dismissed)

Olsen v. Oregon No. 72-569 (Circuit Court Lane County Oregon 1972)

Martwick v. Illinois No. 297 (Circuit Court Cook County Illinois 1972)

Rothschild v. Bakalis No. C 2863 (N.C. Illionis 1971)

Tax Reform League v. Illinois No. 04 (N.D. Illinois 1972)

Northsore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear No. 42342 (Supreme Court Washington 1972)

Lahaye v. Maine No. 927 (Supreme Court Maine 1972)


Baker v. Strobe No. 2534 (Western Dist. of Kentucky at Owensboro 1971)

Miller v. Nunnelley No. W-85-71 (Ct of Appeals of Kentucky 1971)

Starr v. Mallory No. 753,356 (Cir Ct Jackson County Missouri 1971)

Bedard v. Warren No. c-451 (W.D. Wisconsin 1971)

Net Worth Tax League v. Wisconsin No. c -140 (Eastern Division 1972) Dist Ct.

Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle No. 3998 (Supreme Ct Wisconsin 1971)
In addition, Iowa's system of school financing was challenged in a suit filed on Feb. 22, 1972. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1972, p. 32, col. 3-4.


156/ Id. at 873.

157/ Id. at 874
The court's analysis of the constitutional questions presented to it proceeded along the lines comparable to that in *Serrano*: is a "fundamental interest" involved? has the State used a "suspect classification"? is there a "compelling state interest"? The court observed:

...education...is to be sharply distinguished from most other benefits and services provided by government. It is not the "importance" of an asserted interest which alone renders it specially protected... Education has a unique impact on the mind, personality, and future role of the individual child. It is basic to the functioning of a free society and thereby evokes special judicial solicitude. 158/

This "fundamental interest", the court concluded, is invidiously affected by a wealth classification and:

...the objection to classification by wealth is in this case aggravated by the fact that the variations in wealth are State created. This is not the simple instance in which a poor man is injured by his lack of funds. Here the poverty is that of a governmental unit that the State itself has defined and commissioned. The heaviest burdens of this system surely fall *de facto* upon those poor families residing in poor districts who cannot escape to private schools, but this effect only magnifies the odiousness of the explicit discrimination by the law itself against all children living in relatively poor districts. 159/

Since this discrimination was not compelled by any State interest of sufficient magnitude, it was invalidate under the 14th amendment. This did not mean, said the court, that the only valid system was one involving uniformity of expenditure

158/ Id. at 875.

159/ Id. at 875-76.
for each pupil in Minnesota. All that fiscal neutrality requires is that educational benefits are not distributed according to wealth; the State may adopt one of many optional funding systems which do not violate the equal protection clause. 160/

2. In Texas, a three-judge Federal court, in *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, 161/ relied on *Serrano* in finding that Texas' method of financing public elementary and secondary education violated the equal protection clause. Although the complaint in the *Rodriguez* case, in addition to alleging that the Texas school finance system discriminated on the basis of wealth, also alleged that it discriminated against Mexican Americans 162/ - and all the plaintiffs in the case were Mexican Americans - the court's decision rests solely on wealth discrimination. In Texas, there happens to be a close correlation between financial discrimination and ethnic and racial discrimination. A study of the Texas finance system submitted in evidence in the *Rodriguez* case concluded that:

Racial discrimination is also readily apparent in Texas educational finance. There is a consistent pattern of higher quality education in districts with higher proportions of whites, and lower quality education in districts with lower proportions of whites. In short, the more Negroes and Mexican Americans in the school population of a district, the lower its revenues for education. 163/

160/ Id. at 876-77.
161/ 337 F. supp. 280
162/ See Appendix F.
163/ See affidavit of Joel S. Berke, p. 4.
Texas is perhaps unique in this respect. 164/ For this reason, the Rodriguez court may well have decided to base its decision on wealth discrimination because that was a more universally existing problem, because it could find support in the Serrano and Van Dusartz decisions, and because some commentators have cautioned against basing the school finance cases on racial and ethnic discrimination. 165/

The court, in Rodriguez, notes these financial disparities. A survey of 110 school districts throughout the State showed that while the 10 districts with a market value of taxable property per pupil above $100,000 enjoyed an equalized tax rate per $100 of only $.31, the poorest four districts, with less than $10,000 in property per pupil, were burdened with a rate of $.70. 166/ The rich low-rate districts, however, raised $585 per pupil while the poor high-rate districts collected only $60 per pupil. 167/ The seven San Antonio school districts followed a similar pattern. Market value per student varied from a low of $5,429 in Edgewood to a high of $45,095 in Alamo Heights. Taxes, as a percent of the property's market value, were the highest in Edgewood and the

164/ See discussion accompanying text at note 162 supra.


167/ Ibid. At this point, the court noted that "those districts most rich in property also have the highest median family income and the lowest percentage of minority pupils, while the poor property districts are poor in income and predominately minority in composition."
lowest in Alamo Heights. Yet Edgewood produced from local taxes only $21 per pupil while Alamo Heights garnered $307 per pupil. 168/

The court, employing the same constitutional analysis as that followed in Serrano and Van Dusartz, invalidated the Texas system. 169/
Disagreeing with the defendants that the plaintiffs were calling for "socialized education", the court said: "Education, like the postal service has been socialized, or publicly financed and operated, almost from its origin. The type of socialized education, not the question of its existence, is the only matter currently in dispute." 170/ The court also rejected the defendant's argument that Federal assistance had an equalizing effect. Factually, this was not so, but more importantly, "performance of its constitutional obligations must be judged by the State's own behavior, not by the actions of the Federal government." 171/ The court ordered Texas to develop a new educational financing system and gave it 2 years in which to do so. 174/

168/ Ibid.
169/ Id. at pp. 282-84.
170/ Id. at 284.
171/ Id. at 285.
172/ Id. at 286. On April 25, 1972, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in this case. 40 L.W. 3513 (1972).
3. New Jersey's school finance system was challenged in Robinson v. Cahill. In a lengthy opinion, the court analyzed the school finance scheme in effect at the time the complaint was filed as well as the "State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law" known as the Bateman Act enacted October 26, 1970 and effective July 1, 1971. The later law was the product of extensive study and was intended to provide an equitable system of State financing. The court, however, employing the Serrano analyses, concluded that:

The present system of financing public elementary and secondary schools in New Jersey violates the requirements for equality contained in the State and Federal constitutions. The system discriminates against pupils in districts with low real property wealth, and it discriminates against taxpayers by imposing unequal burdens for a common State purpose.

The New Jersey's courts opinion is too intricate for thorough analysis here. Some of its highlights, however, merit further attention.

The court found a consistent pattern of financing throughout the State:

In most cases, rich districts spend more money per pupil than poor districts; rich districts spend more money on teachers' salaries per pupil; rich districts have more teachers and more professional staff per pupil; and rich districts manage this with tax rates that are lower than poor districts, despite "equalizing" aid.

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174/ Id. at n. 4. Among other things, the formula in the Bateman Act provides greater minimum aid to districts with a high proportion of children receiving assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program.

175/ Id. at 75.

176/ Id. at 17-18.
For example, Newark has a school tax rate of $3.69 as compared with the 1.43 rate in Millburn. Yet Millburn has more teachers per pupil, spends more for teachers' salaries per pupil ($685 to $454) and has more professional staff per pupil. 177/

Valuable commercial and industrial property was unequally distributed throughout the State. One hundred and twelve municipalities with 11 percent of the State's population had commercial and industrial property almost equal in value to that possessed by a group of municipalities containing 39 percent of the State's population. Both groups raised proportionately similar amounts in taxes, but the first group only needed to use a tax rate under 2 percent while the poorer groups required a tax rate of 6 percent or more. 178/ "Yet more of the poorer communities must serve people of greater need because they have large numbers of dependent minorities, that is, blacks and those whose origin is Puerto Rican or Cuban." 179/ It is not, however, only the older, large cities that are penalized by the funding system; many poor suburbs and rural districts also suffer. 180/

177/ Id. at 20.
178/ Id. at 23.
179/ Ibid.
180/ Id. at 27.
The court extensively analyzed the relationship between dollar expenditures and quality of education and concluded that "there is a correlation between dollar expenditures and input (such as teachers and facilities) and between input and output results." 181/

Although the court praised the improvements the Bateman Act made on the school financing system - such as giving special weight to the number of children in a district receiving aid to dependent children assistance - it noted that such factors as "municipal and county overload" still were not taken into account. Said the court:

Poor districts have other competing needs for local revenue. The evidence shows that poorer districts spend a smaller proportion of their total revenues for school purposes. The demand for municipal services tends to diminish further the school revenue-raising power of poor districts. Another general disadvantage of poor districts is the fact that property taxes are regressive; they impose burdens in inverse proportion to ability to pay. This is because poor people spend a larger portion of their income for housing. 182/

The court's order permits the continued operation of the school system and existing tax laws and all actions taken under them. To allow time for legislative action, the court's order is not to be effective until January 1, 1974. 183/

181/ Id. at 30. The court cited testimony of Professor Henry S. Dyer of the Educational Testing Service of Princeton, N.J. that pupil achievement is positively related to per pupil expenditure for instructional purposes. Id. at 37.

182/ Id. at 66.

183/ Id. at 75-76.
The New Jersey opinion illustrates the varied factors that must be taken into account in order to develop an equitable school financing formula and the difficulty of developing such a formula even where a State makes a good faith effort to do so.

4. An Arizona court followed the Serrano trend in Hollins v. Shofstall. The court found the Serrano and Van Dusartz rulings to be "highly persuasive", but appeared to base its opinion on the discrimination suffered by taxpayers rather than by school children. The court found that the amount of money expended per student could be highly misleading and also noted the various devices that were employed to equalize disparities among districts which conceivably could avoid an equal protection violation.

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185/ Id. at 3 (mem. op.).

186/ The court refers to one of plaintiffs' exhibits (Exhibit C) which shows that Roosevelt Elementary School District spends $606.86 per pupil while the 10 districts in the State which spend the most per pupil spend between $2,370.20 to $1,681.32. The court finds it erroneous to presume that the 10 districts provide superior quality of education "when it is considered that all ten are rural school districts which the highest average daily attendance being 75, the lowest 2, the median 12 and the average 22, while average daily attendance at Roosevelt for 1970-71 was 9,700 ..." Id. at 4-5.

187/ "... the amounts a district received from state financial assistance, state equalization aid and federal programs will influence the quality of its educational programs and the amount which must be raised by district taxation." Id. at 4. Cf. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District op. cit. supra note 161 and extent of federal assistance is irrelevant to the State's obligation of equal treatment.
to the court was a comparison of "the amounts per pupil in average daily attendance raised by district taxation to pay for costs of operation and maintenance in different districts and the district tax rates necessary to raise such funds." 188/ The court noted that in 1970-71 Morenci Elementary School District's taxes produced $249.64 per pupil in average daily attendance at a tax rate of $.67. Roosevelt Elementary School District taxed at a rate of $7.14 but produced only $99.04 per pupil. Thus, "[a]lthough Morenci's tax rate was only about one-tenth of Roosevelt's, it produced about two and one-half times more revenue per ADA child." 189/

The Arizona Superior Court concluded:

... the funds available in any given school district for public education are to a highly significant extent a function of the taxable wealth within the district. Arizona's school financing system imposes grossly disparate tax burdens on taxpayers in its different school districts. Taxpayers in a school district poor in taxable wealth are forced to make a substantially greater tax effort to provide substantially less monies for the operation of their schools in comparison with what is required of taxpayers in a district rich in taxable wealth. (emphasis added) 190/

188/ Hollins v. Shofstall, op. cit. supra note 18 at 5.
189/ Ibid.
190/ Id. at 5-6. Cf. Robinson v. Cahill, op. cit. supra note 11 where the court also found discrimination against taxpayers.
5. A departure from the Serrano trend is noted in the decision of the New York State Supreme Court in Spano v. Board of Education of Lakelank Central School District #1. 191/ The court there concluded that it was bound by the McInnis and Burruss decisions 192/ and took exception to the reasoning of the California court in Serrano in distinguishing those decisions. 193/ In addition, the court feared that if it were to allow this case to go to trial, 194/ it would "render a grievous, if not irreparable disservice to public school education." 195/ The court's concern was based on assertions by counsel for school district that as a result on the filing of this case the market for its school bonds, as well as those of other districts, was in turmoil. 196/ Accordingly, the court dismissed the case and concluded:

"One scholar, one dollar" - a suggested variant of the "one man, one vote" doctrine proclaimed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 - may well become the law of the land. I submit, however, that to do so is the prerogative and within the "territorial imperative" of the Legislature or, under certain circumstances, of the United States Supreme Court. 197/

192/ See text accompanying notes 100-118 supra.
193/ See text accompanying notes 128-153 supra.
194/ As in Serrano, the court was considering the adequacy of the complaint and not the merits of the case.
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\[196/\] Ibid.  
\[197/\] Id. at 235.
Chapter IV. WHITHER SERRANO?

The spate of recent school finance cases undoubtedly will present the United States Supreme Court with another opportunity to consider whether disparities in educational financing violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The three-judge court decision in the Rodriguez case will be the first to reach the Supreme Court. 198/
The Court might choose to summarily reverse Rodriguez and cite its decisions in McInnis and Burruss as authority. This could suggest that the Court regards the equal protection contentions in the school finance cases as settled and not warranting full review. On the other hand, it might indicate that despite the nature of the requested relief in the current cases, *i.e.*, a negative declaration against discrimination based on wealth rather than an affirmative order to provide educational resources on the basis of "needs," the Court - as probably was the case in McInnis and Burruss - continues to regard school finance cases as nonjusticiable because of the unmanageability of the requested relief.

It is difficult to view the equal protection claims in these cases as insubstantial but it is not difficult to imagine that a court, reluctant to play an "activist" role, would decline to immerse

198/ See note 109 supra for a discussion of appeals in three-judge court cases.
itself in the complexities of controversies surrounding the school finance question. Perhaps the Court would prefer to remain out of the "educational thicket" just as, in the reapportionment area before Baker v. Carr, 199/ it preferred to avoid the "political thicket." One reason for the Court's eventual willingness to adjudicate reapportionment cases was the unlikelihood of relief emanating from any other source. 200/ Neither State courts nor State legislatures showed any inclination to correct the inequities typical of most legislative and congressional apportionment.

The school finance area presents a somewhat different situation. State courts have been willing to act 201/ and have found violations of State constitutions as well as the Federal Constitution. 202/ State legislatures, 203/ as well as State Executives, 204/ also have demonstrated

199/ 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This decision contains an extensive discussion of the "justiciability" issue.

200/ See Mr. Justice Clark concurring in Baker v. Carr, Id. at 258-59.


203/ In Minnesota, the plaintiffs in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, op. cit. supra note 155 agreed to dismiss their suit, without prejudice, in December 1971 because they believed that the State's revised school aid formula, passed by the legislature on Oct. 30, 1971, while not meeting the "strict constitutional standard set forth in the Court's Oct. 12 memorandum...it appears that... is considerably closer to meeting the constitutional standard of fiscal neutrality than the previous statute." See Lawyers' Committee tabulation, Appendix F. In California, five major reform proposals are being considered. See Levin, et. al., op. cit. supra note 4 at 10-12. More than one-third of the States have some kind of serious self-analysis under way. See Myers, "School Finance: A return to 'State Pre-eminence'," 6 City (No. 2) 6 (1972).

204/ In New York State, Governor Rockefeller appointed a Commission on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education to explore this area.
that they are sensitive to the inequitable manner in which educational resources are distributed. The Federal Government, moreover, is involving itself with this question and there have been recent proposals for greater Federal efforts to help reform educational financing. 205/

It is possible, therefore, that the Supreme Court might choose to curtail the role of Federal courts in this area.

The interests at stake in the school finance controversy, however, are so basic that it would seem necessary for the Court to define the rights involved and order rapid remedial action - a course it could take without necessarily stipulating in detail just what plan should be adopted. 206/

Assuming, therefore, that the Court chooses to regard its affirmances in McInnis and Burruss in the limited manner suggested by Serrano, it could fully consider the merits in the Rodriguez case. A decision to affirm the lower court might be narrowly based. 207/ The Supreme Court could analyze the Texas school finance system in terms of its impact on Mexican

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206/ In Baker v. Carr, op. cit., supra note 199 at 226 the Court rejected the argument that manageable judicial standards could not be fashioned and said: "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." (emphasis in original)

207/ When passing on constitutional questions, the Court generally prefers to limit its decision as narrowly as possible, See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Americans and conclude that there has been a denial of equal protection. 208/ Or the Court could directly face, as did the Texas Court, the question of whether an educational financing system that distributes its benefits in relation to wealth violates the 14th amendment. A decision on the merits undoubtedly would involve application of the "rational basis" or "compelling State interest" tests.

We already have seen how these tests developed and how they have been applied in the recent school finance cases. Serrano treated the "compelling interest" doctrine as an established member of the Supreme Court household of adjudicatory formulas. If that doctrine retains its vitality, it is likely that most present school finance systems will be found wanting under the equal protection clause. The Court has recognized wealth as a "suspect" classification and the arguments seem compelling to classify education as a "fundamental interest." Once either or both of these categorizations are made, it would seem unlikely for the Court to recognize any "compelling State interest" to continue the present inequities. We now will review briefly recent Supreme Court decisions that relate to these tests and criteria that undoubtedly will figure prominently in the argument of the Serrano issue before the Court.

A. Recent Supreme Court Decisions.

Dandridge v. Williams, 209/ suggests the Court is reluctant to add to the class of "fundamental interests" and adverse to treating all wealth

208/ As noted supra viewing school finance disparities in terms of racial and ethnic discrimination is infinitely more complex and less generally applicable than a wealth analysis.

distinctions as "suspect". Here the Court concluded that even in cases involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," it will apply the "rational basis" test absent some improper or "suspect" classification. This case involved a challenge to Maryland's administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program. Maryland, through a "maximum grant regulation," imposed a limitation on the size of assistance grant any one family unit could receive. The effect of this regulation was to provide families of six or fewer members with assistance sufficient to meet their determined standard of need fully, but "to deny benefits to additional children born into a family of six, thus making it impossible for families of seven persons or more to receive an amount commensurate with their actual need...." 

The Court majority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, described

210/ Id. at 485.

211/ It is not entirely clear how large a family unit must be before it receives less than the subsistence allowance. See Id. at 509 n. 2.

212/ Id. at 490.
the issue before it in these words:

...we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation results in some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families. (emphasis added) 213/

Applying the traditional equal protection test, the Court concluded that the regulation was "rationally supportable":

In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78. 214/

213/ Id. at 484. The Court disagreed with the district court that the regulation was invalid for "overreaching," i.e., "that it dealt too broadly and indiscriminately with the entire group of AFDC eligibles. The concept of "overreaching," the Court concluded, is applicable when a regulation is challenged as sweeping so broadly as to impinge upon activities protected by the first amendment guarantee of free speech. Ibid.

214/ Id. at 485.
The Court conceded that the cases it relied upon for the traditional equal protection test "in the main involved state regulation of business and industry" and that the "administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings." This difference, however, did not require the application of a more stringent constitutional standard. The Court noted, however, that this case did not involve a contention that the Maryland regulation was infected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it inherently suspect.

Apparently, what most influenced the Court in this case was that the classification involved did not appear too unreasonable. The language of the Court suggests that it was not especially moved by a regulation that resulted "only...in some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families." This distinction between differently situated poor families the Court did not choose to regard

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215/ Ibid.
216/ Ibid. 17.
217/ Id. at 484. The Court noted at one point that the maximum grant regulation affects "only one-thirteenth of the AFDC families in Maryland...." Id. at 480, n. 10. At another point, the Court suggested that absent the maximum grant regulation a family headed by an unemployed person would receive more than one supported by an employed breadwinner earning the minimum wage. Id. at 486, n. 19. See Note, "The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge!" 81 Yale L.J. 61, 80 (1971): "The Dandridge Court may well have reasoned that rather than disproportionately disadvantaging the poor through governmental action, the Maryland statute merely refused to extend assistance on an equal basis to a sub-class of the poor, viz. those with large families." See also Lefcoe, "The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court," 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1384, 1424 n. 140 (1971).
Nor did the Court undertake an indepth exploration of the nature of the interests involved by the regulation, except to note that they were important.

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall rests heavily on the unfairness of the classification created by the Maryland regulation. According to Justice Marshall:

This classification process effected by the maximum grant regulation produces a basic denial of equal treatment. Persons who are concededly similarly situated (dependent children and their families), are not afforded equal, or even approximately equal, treatment under the maximum grant regulation. Subsistence benefits are paid with respect to some needy dependent children; nothing with respect to others. Some needy families receive full subsistence assistance as calculated by the State; the assistance paid to other families is grossly below their similarly calculated needs.218/

Justice Marshall does not find either the "traditional", "rational basis" equal protection test or the "compelling" interest test 219/ satisfactory to an analysis of this case. Instead, he concentrates upon "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the government benefits they do not receive, and the asserted State

218/ Id. at 518.

219/ In describing the application of the "compelling" interest test, Justice Marshall seems to limit it to those instances where it is agreed that a "fundamental right" is involved. Id. at 520. As we have shown, supra, this is just one branch of the "compelling" interest test. The Court also has applied the test when the classification involved a "suspect" categorization.
interests in support of the classification." 220/ As indicated, Justice Marshall regards the classification in this case as improper - "even under the Court's 'reasonableness' test" 221/ - since he views the Government benefits involved as vital and he attaches little weight to any of the State's justifications for its regulation. He concludes:

...it cannot suffice merely to invoke the spectre of the past and to recite from Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. to decide this case. Appellees are not a gas company or an optical dispenser; they are needy dependent children and families who are discriminated against by the State. The basis of that discrimination - the classification of individuals into large and small families - is too arbitrary and too unconnected to the asserted rationale, the impact on those discriminated against - the denial of even a subsistence existence - too great, and the supposed interests served too contrived and attenuated to meet the requirements of the Constitution. In my view Maryland's maximum grant regulation is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 221a/

220/ Id. at 520-21. Justice Marshall's formulation does not differ materially from the "compelling" interest approach used by the court in Serrano where the nature of the classification and the importance of the interest involved were analyzed before concluding that the State was required to show a "compelling" interest for its classification. Justice Marshall concedes that the Court has essentially applied his analysis in other cases "though the various aspects of the approach appear with a greater or lesser degree of clarity in particular cases." Id. at 521, n. 15.

221/ Id. at 529.

221a/Id. at 529-30. The Dandridge decision has been criticized. See e.g., Dienes, "To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication," 58 Cal. L. Rev. 555 (1960); Graham, "Poverty and Substantive Due Process," 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1970); Note, "The Supreme Court, 1969 Term," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1970). Surprisingly, Dandridge was not mentioned by the Court in Serrano. In Van Dusartz, the Court dismissed Dandridge with these words: "One can concede the significance of welfare payments to an indigent and yet accept the result in Dandridge v. Williams, where the Court did not face a suspect classification." Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn., 1971).
In March 1971 the Court decided *Boddie v. Connecticut* 222/ in which indigents challenged the constitutionality of a statute requiring the payment of court fees and costs incident to divorce proceedings. The Court might simply have relied on the *Griffin v. Illinois* 223/ line of cases and held that equal protection is denied when access to the courts is dependent on wealth. This was the course advocated in the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan. The majority opinion of Justice Harlan, however, (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Stewart, and Blackmun), resorted to the "due process of law" standard of the 14th amendment. 224/ Recognizing that "marriage involves


223/ 351 U. S. 12 (1956). See also cases cited at note 122 supra.

224/ The 14th amendment, in addition to proscribing denials of equal protection by the States also provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, complains that the due process clause "has proven very elastic" whereas "rather definite guidelines have been developed" for construing the equal protection clause. *Boddie v. Connecticut*, supra note 222 at 384-85. Cf. *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). ("'The equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.") Generally, invocation of the due process clause has a greater overall impact. When a State law is found to violate due process, the State's attempt to regulate a particular subject is completely circumscribed. "Invocation of the equal protection clause on the other hand, does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact." Justice Jackson concurring in *Railway Express v. New York*, 336 U. S. 106, 112 (1949). There has been a long dispute regarding the meaning and scope of the due process clause. Such questions as whether the clause incorporates all or some of the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights have concerned the Court for decades. Some members of the Court, in seeking to give substance to the command of "due process
interests of basic importance in our society" \textsuperscript{225} and that the State monopolizes the means of dissolving marriages, \textsuperscript{226} Justice Harlan concluded that the plaintiffs had been denied "an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages, and, in the absence of sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action," had been denied due process. \textsuperscript{227} The opinion, therefore, emphasizes the unfairness of lack of access to the courts when marriage is involved; the emphasis is on marriage - not on indigency. The opinion, moreover, recognizes that some interests, here marriage, are of "basic

\textsuperscript{224} (continued) of law," have argued that the 14th amendment was intended to make the provisions of the Bill of Rights -- which are directed at the Federal Government -- also applicable to State action. Other members have favored a selective incorporation approach. See e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968). To those who favor the application of the due process clause on a case by case basis, the test has been one of "fundamental fairness." Duncan v. Louisiana, supra at 186-187. Justice Black, long an opponent of this application of the due process clause, strongly criticized its application in the Boddie case. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra at 392-94. Justice Black also did not regard the charging of fees and costs as a denial of equal protection. Id. at 389.

\textsuperscript{225} Boddie v. Connecticut, op. cit. supra note 222 at 376.

\textsuperscript{226} Justice Harlan emphasized that unlike other contractual arrangements which can be rescinded or amended out of court, the marriage contract only can be dissolved in a judicial proceeding. Parties to ordinary commercial contracts have alternative means of conflict resolution; with respect to marriage, the State monopolizes the only means available for resolving disputes. Thus, persons who seek access to courts to dissolve marriages do so no more voluntarily than a defendant who is in court as a result of being sued. Special protections therefore are appropriate. Id. at 375-77.

\textsuperscript{227} Id. at 380-81.
importance in our society" and that the State requires "sufficient
countervailing justification" to impinge on them. Thus, the Court, in
applying a "compelling interest" test in the due process context, seems
to be developing a dual standard for testing due process claims parallel
to that used in the equal protection area. 228/

228/ For a perceptive discussion of indigency and court access see
Klimpl, "Access to Court: A Fundamental Right?" 4 Col. Human Rights
Law Rev. (1972). Two months after its decision in the Boddie case, the
Court took action in eight cases which seemed to suggest that Boddie was
to be given a narrow application. Review was denied in five cases:
1) In re Garland, 402 U. S. 966 (1971) which involved the right of a
bankrupt to file a petition in bankruptcy without payment of a filing
fee; (But see U. S. v. Kras, 40 L. W. 3385 (1972) where, on February 21,
1972, the Court agreed to review a similar case.) 2) Meltzer v. C. Buck
Le Craw & Co., 402 U. S. 954 (1971) involved a statute that penalized a
tenant double his rent if he went to court to challenge his eviction
and lost; 3) Bourbeau v. Lancaster, 402 U. S. 964 (1971) where an indigent
could not afford an appeal docketing fee in a guardianship action;
involving an indigent who could not post the penalty bond required to
appeal from an adverse judgment in a housing eviction case; and 5)
Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U. S. 964 (1971) where an indigent mother was
denied court-appointed counsel to defend herself against a State civil
suit to declare her an unfit mother and take away five of her seven
children. Two cases were sent back to the lower courts for reconsidera-
where a filing fee was required in divorce cases but an indigent could
obtain an extension of time to pay that fee and 2) Frederick v. Schwartz,
402 U. S. 937 (1971) involving an indigent who could not afford to appeal
a welfare claim from an adverse court decision. In the eighth case,
Lindsey v. Normet, 402 U. S. 941 (1971), involving a situation similar to
the Beverly case, supra, the Court agreed to review the decision below.
See text accompanying note 254 infra for a discussion of the Court's
decision in the Lindsey case. Justice Black disagreed with the Court's
decision in all but the Lindsey case. He argued that if Boddie is to be
the law, it should not be confined to divorce cases but extended to all
civil cases. It would be inconsistent with equal protection to extend
special favors to divorce litigants. According to Justice Black, "... the
decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one crucial
foundation -- that the civil courts of the United States and each of the
States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be
denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he
cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an
attorney.... There is simply no fairness or justice in a legal system
which pays indigents' cost to get divorces and does not aid them in other
civil cases which are frequently of far greater importance to society."
Later in the same month as the Boddie decision, the Court decided Labine v. Vincent, 229/ where it concluded that there was "nothing in the vague generalities of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses which empowers this Court to nullify the deliberate choices of the elected representatives of the people of Louisiana." 230/ At issue was a Louisiana statute which accorded different inheritance rights to illegitimate children, although duly acknowledged, than to legitimate children of a father who died without a will. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, concurred in separately by Mr. Justice Harlan, which concluded that there was no constitutional basis for upsetting the disparate treatment accorded the inheritance rights of legitimate and illegitimate children under Louisiana law. In a strongly worded dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Douglas and Marshall argued that there was "no rational basis to justify the distinction Louisiana creates between an acknowledged illegitimate child and a legitimate one" and that the "discrimination is clearly invidious." 231/

Illegitimate children had received somewhat better treatment in 1968 when Justices Brennan, White, Douglas and Marshall could recruit as allies Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas. In Levy v. Louisiana 232/ and

230/ Id. at 539-40.
231/ Id. at 558.
Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co., 233/ these six Justices, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, found that Louisiana had denied equal protection of the laws in situations involving illegitimate children. In Levy, the Court held that Louisiana could not deny illegitimates the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother; the Court followed standard equal protection analysis and treated this as a case involving "basic civil rights." 234/ In Glona, the Court concluded that there was no rational basis for a law which denied natural mothers the right to recover for the deaths of their illegitimate children. 235/

In both of these cases, Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. 236/ When these same Justices, accompanied by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, constituted the majority in Labine, they narrowly restricted the scope of Levy and Glona noting that "Levy did not say and cannot fairly be read to say that a State can never treat an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring." 237/ Needless to say, the dissenting Justices in Labine relied heavily on Levy and Glona. 238/


234/ op. cit. supra note 232 at 71.

235/ Mr. Justice Douglas wryly commented: "It would, indeed, be far-fetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their death." Id. at 75.


238/ Id. at 550-51.
A month after Labine, the Court again refused to invoke the equal protection clause to invalidate a legislative classification - this time, one alleged to be based on poverty. In James v. Valtierra, 239/ the Court upheld a provision of the California constitution requiring that low rent public housing projects be approved by a majority of the qualified voters in the community affected. It distinguished Hunter v. Erickson, 240/ relied on by the lower court, where the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of a city charter which required that any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could not take effect without approval by a majority of those voting in a city election. That case, said the Court in Valtierra, involved a classi-


240/ 393 U. S. 385 (1969). Perhaps the Court's change of heart toward illegitimates was based on its view of the importance of the different interests affected by the classifications — in Levy and Glona, the right to maintain wrongful death actions; in Labine, the right to inherit. Or perhaps the difference in the decisions related more to the change in the composition of the Court. Nevertheless, the Court's treatment of illegitimates does not necessarily dictate its attitude toward the poor. Illegitimacy, perhaps, can be eradicated if there are sufficient disincentives. The Bible, however, tells us: "For ye have the poor always with you." Matthew 26:11. Justices also have distinguished between illegitimates and the poor. Compare Chief Justice Taney, Lessee of Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet (39 U.S.) 178, 198-99 (1840): "All illegitimate children are the fruits of crime; differing, indeed, greatly in its degree of enormity," with Mr. Justice Byrnes, Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177 (1941): "Poverty and immorality are not synonymous." But see Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 40 L.W. 4460 (1972) discussed infra at p. 92 where the Court returned to the Levy and Glona treatment of illegitimates.
fication based on race while the California law required "approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority." (emphasis added) 241/ The Court placed great reliance on the place of referendums in California's history and concluded that "his procedure for democratic decisionmaking does not violate the Constitutional command that no State shall deny to any person 'the equal protection of the laws'." 242/

Justice Marshall, dissenting for himself and Justices Brennan and Blackmun, found the special treatment of low-income housing in this case to be invidious discrimination based on poverty, prohibited by the 14th amendment and previous Court decisions. 243/ The dissent criticizes the majority for only testing the California law in terms of racial discrimination. "It is far too late in the day," said Justice Marshall, "to contend that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and to me, singling out the poor to bear a burden not placed on any

241/ op. cit. supra note 239 at 141.

242/ Id. at 143. The fact that this case involved a referendum could not have been the principal element motivating the Court's decision. In other situations, the Court has invalidated actions accomplished by referendum. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964). See also Comment, "James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination By Referendum?" 39 Univ. of Chic. L. Rev. 115, 117-18 (1971). One commentator has suggested that newly enacted referendum requirements for public housing will not be sustained. See Lefcoe, op. cit. supra note 217 at 1457. Another commentator has reached a contrary conclusion. See Comment, "James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination By Referendum?" Id, at 127 n. 59.

other class of citizens tramples the values that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect." 244/ 

B. The Implications of Dandridge and Valtierra for Equal Protection.

It is possible that the explanation offered for the Court's decision in Dandridge also is appropriate to Valtierra. 245/ The Court may have recognized the classification at issue as imposing some hardships on the poor but it may not have considered the extent of the hardship great enough to warrant closer scrutiny of the State law involved. 246/ The California law required a referendum only in the case of low rent public housing; 247/ other housing that would benefit low- and moderate-income families was not subject to a referendum. 248/ The Court also may not

244/ Id. at 145.

245/ As noted, the Serrano decision, of Aug. 30, 1971, did not discuss Dandridge. Nor did it discuss Valtierra. Both of these decisions were decided before Serrano -- Apr. 6, 1970 and Apr. 26, 1971, respectively.

246/ See Lefcoe, op. cit. supra note 217 at 1416: "...the Court's opinion was based on a determination that the article was reasonable even though it affected poor people specially." See also Note, "The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge," 81 Yale L. J. 61, 80 (1971).

247/ Nor was it clear that the referendum provision doomed public housing in California. 69 percent of the referendums covering 52 percent of the proposed units had yielded affirmative results. See Lefcoe, op. cit. supra note 217 at 1400.

have believed that access to public housing warranted the same degree of protection as, for example, access to the courts. 249/

In addition to the extent of the harm involved, a second difference between Dandridge and Valtierra on the one hand and the cases in which the "compelling State interest" doctrine have been applied on the other is that both cases involved relatively recent Government programs - public welfare and public housing. The rights of citizens to welfare and housing, unlike the right to vote, to access to the courts, and, perhaps, to education, are not deeply imbedded in our laws or traditions. Valtierra and Dandridge suggest, therefore, that the Court does not believe that the Government has a general obligation to remedy existing economic inequalities or provide an adequate supply of low-income housing. When the Government ventures into these fields, its actions should not be subjected to intensive judicial scrutiny. One commentator has suggested that:

...there are certain limits to the Government's constitutional obligation to further fundamental interests and relieve the plight of racial minorities and the poor, and that when remedial action is undertaken outside the area of constitutional compulsion the stringent judicial scrutiny normally triggered by the presence of fundamental interests and suspect classifications is no longer appropriate. 250/

249/ Public housing accounts for only about 1 percent of the Nation's housing stock and fewer than 10 percent of people classified as in poverty occupy publicly owned units. See Lefcoe, op. cit. supra note 217 at 1423-24. See also Lefcoe, Id. at 1391: "Denying an indigent person the right to a divorce can be regarded as a greater hardship than the one inflicted by /the California law/.

Valtierra, coming on the heels of Dandridge, has created concern that the Court is abandoning its special solicitude for the poor and that the "compelling State interest" doctrine will be allowed to atrophy. One commentator concluded:

...Valtierra affirms once again that poverty or wealth classifications are not being assigned that same station as racial categories.... Valtierra can be seen as marking the end of a doctrinal detour. 251/

Another commentator decried the fact that in Valtierra "the Court may have signaled a retreat from its formerly expansive interpretations of the fourteenth amendment." 252/ Recent decisions of the Court, however, suggest that Valtierra and Dandridge do not necessarily herald a turnaround from the past.

251/ See Lefcoe, op. cit. supra note 217 at 1457, 1458. See also Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1405 where the author states that the Dandridge and Valtierra decisions "cast doubt upon the status of poverty as a criterion meriting particular scrutiny under the equal protection clause."

C. *The Equal Protection Clause Continues to be Broadly Applied.*

On February 23, 1972, the Court reaffirmed its position that the poor are entitled to special considerations when they are seeking access to the courts. The Court, however, refused to hold that the poors' interest in decent shelter is so fundamental as to warrant special Court scrutiny when dealing with State statutes regulating landlord-tenant relations. At issue in *Lindsey v. Normet* 253/ were three provisions of Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute which provided that 1) trials in eviction proceedings were to be held no later than 6 days after the complaint was served, unless the tenant provided security for accruing rent; 2) the only issue that could be considered at the trial was the tenant's failure to pay rent; any defenses, such as lack of repairs, could not be raised; 3) if the tenant lost the case and wished to appeal, he was required to post a bond, guaranteed by two sureties, for twice the amount of rent expected to accrue during the appeal, the bond to be forfeited if the lower court decision was affirmed.

The Court held that neither the expedited trial nor limitation of defenses provisions violated the due process or equal protection clauses. 254/


254/ Due process requirements were met since the proceeding was sufficiently simple that a short notice requirement was not unreasonable and since other types of actions were available to the tenant to raise whatever defenses he had. Nor was equal protection violated because suits under the statute differed significantly from other litigation where the time between complaint and trial is substantially longer and where a broader range of issues may be considered. The potential application of the statute reaches all tenants—rich and poor, commercial and noncommercial. Treating tenants sued for possession of property differently from tenants sued in other types of actions, moreover, is impermissible only if there is no valid State objective. An analysis of the purposes of the Oregon law convinced the Court that "Oregon was well within its constitutional powers in providing for rapid and peaceful settlement of these disputes." *Id.* at 73.
The Oregon statute was found to have a "rational basis." Appellants argued, however, that a more stringent standard than mere rationality should be applied:

...the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home" are fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor and which may be trenched upon only after the State demonstrates some superior interest. 255/

The appellants relied on the "suspect" classification and "fundamental interest" cases. 256/ In rejecting this argument, the Court said:

We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relations are a legislative, not judicial functions. Nor should we forget that the Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property or the income therefrom. 257/

The Court, however, concluded that the double-bond prerequisite for appealing did violate the equal protection clause; it discriminates against tenants appealing from adverse decisions and cannot be related to any valid State objective. The Court relied on those cases which hold that where an appeal is granted to some litigants it cannot be

255/ Ibid.
256/ Ibid., notes 21-23.
257/ Id. at 74
capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others. 258/ Here the Court found the State's justification for the double-bond provision to be "arbitrary and irrational" and noted:

The discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but cannot post the bond is particularly obvious. For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be. The non-indigent ... appellant /in this type of action/ also is confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon. 259/

In separate opinion, Justice Douglas agreed that the double-bond provision violated the equal protection clause. He characterized the interest in one's home as a "fundamental interest" 260/ and proceeded to apply the "compelling interest" test:

Modern man's place of retreat for quiet and solace is the home. Whether rented or owned it is his sanctuary. Being uprooted and put into the street is a traumatic experience. Legislatures can of course protect property interest of landlords. But when they weigh the scales as heavily as does Oregon for the landlord and against the fundamental interest of the tenant they must be backed by some "compelling ...interest." 261/

Justice Douglas, however, disagreed with the majority's view that the expedited trial provision and one-issue-trial requirement of the Oregon statute did not violate the due process clause. The former provision effectively denied tenants' access to the courts, particularly slum tenants; "this kind of summary procedure usually will mean in actuality no opportunity to be heard." 262/ While normally a State may

258/ Id. at 77.
259/ Id. at 79.
260/ Id. at 82.
261/ Ibid.
262/ Id. at 85.
bifurcate trials by considering one issue in one suit and another issue in another suit, "... where the right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be more embracing." 263/

Concern for the poor was expressed by the Court in Lindsey but was not controlling in finding an equal protection violation; discrimination related to wealth, however, was directly related to the Court's finding of an equal protection violation in Bullock v. Carter, 264/ decided the day after Lindsey. Bullock involved a Texas law requiring a candidate to pay a filing fee as a condition for being on the ballot in a primary election. Fees ranged as high as $8,900. 265/

At the outset, the Court recognized it had to decide which standard of review was appropriate. The Court said:

The threshold question to be resolved is whether the filing-fee system should be sustained if it can be shown to have some rational basis, /citing Dandridge and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420/ or whether it must withstand a more rigid standard of review. 266/

263/ Id. at 89. Justice Douglas added: "In the setting of modern urban life, the home, even though it be in the slums, is where man's roots are. To put him into the street when the slum landlord, not the slum tenant, is the real culprit deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend. Then he loses the essence of the controversy, being given only empty promises that somehow, somewhere, someone may allow him to litigate the basic question in the case." Id. at 89-90.


265/ Id. at 138 note 11.

266/ Id. at 142.
As in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 267/ the requirement here had an impact on the franchise since the requirement of high filing fees narrows the field of candidates, thus limiting the choice of voters. And this limitation especially affects the less affluent. As the Court said:

... there is the obvious likelihood that this limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system ...[I]t gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot their own names or the names of persons they favor.... [W]e would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic means. 268/

The Court, relying on Harper, concluded that because of the influence of an impact on the franchise and an impact which is "related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate," more is required than a showing that the law has some rational basis; it is necessary that the law be "closely scrutinized" and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate State objectives. 269/

Applying this test, the Texas law is found wanting. Even under conventional standards of review -- the rational basis test -- the Court considers the Texas law "extraordinarily ill-fitted" to the goals Texas asserts the law is designed to achieve. 270/ The Texas law, the unanimous Court concluded, denies equal protection because:

268/ op. cit. supra note 264 at 144.
269/ Ibid.
270/ Id. at 146.
... Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion of ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some candidates otherwise qualified and denying an undetermined number of voters the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice. 271/

The Bullock case appears to move well beyond Harper. It shows special concern for the interest of the less affluent. While Harper said that a person could not be denied the ballot because of his economic circumstances, Bullock says that economic circumstances cannot be allowed to limit the impact of a person's vote. The analogy to the racial cases is close. The 15th amendment proscribes voting denials based on race and such cases as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 272/ and Fortson v. Dorsey 273/ suggest that devices that minimize the voting impact of minorities will

271/ Id. at 149. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972)--decided the same day as Bullock--where the Court upheld a lower court judgment affording special protections to persons earning less than $10,000 a year who sign contracts that contain confession of judgment clauses which permit creditors to obtain automatically a court judgment in the event the debtor fails to meet the terms of the contract. Again, the Court demonstrated that it is appropriate to consider relative wealth when denials of equal protection are alleged.

272/ 364 U.S. 339 (1960). This case involved a gerrymander which removed black voters from the city of Tuskegee. The scheme did not deprive blacks of the right to vote; it altered the impact of that vote.

not be tolerated. At least in the voting area, therefore, the Court appears to be according race and poverty equal consideration.

The Court also is continuing to apply the "compelling State interest" test. In one of Mr. Justice Powell's first decisions -- Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 274/ -- the Court struck down a statute alleged to discriminate against illegitimates and said:

Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these helpless children but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where -- as in this case -- the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. (Emphasis added) 275/

274/ op. cit. supra note 240.

275/ Id. at 4463. The Weber case returns to the reasoning of Levy and Glona -- see discussion pp.79-80 supra -- and narrowly limits Labine v. Vincent supra at p. 79. Involved in Weber was a claim by illegitimate children under Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation law. Louisiana law relegated the right to recover compensation of unacknowledged illegitimate children to a lesser status than that of legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children. The Court found no basis for distinguishing between unacknowledged illegitimate children and other dependent children. The Court distinguished the Labine case as one involving State control over the disposition at death of property within its borders -- an area in which "[t]he Court has long afforded broad scope to state discretion...." Id. at 4461-62.
D. The School Finance Cases in the Supreme Court.

What do these recent decisions portend for the school finance cases? Obviously, predicting what the Supreme Court will do is risky business, particularly at a time when membership on the Court is changing. It seems safe, however, to predict that the Court will continue to scrutinize, in particular, certain types of legislation that affect persons differently because of their wealth. Although the Court has used language indicating that a classification related to wealth is in itself sufficient to warrant close scrutiny, the cases suggest that close scrutiny will not be accorded unless the discrimination based on wealth affects some other important interest or right.

Generally, when the interest affected comes within the rubric of "political or civil rights," a person's economic circumstances will not be allowed to result even in a minor impairment of his ability to exercise his right. Thus, wealth may not impede the exercise of the ballot nor may it limit a voter's choice of candidates; wealth may not deny access to the courts in criminal cases, nor may it act as a bar in certain civil cases.

On the other hand, when a wealth classification affects an interest that can be labeled "social or economic," the Court's decision as to whether to afford close scrutiny to the alleged discrimination will depend upon its evaluation of the magnitude of the injury.

The failure, for example, to provide large families on welfare with proportionately more funds than smaller families as in Dandridge or the creation of barriers to the construction of some types of housing within the means of the poor as in Valtierra, has not been regarded by the Court as resulting in injuries of sufficient magnitude as to warrant close scrutiny.

In this area, however, matters of degree are significant. Although the Court refused to mandate a particular level of subsistence in Dandridge, it has declared legislation illegal which barred persons from obtaining subsistence, as in Truax v. Raich 277/ and Shapiro v. Thompson. 278/

Similarly, in Valtierra, the Court declined to hold that some types of housing could not be restricted, but where restrictions on housing have been general and widespread, the Court has reached contrary conclusions. 279/

Economic and social interests, therefore, do obtain close consideration from the Court when their invasion is especially widespread; political or

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277/ 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
There are strong arguments for treating education as a political or civil right. Many of the reasons for placing education in a special category have been explored in our consideration of the cases which have

280/ The Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., recently commented upon the dichotomy between political and civil rights and economic and social rights. "The rights of individuals in this country have been largely a collection of political and civil liberties which are rooted in a centuries-old tradition .... But to secure the dignity of human beings more is required than political and civil rights.... Too often we have been dealing with social and economic issues in this country as problems, as the discharge of minimal responsibilities to take care of the needy. When we have asked to provide economic or social benefits, we have viewed such actions as bestowing a privilege. Our people have political and civil rights; in the economic, social, and cultural areas, we disperse privileges. This is too narrow a view.... There is a split in the world between the definitions of rights in the western world and in the socialist world. To socialist governments the great rubric of human rights focuses essentially on economic rights. We, on the other hand, have focused somewhat more on political and civil rights.... To make meaningful the civil and political guarantees under the Constitution they must be extended to economic and social rights." See "Beyond Civil Rights," unpublished remarks of Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh delivered to the American Jewish Committee, May 13, 1971. See also R. Rankin and M. Smith, "State Bills of Rights: Revitalizing Antiques," 2 Civ. Rights Dig. (No. 4) 47, 48 (1969) where the authors note that a provision of the original Puerto Rican Constitution which would have guaranteed certain economic rights was withdrawn because of strong objections preventing Congressional approval.
afforded education special treatment and in our review of the place of education in our society. Significantly, the statements by the Founding Fathers cited earlier emphasized the importance public education played in maintenance of the democratic system rather than the importance it held for an individual in the social and economic areas. As the Court said in *Van Dusart v. Hatfield*:

> Education has a unique impact on the mind, personality, and future of the individual child. It is basic to the functioning of a free society and thereby evokes special judicial solicitude. 281/

281/ 334 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971). The Court argues that the Dandridge opinion supports its special treatment of education. "Even the majority opinion in *Dandridge*," the Court notes, "seems to intimate this by its citation of the decision in *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960) as the exemplar of the Court's commitment to those areas where 'freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights' may be affected. 397 U.S. at 484, 90 S. Ct. at 1161. In *Shelton*, Mr. Justice Stewart for the majority had declared that 'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools,' 364 U.S. at 487, 81 S. Ct. at 251." Id. at 875 n. 10. The Court also found support in the Valtierra decision saying "In another respect Valtierra actually supports the fundamentality of the interest in education. The Court there emphasized the special importance of the democratic process exemplified in local plebiscites. That perspective here assists pupil plaintiffs who ask no more than equal capacity for local voters to raise school money in tax referenda, thus making the democratic process all the more effective." Id. at 875 n. 9. See Coons, *Clune* and Sugarman, "Educational Opportunity," op. cit. supra note 5 at 373-389 where the authors review the special status of education. The authors argue that education should be viewed as a "favored interest"--not as a "right"; to treat education as a right is "preposterous" and will create a "judicial nightmare." Courts would be unable to develop manageable standards. Id. at 373-74. In other areas, however, where interests are regarded as "rights," the courts have had to develop standards and distinguish between degrees of impairment. The "right to vote" involves everything from the denial of the ballot, to dilution of one's vote to limiting one's choice of candidates. See also Silard and White, "Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause," 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 7, 18 (1970).
The Supreme Court has expressed great solicitude for education, noting that "the American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted." There is a strong possibility, therefore, that the Court will accord the same special treatment to education as now afforded to political and civil rights.

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282/ Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). See also Mr. Justice Brennan concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963); "...Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. It is therefore understandable that the Constitutional prohibitions encounter their severest test when they are sought to be applied in the school classroom."

283/ An alternative to treating education as a political or civil right would be to categorize it as a "fundamental interest," as did the Serrano Court. This, however, seems a more porous container than "political or civil right." In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), welfare payments were treated as a "fundamental interest" since many families depend upon them "to obtain the very means of subsistence--food, shelter, and other necessities of life." Id. at 627. On the other hand, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), welfare payments were denied the favored "fundamental interest" caption even though they involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings." Id. at 485. See Mr. Justice Harlan's criticism of the concept of "fundamental interests," Shapiro v. Thompson, Id. at 660-62. Interests regarded as "political or civil rights" almost always receive close scrutiny from the Court when an impairment is alleged; other types of interest may be regarded as fundamental under some circumstances and not in other instances. We have preferred to label this second category as "economic and social rights."
If the Court chooses to regard education as a social or economic interest, whether or not it will afford close scrutiny to educational finance systems will depend upon its evaluation of the magnitude of the injury inflicted by those systems. Just as in Lindsey, where the Court concluded that there is no "Constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality" (emphasis added) or as in Dandridge, where the Court rejected the contention that a person had a right to a particular level of subsistence, so, too, the Court might conclude that as long as a State provides an educational program, it will not become involved in questions related to the quality or level of that program. However, the disparities among districts are of enormous magnitude. Even if there is continuing debate over whether additional money will improve educational achievement, there can be no debate that money buys books, laboratory facilities, pleasant surroundings, and pays teachers' salaries. The disparities in the availability of funds to different school districts are so extreme that resulting injury is inevitable and substantial.

The substantiality of the disparities seems to distinguish the school finance cases from cases such as Dandridge and Valtierra. In Dandridge, the discrimination between large families and small families was relatively modest. In Valtierra, sustaining the California law would not necessarily result in a substantial diminution of housing opportunities for the poor.

These cases might be said to involve classifications based on wealth that impose minimal injury. To be sure, the school finance cases do not involve situations where persons are denied the opportunity to attend school; what is involved is a system which dilutes or diminishes that opportunity. We are not dealing with the type of total deprivations that were involved in Harper and Griffin. School finance is more like Baker v. Carr where an irrational structure resulted in the diminishing of a right. Accordingly, a strong argument can be made that the school finance cases involve injury of a sufficiently significant magnitude as to warrant different constitutional treatment. 285/

Should the Court conclude that disparate educational financing schemes encroach on political or civil rights or, alternatively, that they do substantial injury to an economic or social interest, the burden would be on the State to present a strong justification for the inequities it created. The Court, however, might choose to employ the "suspect" classification "fundamental interest", "compelling State interest" terminology that has developed over recent years, and there is nothing in the recent cases to suggest that the Court has abandoned this method of analysis. In Bullock, the Court recognized classifications based on wealth as "suspect" and required a "compelling State interest" as a justification; in Lindsey, the Court acknowledged that were it faced with a "fundamental interest", the State would

285/ Cf. Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1400. "One could not expect a Court that regarded state imposition of a flat dollar ceiling per family unit in dispensing AFDC payments as presenting an 'intractable economic, social, and even philosophical' problem insusceptible of judicial resolution to look favorably upon claims of legal entitlement to compensatory education or equality of educational opportunity in some positive sense."
be required to demonstrate a "compelling interest" to justify its discrimination. 286/ Both of these cases involved an application of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the Boddie decision represents a Court determination to abandon the equal protection path in favor of a due process framework.

286/ See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 L.W. 4269 (1972) where the Court struck down Tennessee's durational residency requirement for voting and said: "...Shapiro and the compelling state interest test it articulates control this case." Id. at 4272. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, op. cit. supra note 93 at 4306 n. 7 (1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 40 L.W. 4460 (1972), Mr. Justice Rehnquist expressed his disagreement with the Court's practice of applying a more stringent equal protection test to cases where it concludes that a "fundamental interest" is involved. He labeled this approach "devoid...of any historical or textual support in the language of the Equal Protection Clause" and said: "This body of doctrine created by the Court can only be described as a judicial superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution itself." Id. at 4464.
E. Nature of the Relief.

Once the Court concluded that systems of educational finance which discriminate on the basis of wealth violate the equal protection clause, it would be necessary to frame an appropriate order to secure relief. As McInnis v. Shapiro 287/ demonstrates, there are doubts as to the ability of courts to devise manageable standards that a State could be required to implement. In McInnis, the Court was asked to order educational funding that met the "needs" of the pupils in various districts. The more recent school finance cases, however, have urged a negative declaration from the courts. 288/ The courts have been requested to tell the States what they cannot do, not what they should do. For example, in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, the Court concluded that "a system of public school financing which makes spending per pupil a function of the school district's wealth violates the equal protection guarantee of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 289/ The Court did


288/ In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 614, 487 P. 2d 1241, 96 Cal. Repr. 601 (1971) the Court concluded that the California educational finance system "classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's education depend upon the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his parents." (Emphasis added.) Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 argues that if the California Court's decision is interpreted to mean that school districts must be of equal quality, this would be an inappropriate exercise of judicial power. He contends that "a number of considerations based upon educational research and budgetary theory...lend support to the conclusion that the Supreme Court should not hold that the fourteenth amendment requires that the states afford equality of educational opportunity in some positive sense." Id. at 1399.

not prescribe any particular formula for remedying the Constitutional violation; in fact, it deferred action until after the then current session of the Minnesota legislature.

There is ample precedent for the Supreme Court to conclude that a particular type of discrimination violates the equal protection clause without prescribing a specific formula for remedying the violation. 290/ In Brown v. Board of Education 291/ the Supreme Court held that separate but equal public school education denied equal protection of the laws. No specific formula was prescribed for attaining a discrimination-free school system. Rather, the Court deferred ruling on the question of relief. When, a year later, it directed itself to this question, it

290/ Ibid. Also see Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 which concludes that "...the courts should not attempt to guarantee equality of educational attainment. The means through which such a result might be obtained are at present unknown. The courts are an especially inappropriate institution to make such an effort." Id. at 1401. Nevertheless, he says: "Our conclusion that a court should not attempt to insure equality of educational result does not dictate that the court should abstain altogether from protecting against inequality. The inability of a court to state with certainty that particular programs will produce equality of educational attainment does not mean that the court cannot remedy instances of injustices and afford protection against too gross an inequality." Id. at 1401-1402.

merely provided some general guidelines to the lower courts and ordered that plans be implemented for carrying out its 1954 declaration "with all deliberate speed." 292/ In subsequent years, numerous questions arose as to what specific systems constituted compliance with the Court's order, and these issues were considered and resolved on a case by case basis. Similarly, when the Court first ventured into the area of reapportionment, it did nothing more than declare that legislative apportionment schemes that dilute the votes of citizens in particular areas violate the equal protection clause. 293/ It was left to subsequent cases to define more specifically what types of systems complied with the equal protection clause. 294/

The Court could declare that educational financing schemes that discriminate on the basis of wealth violate the 14th amendment. It could be left to future cases to define more concretely what type of systems are in accord with the equal protection clause. 295/ As we

indicate infra, some commentators anticipate that a Supreme Court declaration in this area will set off a wave of reform by State legislatures. This might well make future court action unnecessary. In fact, as we have previously shown, there already has been considerable nonjudicial action directed at equalizing State educational finance systems. Dire warnings preceded and accompanied the Supreme Court's involvement in the "political thicket" of legislature reapportionment. 296/

Happily, the decision did not involve the Court in unmanageable problems. Rather, compliance has proceeded rather rapidly, and our democracy has been considerably strengthened as a result. The consequences of the Court's involvement in the school finance area might well be the same.

CHAPTER V. DEVELOPING AN EQUITABLE SYSTEM OF SCHOOL FINANCING

Reforming the methods by which our schools are financed is not dependent upon the Supreme Court's response to the school finance cases. As we have shown, State courts, legislatures, and executives are acting to assure that the level of education a district offers is not dependent on the wealth of that district.297/

Many formulas are available to the reformers, and the particular formula selected will have varying impact on different segments of the population and sections of the States.

A. Impact on the Cities.

There has been much concern for our financially strapped cities where the poor and the minorities are located in large numbers. The expectation has been that a wealth-free system of school financing would benefit the cities and their poor and minorities. The opposite may be true.

Under the present system of school financing, a school district's ability to raise money is dependent upon the value of the property in the district subject to taxation as well as the tax rate. There are obvious limits on the degree to which tax rates can be raised; therefore, the extent to which a district is property rich is the principal determinant of its ability to raise taxes for schools and other purposes. Under a wealth-free system of financing, educational expenditures cannot

297/ See text accompanying notes 201-204 supra.
be a function of district wealth; property rich districts, therefore, lose the advantage associated with their high property values. Cities face a potential loss of education funds under a wealth-free system because, in general, the assessed value of property per pupil in cities is higher than the average in the State. 298/

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298/ See Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 55. Robert Reischauer, a Brookings Institution property tax expert, has said: "It is an interesting hypothesis that central cities are poor. Relative to the new growth, of course, cities are declining. But in very few cities is absolute wealth declining. It is probably going up slightly in most cities. Cities have real problems, but maybe it's not their fiscal base, but their excessive needs." Quoted in Myers, "Second Thoughts on the Serrano Case," 5 City 38, 40 (1971). A study by the Fleischmann Commission in New York reveals that virtually every sizable city in New York State falls above the statewide median in wealth as measured by property value per pupil. Id. at 40. The poor areas, in terms of taxable wealth, are in the rural areas. Fleischmann Commission, op. cit. supra note 12 at 2.20-2.23.

An analysis of the situation in California distinguishes between slow growth suburbs and fast growth suburbs and concludes that: "Central cities have the highest average per pupil property values for several reasons: their large commercial and industrial base, the small proportion of school aged children compared to the total population, and their high private school enrollment. Slow growth suburbs follow closely behind central cities. Substantially lower per pupil property values are found in rural, smaller city, and fast growing suburban districts. California's rural districts, unlike those in many other states, do not have the lowest property wealth." See Levin, et. al., op. cit. supra note 4 at 15-16.
This phenomenon can be demonstrated by a simple hypothetical. Assume that a State adopts a strict application of the wealth-free system by providing an equal expenditure of $1,000 for all pupils wherever located - in city, rural, or suburban areas. The tax rate required to raise this amount will depend upon the statewide average assessed value of property per pupil. The appropriate rate will be imposed on every district. In districts where the assessed value of property is below the State average, the amount raised will be less than $1,000 and the State will have to make up the difference. In districts where it is above the excess taxes that are raised will be turned over to the State.

Suppose that under the present system "Fun City" is able to raise $1,000 per pupil by taxing at a rate of 3 percent; Poverty Hollow, on the other hand, must tax at a 6 percent rate to raise that same amount. Under our hypothetical, a statewide rate of 4 percent may be required to raise $1,000 per pupil. Such a rate would raise "Fun City's" tax rate by 1 percent. If, in fact, "Fun City" had been taxing at the rate of 3.5 percent in order to spend $1,200 per pupil, under our hypothesized wealth-free system it would find itself taxing at a 4 percent rate and only receiving $1,000 per pupil.

Focusing on two specific cities, we compare urban Albany which has a valuation per student of $57,498 with Carthage, a rural district with a valuation of $14,109. If both districts taxed at a rate of

299/ Fleischmann Commission, op. cit. supra note 12 at 21-22
$.02 for educational revenues, Albany would raise $1,149.96 in local
taxes per student, whereas Carthage would raise only $282.18. Under
a strict application of the wealth-free formula of distribution, both
Carthage and Albany would receive equal expenditures per student.
Albany would receive less than before, because the average valuation
per student in New York is less than Albany's valuation. Carthage, on
the other hand, with a lower than average valuation per student would
receive more than before. If, for example, the average valuation were
$40,000 in New York and educational funds were raised by a uniform
State property tax of $.02, then a student in Albany would receive only
$800 from the property tax revenues. In this example Albany receives
less money for the same tax effort.

An analysis of the effect on the central cities of the 37 largest
metropolitan areas of providing essentially equal expenditures for all
children financed from a broad based statewide tax system of proportional
rather than progressive rates has shown that nearly twice as many central
cities would receive lower expenditures from the States than they now
receive under the existing revenue structures. Coincidentally, in three-
quarters of the cities in these metropolitan areas, school taxes would
rise. For example, in Indianapolis, the tax rate would go from 2.4 to
2.8 while per pupil expenditures would drop from $415 to $377; in Denver,
the tax rate would increase from 3.3 to 4.3 as expenditures declined from
$667 to $507. If, however, the cities were allowed to keep the additional
revenue raised by the higher tax rates, the effect would be significant. In four-fifths of the cases in the largest 37 metropolitan areas, these higher tax rates would have provided the city with more revenue than they will receive under a State distribution system providing for equal expenditures. 300/

Thus, although many cities are losing in assessed value as industry and the wealthy escape to the suburbs, they are still relatively wealthy in terms of assessed value and would be financially prejudiced by a system that provided equal educational expenditures per pupil. 301/ The advantages that many cities have over the average district in assessed valuation, however, is overshadowed by special urban problems that have taken many city schools beyond the crisis stage and on to the verge of financial collapse.

1. Added Educational Costs to Cities.

Larger than average costs strain the budgets of the city schools. Higher teacher salaries, the outstanding budget item, 302/ are necessitated

300/ See Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 65-71. The authors of this analysis cautioned: "The foregoing tax expenditure analysis should, we believe, be seen as a warning to those who uncritically hailed the new cases and proposals that call for State assumption of educational costs by proportional taxes and a reduction of expenditure disparities." Id. at 71.

301/ It should be noted, however, apart from any effect the wealth-free formula has on the absolute amount of funds alloted the cities, the cities have something to gain because use of such a formula would reduce the large differentials in educational expenditures between the cities and nearby suburbs. Competition with wealthy suburban areas for better teachers has been an important source of the cities' high costs for education. See Myers, op. cit. supra note 203 at 41.

302/ A typical public school district spends approximately two-thirds of its annual budget on teachers' salaries. See Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1359. In California, it is 73 percent. See Levin, et. al., op. cit. supra note 4 at 9.
by a combination of a stable and mature teaching staff at the top of the salary schedule and aggressive teacher union activity. For example, Detroit offered a beginning teacher salary in 1968-69 of $7,500. The average for 35 surrounding suburban district was $6,922.\textsuperscript{306} Big cities also usually pay higher wages to nonprofessional workers.

Urban school districts must pay high prices for land acquisition. Urban land is scarce and, therefore, expensive; in the outlying areas, less expensive undeveloped land can often be found. In 1967 Detroit paid an average price per acre for school sites in excess of $100,000; surrounding suburban districts only paid approximately $6,000 per acre.\textsuperscript{306} In the 25 largest cities average land costs per acre are $658,000; in their contiguous suburbs, $3,500.\textsuperscript{306} City school districts also have higher insurance rates, vandalism costs, and maintenance costs for the older school buildings.\textsuperscript{306}


\textsuperscript{306} Report of the Commissioner's Ad Hoc Group on School Finance, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 303 at 8372 at 8372.

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{306} See also Testimony of Dr. Mark Shedd, \textit{Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings}, pt. 16A at 6609-6613.
2. Special Educational Problems of the Cities.

Equal per pupil distribution of education funds, therefore, would not be equal for the cities because it does not take account of higher urban costs. Nor does it take account of the special problems of educating the large number of disadvantaged minority and low-income children found in the cities. One specialist in public education has said of such children: "Their verbal skills may be severely limited; their motivation to do school work may be inadequate; their attitudes may be inappropriate to the traditional classroom context." 307/ That extra needs require additional expenditures was noted by the court in Robinson v. Cahill: "It is now recognized that children from lower socio-economic level homes require more educational attention if they are to progress normally through school. When the additional compensatory education is provided, it results in substantially higher costs." (Emphasis in original.) 308/

Large populations of minorities and poor are found in the central cities. In the 37 largest metropolitan areas, central cities average more than 20 percent black population, while outlying areas contain approximately 5 percent. 309/ The percentage of black students in the schools is considerably higher than in the general population in the cities because of the higher proportion of white students in nonpublic schools and because of larger proportions of nonwhite families with children in core cities. 310/


308/ Robinson v. Cahill op. cit. supra note 11 at 52.

309/ Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 161 at 51.

310/ Ibid.
Approximately half the black school children in the country are enrolled in the Nation's 100 largest systems 311/, located primarily in the cities. In the five Southwestern States of Arizona, Texas, Colorado, California, and New Mexico, 80 percent of the Mexican Americans lived in cities in 1960. 312/ Thus, most Mexican American children are probably enrolled in city school systems.

3. **Higher Noneducational Costs of the Cities.**

A strict application of a wealth-free formula that provides equal per pupil expenditures also fails to take account of the additional non-educational services that cities must support from their property tax revenues. "Municipal overburden" is the term used to express the cities' greater needs for general public services such as health, public safety, sanitation, public works, transportation, public welfare, public housing, and recreation. 313/ Because of municipal overburden, cities devote only approximately 30 percent of their budgets to their schools, as compared to more than 50 percent allocated by the suburbs. 314/ While central


313/ See 1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, 26-27 (1967): "...Cities spend a third more per capita for welfare and two times more per capita for public safety than suburbs, while suburbs spend more than half again as much per capita for education. Suburbs spend nearly twice the proportion of their total budget upon education as cities. The greater competition for tax dollars in cities seriously weakens their capacity to support education. Even though school revenues are derived from property tax levies, which in theory are often independent of other principal taxes, city school authorities must take this greater competition into account in their proposals for revenue increases." See also Fleischmann Commission Report, *op. cit. supra* note 12 at 2.67 -2.70.

314/ Berke and Callahan, *op. cit. supra* note 14 at 54.
cities in the largest metropolitan areas average $600 per capita in total local public expenditures for all services; total expenditures outside central city areas in those metropolitan areas average only $419 per person. 315/

The financial disadvantage imposed on the cities by municipal overburden is illustrated by several specific examples. A study of Detroit and its 19 suburbs showed that when all calls on local property taxes are taken into consideration, Detroit has the highest local tax rate; Detroit's tax rate for schools alone, however, is at the bottom of the list. In Baltimore, one-third of the total local budget goes for schools, while Baltimore County can devote 56 percent of its local budget for schools. In Boston, schools get 23 percent of the total budget, while in the neighboring suburb of Lexington, the figure is 81 percent. 316/


The school finance decisions, however, do not require a system of school finance that will be disadvantageous to the cities. What is proscribed is the distribution of educational resources on the basis of district wealth. The States could employ wealth-free formulas that take account of the higher costs in the city, the need for greater funds to educate the disadvantaged, and the problem of municipal overburden. If the State formula distributed education funds on the basis of a set amount per pupil, it could weigh the calculation of the number of pupils to compensate for higher costs and greater needs in the cities. If it were determined, for instance, that cities must pay 25

315/ Id. at 53.
316/ Myers, op. cit. supra note 203 at 40. See Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 54 for a Table comparing the 37 largest metropolitan areas with their central cities in regard to education expenditures as a percent of total expenditures for the years 1957 and 1970. The table shows that a consistently higher percentage of the central cities' budgets goes for noneducational expenditures. See also Dimond, "Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," 2 Yale Rev. of Law and Soc. Action 133, 135 (1971).
percent more than the statewide average for educational goods and services, then each child in the city would count as 1.25 in the calculation of the total number of pupils. Educational need could be measured in a variety of ways including the number of children receiving AFDC, a program of aid for poor dependent children, or the number of children testing below a certain score on a statewide achievement test. Each pupil receiving AFDC or scoring below a certain level could be counted as 2 in determining the total number of pupils on which aid is calculated. 317/

317/ In Robinson v. Cahill, op. cit. supra note 11 at 45 and 46, the Court discussed a recently enacted New Jersey school finance law, the Bateman Act, which took account of educational needs by assigning AFDC children an additional .75 units in determining the number of children for the school district. Although the Court approved of taking needs into account, it found the Bateman Act inadequate in other respects.

See the report of the National Educational Finance Project, Future Directions for School Financing (1971) which called for "weighting" to meet educational cost differentials. The following sample weights computed in the detailed research of the Project illustrates the concept of weighting to determine the relative costs of educational programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Program</th>
<th>Weight Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic elementary grades 1-6</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades 7-9</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades 10-12</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentally Handicapped</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically handicapped</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special learning disorder</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensatory education</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational-technical</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Id. at 28.

See also Fleischmann Commission Report, op. cit. supra note 12 at 2.17 which proposed that each student who scores in approximately the lowest quarter on third-grade reading and mathematics achievement tests currently being administered in the state be weighted 1.5 as against a weighting of 1.0 for other children. The Commission concluded that "this mechanism would distribute a share of the state's education budget to schools that are characterized by low rates of student progress and are therefore in greater need."  Ibid.
The cities would receive additional funds under either of the above measures of needs. A study of New York State shows that when AFDC is used to determine need, cities have more than three times the proportion of pupils needing more extensive services, and that when need is determined by test scores, the cities have more than twice as many disadvantaged children as noncity districts. 318/

Taking municipal overburden into account would probably involve a more complex formula. One manner of compensating cities would be to make contiguous areas that use municipal services pay a share of their costs. 319/ If the State's new wealth-free system involves a state-wide property tax, municipal overburden could be recognized by imposing on the cities a lower than average tax rate for educational revenue. 320/

318/ Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 59. In the study disadvantaged children included those scoring at least two grade levels behind the State norm.

319/ In Bradley v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Vir. 1972) the court ordered the consolidation of Richmond and its two contiguous counties and noted the manner in which communities bordering on cities benefit from their services. Id. at 179-180.

320/ See Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wealth, op. cit. supra note 4 at 232-242, for a more thorough discussion of how a distribution formula can take into account municipal overburden, particularly under the power equalizing model of distribution.
Two commissions on school finance - the President's Commission on School Finance and the Fleischmann Commission in New York - have recently issued reports recognizing the special financial problems of the cities and recommending that differences in costs and needs be included in any new distribution formulas. 321/

321/ On Mar. 6, 1972, the President's Commission on School Finance issued its Final Report, a product of 2 years work and 32 volumes of studies. The Report discussed the acute problems of school finance faced by the cities. In this regard the Commission made the following recommendations: "...that State budgetary and allocation criteria include differentials based on educational need, such as the increased costs of educating the handicapped and disadvantaged, and on variations in educational costs within various parts of the State." Final Report of the President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People, & Money 36 (1972). "The Commission recommends the initiation by the Federal Government of an Urban Education Assistance Program designed to provide emergency financial aid on a matching basis over a period of at least 5 years, to help large central city public and nonpublic schools...." Id. at 44.

On Jan. 30, 1972, the New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education (the Fleischmann Commission) released the first three chapters of its Report. As a general principle of support distribution, the Commission set forth the following proposition: equal sums of money should be made available for each student, unless a valid educational reason is found for spending some different amount. Fleischmann Commission Report 2.12. As we have noted, supra note 317, the Commission recommended that the distribution formula be weighted to provide additional funds for children having demonstrable learning problems.
B. **Impact on the Suburbs and Rural Areas.**

Wealthy suburban areas might suffer under a wealth-free formula that provided equal expenditures for all students. Because of the high assessed property values in these areas, substantial revenues can be raised at relatively low tax rates. Under a system in which district wealth is not the determinant of educational expenditures, the suburban areas lose their former advantage. In this respect, a wealth-free school finance formula would affect wealthy suburban areas in the same manner as cities with high assessed property values. As we have shown, such cities would receive fewer educational dollars despite a higher tax rate. Rural areas, on the other hand, have relatively low property values. Consequently, they undoubtedly would receive more educational funds under a wealth-free system of school finance.

Reducing educational expenditures where they now are high presents obvious political problems. Districts currently spending substantial sums on education would oppose any formula that reduced their expenditures and at the same time increased their taxes. One way to avoid this problem is to increase substantially overall State spending for education. This was the approach of the Fleischmann Commission in New York which recommended such an increase in overall educational expenditures and a 5 year "phasing in" period in which expenditures to the poorer districts are leveled upward to meet those of the wealthier districts. 323/

322/ Berke and Callahan, *op. cit.* supra note 14 at 61; Berke and Kelly, *op. cit.* supra note 20 at 16.

C. Impact on Minority Group Children and the Poor.

The implication for minority group children of the strict application of a wealth-free formula of distribution among school districts are uncertain. Minority group children live primarily in majority group districts. 324/ The fate of either the majority or minority group living within the same district is dependent upon the district's characteristics - whether it is urban, rural, or wealthy. Since, however, most minority group children reside in cities, 325/ implementation of a strict wealth-free system would deprive them to the same extent as the cities where they live are dis-deprived 326/ For minority group children residing in rural areas, however, the results would be beneficial.

The implications of a wealth-free system for the poor also are dependent upon the characteristics of their particular districts. The large concentrations of urban poor would receive lesser amounts for education. On the other hand, those living in the rural areas would gain.

324/ See note 4 supra.
325/ See notes 311-12 supra.
326/ See also Kirp and Yudof, "Serrano in the Political Arena," 2 Yale Rev. of Law and Social Action 143, 145-46 (1971).
D. Alternative Systems of School Financing.

We have described the effects on various groups of children of the implementation of a wealth-free system which allots equal expenditures for all children throughout the State. The school finance court decisions, however, do not mandate such a system. They proscribe the use of district wealth as a determinant of educational expenditures. The particular choice of a wealth-free system of school finance is left to the legislatures.

There are numerous possible wealth-free formulas - each of which has various attributes and deficiencies. We will describe five of the basic models. Modifications and various combinations of these models form numerous other models.

1. Reorganization of Existing School Districts.

The first alternative is for the State to reorganize existing districts to create new districts with equal tax bases.\textsuperscript{327} This alternative has the virtue of preserving the traditional method of school finance minus its source of financial inequalities.\textsuperscript{328} There are several difficult problems with this approach, however. For one thing it may require monstrous gerrymandering that would in many instances create geographic entities virtually impossible to administer. For another thing, changes in income distribution would almost certainly

\textsuperscript{327} See, e.g., Final Report, The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People, and Money 31-32 (1972).

\textsuperscript{328} See Schoettle, "The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education," op. cit., supra note 13 at 1401, where the author suggests that in the area of school finance inequality, courts should limit their intrusion to requiring a rational distribution of tax base resources for districts. Such action would also have the effect of removing financial disparities between districts in providing other municipal services.
require periodic redistricting. 329/ Furthermore, this model would permit wide variations in educational expenditures per child depending on the rate at which the residents of the school district chose to tax themselves.

2. **Statewide Financing and Administration.**

The second model is the abolition of local school districts and placement of all school administration and financing on a statewide basis. This model runs counter to the American preference and tradition for local decisionmaking and administration in the area of education.330/

3. **Statewide Financing and Local Administration.**

A third alternative is for the State to raise all the funds and distribute them to the local school districts for administration.331/ Under this model children in different districts would receive the same amounts of educational expenditures, except for nonwealth based differentials such as needs and costs. The district's chosen tax rate, however, would not be a source of differentials in expenditures. The full State funding approach was recently recommended by the President's Commission on School Finance and the Fleischmann Commission in New York State.332/

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329/ Final Report, President's Commission on School Finance, op. cit. supra note 327 at 31-32.


332/ The President's Commission concluded: "The Commission recommends that the state governments assume responsibility for financing substantially all of the non-Federal outlays for public elementary and secondary
education, with local supplements permitted up to a level not to exceed 10 percent of the state allocation." Final Report op. cit. supra note 327 at 36.

The local supplement feature recommended by the Commission would reserve to the localities some power to determine expenditures on the basis of wealth. This is the very characteristic of the present system of school finance that is proscribed by the Serrano line of decisions. Neil McElroy, Chairman of the Commission, said that this local payment might fail to meet court requirements. Washington Post, March 7, 1972, at 1, Col. 1. The only way that it could pass muster under Serrano would be on the basis that the 10 percent option was so small that the system remains substantially wealth-free.

New York State's Fleischmann Commission called for full State financing of public elementary and secondary education in order to assure that each student is provided equal educational opportunity and that the quality of his education does not depend upon the property values in the area where he happens to live. The 18 member Commission said that its position on centralizing the funding of the schools "is not inconsistent with the Commission's desire to strengthen local control over many educational matters...(for) it is clearly possible to have centralized financing and decentralized policymaking." See Fleischmann Commission Report, op. cit. supra note 12 at 24. See also Levin et. al., op. cit. supra note 4 at 54.
4. Percentage Equalizing.

Another approach, called percentage equalizing, compensates for differences in local revenue capacity by matching locally raised funds with State funds in a ratio inversely related to district wealth. This method is similar to the widely used foundation plans that attempt to reduce local financing discrepancies with equalizing State grants. However, it provides local districts with financial incentive and full equalization at any level of spending.

A problem with the percentage equalizing model is that in practice the States that have employed it have imposed restraints that substantially reduce the theoretical equalizing effects. Furthermore, percentage equalizing, like district reorganization, would permit wide variations in educational expenditures for children depending on the tax rate chosen by the district.

5. District Power Equalizing.

Finally, there is the system of district power equalizing -- a method that allows differential expenditures among school districts,


while removing the effect of differential tax bases on the expenditures. 335/

Under district power equalizing the State would determine how much each district would be permitted per pupil for each level of tax effort. Districts making the effort but not raising the amount would be supplemented by the State. Districts raising over the set amount would give their excess to the State.

This method is illustrated in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Tax Rate</th>
<th>Permissible Per Pupil Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 mills</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 mills</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 mills</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 mills</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 mills</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The educational expenditures permitted a particular district is a function of the chosen local tax rate, not the district wealth. Consequently, if two districts, whatever their relative wealth established property taxes at the same rate, they would receive equal per-pupil revenues from the State. 336/

"Power equalizing" theoretically has the virtue of allowing local districts to choose various levels of educational expenditures according to their relative interest in education. It would be very difficult, however, to devise a formula to measure true tax effort. 337/


337/ Sugarman states, "I would be the first to agree that while it is quite easy to suggest that wealth should be eliminated as a basis for supporting schools, as a practical matter determining what equal effort really is is very complex indeed." Quoted in Myers, "Second Thoughts on the Serrano Case," op. cit. supra note 298 at 41.
Furthermore, as with note one and four, under "power equalizing" children could receive widely divergent educational resources.

Whatever approaches the various States adopt in devising wealth-free systems of school finance, we can be sure that legislatures throughout the Nation will be grappling with the issue for some time to come. The Commentators and lawyers involved in the cases already have begun to prognosticate about the likely legislative responses. One lawyer cautions: "State legislatures don't move often. When they do, unless we are careful, we can be locked into a formula we don't like for over a decade." Others fear "that the direction that change may take in the post-Serrano period will be that of providing essentially equal expenditures for all children financed from a broad based statewide tax system of proportional rather than progressive rates." /341/

Still other commentators predict that most legislatures will cooperate with a judicial decree ordering a wealth-free system of finance. "The blessings of Serrano are too obvious and the risks too remote." They also suggest the possibility of a favorable Supreme

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340/ Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra Note 14 at 65-66.

341/ Coons, Cline, and Sugarman, "A First Appraisal of Serrano," op. cit. supra note 13 at 118.
Court decision on school finance which would touch off "an explosion of creativity in the structure of education." 341/

A less optimistic commentator suggests that rather than act as laboratories of democracy by experimenting with various creative models of school finance, it is "more likely that the state's drive for uniformity will as usual triumph, and all the States with no good reason will jump for the same remedy." 342/


VI. SOME POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL FINANCE REFORM

A. On Land Use.

Adoption of wealth-free systems of school finance is sure to have extensive impact in the area of education. Though less obvious, there may also be widespread impact on other areas of American life. Its adoption would remove an important economic obstacle to location of low- and-moderate income housing in the suburbs. Suburban residents would no longer be able to resist such housing on the grounds that it would bankrupt the municipality because the cost of educating the children who would live in such housing would far exceed the property tax income derived from it. Removal of the "respectable" economic justification hopefully would provide the impetus to open up the suburbs to all economic classes.

A related land use problem that would be affected by the adoption of a wealth-free system of school finance is the wooing of commercial and industrial enterprise from the cities by suburban communities to gain

343/ Suburbs devote more than 50 percent of their budgets to their schools. Berke and Callahan, op. cit. supra note 14 at 54.

344/ Introduction, "Who Pays for Tomorrow's Schools" The Emerging Issues of School Finance Equalization," 2 Yale Rev. of Law and Social Action 108 (1971). See also Fleischmann Commission Report, opp. cit. supra note 12 at 2.71: "...the property tax dependence is a barrier to effective social class integration....Full state assumption of educational costs would work to break down these unnecessary and damaging barriers," and Appendix 2E, "Impact of Low-and Middle-Income Housing on School District Finance."
taxable property. Such action currently has the effect of putting jobs out of reach of the urban residents who so desperately need them and dotting esthetically pleasing landscapes with offices and factory buildings.

Educational finance reform also could have the effect of decreasing rural migration to the cities to the extent that rural families feel that inadequate and underfinanced schools in rural areas cheat their children of educational opportunities.

B. On School District Organization.

Community control proponents might find support in the adoption of a wealth-free system because poor communities would no longer need to expand the level of educational expenditures by combining with richer areas into a single district. One commentator has said, "/\textit{if} fragmentation no longer means \textit{diminution} of fiscal capacity, the community control movement has become economically credible. It is now difficult to justify the independence of a middle class suburb while rejecting community demands in the inner city." 345/ 

The extent to which the school finance cases will impede or stimulate the consolidation of school districts depends upon the financing scheme adopted. A financing scheme which provides aid independent of local tax effort or local tax base might stimulate rich districts, that are administratively inefficient because they are small, to consolidate with other districts. By remaining small, these districts have managed to

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345/ Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "A First Appraisal of Serrano," \textit{op. cit. supra} note 1 at 121 n. 54.
provide ample funds for education at a low tax rate. They have resisted any programs that would increase their educational costs—such as public housing projects or consolidation with areas with low tax bases. Once a district's tax base is removed as the determinant of its educational expenditure, rich districts might be less opposed to consolidating with other districts if this results in a more efficient educational system.

On the other hand, a wealth-free system of school finance will remove the incentive for poor districts to consolidate with richer ones to obtain a large joint tax base. It has been noted that

/Serrano/ closes out the long movement for district consolidation by subsuming its rationale. If tax bases in a decentralized system must be effectively equivalent through power equalizing, there is no point in amalgamating districts beyond the point of increasing educational efficiency. Currently district gigantism is receiving low grades in this respect... If fragmentation no longer means diminution of fiscal capacity...prima facie /Serrano/ will make metropolitan integration plans more difficult. 346/

But, as we have noted, not all the proposed methods of equalizing school finance operate within the present system of school districts; not all seek to equalize aid within the present framework. Some proposals call for reorganizing school districts so as to equalize their tax bases. This would provide school districts with equal capacity to raise educational dollars. Some of the recent school finance cases recognize district

346/ Id.
reorganization or consolidation as a possible and feasible solution to inequities in school financing.

For example, in *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District* [347/](op. cit. supra note 161) as an alternative to ordering that the State restructure its educational finance system to assure that funds are distributed without regard to a district's wealth, the plaintiffs requested that the court order "the defendant school districts in Bexar County be abolished and that the County School Trustees establish new boundary lines for school districts or districts of approximately equal taxable property per child." [348/](op. cit. supra note 161)

Similarly, in *Robinson v. Cahill, 349/*(op. cit. supra note 161) the plaintiffs requested that the court order the defendants "to change the boundary lines of the districts in a way that will equalize the amount of tax base per student...." [350/](op. cit. supra note 161)

The authority of the courts to order school district consolidation has been an issue in school desegregation cases. Most recently, in *Bradley v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia et al, 351/* Richmond and its two contiguous counties of Henrico and Chesterfield were ordered to adopt a metropolitan student assignment plan that would consolidate city and county school systems in order to achieve racial integration in the schools of the three political subdivisions. The

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347/ op. cit. supra note 161.
348/ See appendix F.
350/ See appendix F.
351/ op. cit. supra note 101.
Court's reasoning in support of its order might well be equally applicable to cases where consolidation is requested to remedy financial disparities. The Court regarded consolidation as the only feasible solution and said:

At present the disparities are so great that the only remedy promising immediate success—not to speak of stable solutions— involves crossing these county lines.

Referring to other cases in which school consolidation was required or the creation of separate districts was prohibited in school desegregation cases, the Court concluded there was ample precedent to support its order and said:

The equal protection clause has required far greater inroads on local government structure than the relief sought here, which is attainable without deviating from state statutory forms. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Serrano v. Priest, 40 U.S. L.W. 2128 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1971).... In any case, if political boundaries amount to insuperable obstacles to desegregation because of structural reasons, such obstacles are self imposed.

School district consolidation also has been an issue in the Detroit school segregation case, Bradley v. Milliken where the court concluded that de jure segregation existed in the Detroit schools. The Court

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352/ Id. at 100 (mimeographed opinion).

353/ Id. at 104-111.

354/ Id. at 103.

emphasized that the obligations imposed by the 14th amendment fall upon the State, 356/ that Michigan's central educational administrators have extensive powers over the State's educational system, including that of school district reorganization, and that State law provides mechanisms for annexation and consolidation of school districts. Although the Court did not order a merger of school districts, it indicated that such a device would be considered in drawing up its final order.

Accordingly, the ordering of school district consolidation or re-districting as a means of equalizing educational expenditures would be within the authority of a court, 357/ and, without question, within the authority of a State legislature. Were a court to seek to equalize, through consolidation, the ability of school districts to raise funds, it would be important for the court to recognize the demands on a district's tax base other than those for educational funds. As we have shown, "municipal overburden" places great strains on the revenues raised by cities. In order to insure that districts have equal capacity to raise funds for education, the size of the district's tax base must be adjusted

356/ See also notes 23 and 171 supra.

357/ See Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1411: "The scheme by which tax bases are arbitrarily parceled out among different municipal jurisdictions, while perhaps necessary in an earlier era when records and data were not available, presently has no reasonable justification.... In this respect, the present inequalities are analogous to the unequal distributions of voting power that preceded Baker v. Carr."
to insure that other unequal demands are taken into account. Thus, a system designed to eliminate fiscal disparities between districts would not necessarily result in uniform tax bases; the tax bases would have to be adjusted to provide adequate funds to meet each district's particular needs.

\[358/\] See Schoettle, Ibid. : "Though education accounts for the major expenditures of local governments, there is no justification—once the focus has been shifted from education to fiscal disparities—for restricting the requirement of a rational distribution of tax base to school districts. Other mal-distributions are equally significant and equally offensive." See also Robinson v. Cahill, op. cit. supra note 11 at 66: "Even if districts were better equalized by guaranteed valuations, the guarantees do not take into consideration 'municipal and county overload'. Poor districts have other competing needs for local revenue."
VII. THE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES: RELATED PROBLEMS

A. The Property Tax.

A frequent misinterpretation of the school finance cases is that they invalidate the use of the local property tax as a source of revenue for educational finance. The focus of the cases, however, is on unequal educational expenditures; property taxes are important to the decisions only as they relate to unequal expenditures. The school finance cases permit

359/ In Serrano the court upheld the plaintiff parents' cause of action which, in addition to incorporating the children's claim, also alleged that under the current financing scheme they are required to pay a higher rate than taxpayers in many other districts in order to secure for their children the same or lesser educational opportunities. The court upheld this second claim on the basis that it seeks to prevent public officials from acting under an allegedly void law and "if the...law is unconstitutional, then county officials may be enjoined from spending their time carrying out its provisions." (citations omitted) Serrano v. Priest op. cit. supra note 10 at 618. Therefore, the parents' claim against public officials apparently depends on a favorable holding in regard to the children's second claim of differential educational opportunities based on wealth. The Court does not hold that the system of collection and administration of the property tax is itself valid.

Further, the Court's statement in the second line of its opinion also shows that discriminatory expenditures, not property taxes, were the evil proscribed by the Court. "We have determined that this funding scheme individually discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." Id. at 589.

It also should be noted that the parents' cause of action, complaining of higher property taxes, if made independent of the children's claim for equal expenditures, would not fall under the fundamental interest doctrine used by the Court in reaching its decision.

In Hollins v. Shofstall op. cit. supra note 18 at 3, 4 the Court apparently upholds the taxpayers' claim. Although the Court's reasoning and holding is unclear on this issue, it seems to follow Serrano in linking taxation with expenditures in a way that does not require the elimination of the property tax.
continued reliance on the property tax so long as the distribution of revenues collected are free of any wealth criteria.

Nevertheless, the school finance cases may provide an important impetus for property tax reform. These cases highlight the extensive use of property taxes and they make a dramatic and reasoned appeal for the removal of financial inequities in school finance. Further pursuit of dragons of inequity will lead to the lair of the property tax.

Property taxes are the principal local source of revenue for all local government, not merely the schools. 360/ Nationwide they produce $33 billion in tax revenues. 361/ Ninety-five percent of all education tax revenue comes from the property tax or $17.4 billion, out of a total of $18.4 billion. 362/

As a source of local school support, the property tax has three major deficiencies. It is a poor measure of ability to pay since today wealth is measured in terms exceeding the amount of real estate a person may own. 363/

360/ J. Kelly, Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings pt. 16D-1 at 7470.
361/ S. Carey, Id., pt 16B at 6875.
362/ Final Report, Pres. Comm'n on School Finance, op. cit. supra note at 27. In New York State, however, in the 1969-70 school year 47.5 percent of all revenue for public elementary and secondary education from non-Federal sources was derived from the local property tax. Fleischmann Commission Report op. cit. supra note 12 at 2.26.
363/ "When we were a Nation largely of farmers and home owners, real estate comprised the bulk of the wealth and offered a valid basis for taxation. Wealth could reasonably be measured by holdings of real estate..."

"But the growth of manufacturing and other industries, the relative decline in the importance of agriculture, the migrations to cities and to suburbs have created enormous imbalances in this traditional system. Real estate is no longer the fundamental measure of the ability of people to pay for government services or of their need for them." Id. at 28. See also Comment, "The Evolution of Equal Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth," op. cit. supra note 70 at 111.
It is regressive since families in the lower-income brackets pay a larger percentage in property taxes than do those in higher brackets. 364/ Improper administration of the property tax in most States has resulted in a multiplication of further inequities. 365/ Although two-thirds of the States require that property be assessed at its full value, according to 1962 data locally assessed real property averaged less than 30 percent of market value. 366/ Even more alarming are the huge variations between and within assessment districts. 367/ The tendency of many assessors to allow the ratio of assessed values to full market values to decline presents still another problem of property tax administration. 368/ This reduces the capacity of the school district to tax local funds. For example, according to one estimate, the assessment ratio in the city of Detroit declined from 90 percent in 1930 to about 50 percent in 1960. 369/ A final problem is the unequal dis-


367/ "The 1962 Census of Governments disclosed that in more than two-thirds of the assessment units studied the top quarter of parcels in assessment ratio were assessed on the average at more than twice the ratio for the lowest quarter." J. Kelly, Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings, pt. 16D-1, at 7470.

368/ Ibid.

369/ Ibid. See also Fleischmann Commission Report, op. cit. supra note 12 at 2.34-2.36.
tribution of tax exempt property, such as Federal Government property and that of church and charitable organizations. These problems of property tax administration recently were summarized:

Highly unsatisfactory administration of the property tax, including failure to use modern appraisal methods or reassess at frequent intervals, has resulted in gross inequity in relative tax burden. Local governments 'need to improve local property tax administration to remove the haphazard way in which the tax applies to properties of equal values.' Critics have claimed, for example, that proper assessment of big business could reduce local property taxes on residences and small businesses by 25% while still increasing local property tax revenues. 'All of which is to say that property value as a measure of wealth for purposes of equalization has all of the problems inherent in the property tax itself.'

Property tax reform is sorely needed. The Federal and State governments are showing interest as taxpayers across the country register their disapproval by refusing to support property-tax financed municipal and educational programs. In the meantime, property tax reform is being pressed in the courts.

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370/ S. Carey, *Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings*, pt. 16B, at 6875. Many of the Nation's cities, which are suffering the greatest fiscal decline, have 30-50 percent of their property exempt. *Id.* 6875 n. 1. See also testimony of Ralph Nader, *Equal Educational Opportunities Hearings*, pt. 16B at 6768 where he cites a series of specific examples of powerful corporations extracting local property tax concessions and goes on to state, "The pattern continues across the country. Our files are filled, Mr. Chairman, with examples and documentation of this explicit means of corporate crime; this willful and knowing refusal to pay the most bare minimum property taxes to support local services such as education."


In Russman v. Luckett, 373/ the Kentucky Court of Appeals (the State's highest Court) held that the land assessment practices were in violation of the State laws and Constitution. Plaintiff, taxpayers, parents of school children, and students, sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against tax officials. The Court upheld their right to sue on the basis that "a justiciable controversy is presented" and "here are no other adequate remedies which may be invoked by these plaintiffs." 374/ The Court noted that in the different taxing districts real estate and tangible personal property were assessed at percentages ranging from 30 to 12 1/2 percent of fair market value and that the statewide median real estate assessment ratio was approximately 27 percent. The problem with the system was said by the Court to be that it made for disparities in the tax burden upon taxpayers in different counties and taxing districts, and that it produced extreme fund raising difficulties for taxing authorities whose maximum tax rates were limited. More significant to the Court was the fact that the current method of assessment was in violation of a provision of the Kentucky Constitution and implementing statutes which require assessment at 100 percent of fair cash value. The Court rejected as "appalling" the defendant's argument that the constitutional provision was implicitly repealed because of its continued violation by public officials. 375/ The Court also rejected the

373/ 391 S. W. 2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
374/ Id. at 696.
375/ Id. at 697.
defendant's argument that court decisions had nullified the constitutional provision and its implementing statutes by substituting the test of uniformity in place of fair cash value. Finding further that the question of assessment was not a discretionary matter with the Commissioner of Revenue, the Court ordered compliance by the beginning of the following calendar year, approximately 6 months following the decision. Similar suits have been brought successfully in other States. 376/

On June 29, 1971, a three-judge Federal District Court held that assessment practices and laws in Alabama were in violation of the Federal Constitution (Weissinger v. Boswell).377/ Plaintiffs attacked two separate aspects of the assessment process: first, the failure of the State officials to equalize assessment rates violated the Alabama Constitution and laws and also the due process and equal protection clause of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution; and, second, the Alabama statute granting State and local tax officials wide discretion in setting assessment rates was so vague and indefinite that it, too, violated the Federal due process and equal protection guarantees.


The Court found that the Alabama constitutional provision requiring that property be assessed at value and that the property of private corporations and individuals be taxed at the same rate has been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court of Alabama as requiring "uniformity and equality among all taxpayers, 'private corporations, associations and individuals alike' both as to ratio and percentage of taxation and also as to rate of taxation." 378/ Nevertheless, the Court noted that the median assessment ratio for the State of Alabama was approximately 16.9 percent of fair market value and the median ratios for individual counties ranged from lows of 6.7 and 7 percent to highs of 23.1 and 26.8 percent. 379/ Such inequality of treatment was found by the Court to violate not only the Alabama Constitution but also the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Court noted that "While distinctions based on geographical areas are not, in and of themselves, violative of the 14th Amendment..., a state must demonstrate, if it wishes to establish different classes of property based upon different geographic localities...that the classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary but rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy." 380/ The Court was unable to find any legitimate State objective to be served by the vast disparities in the present system.

378/ Id. at 620.
379/ Id. at 621.
380/ Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs' second cause of action attacked the Alabama statute that directed that taxable property within the State be assessed not to exceed 30 percent of its fair market value. The Court found the statute to be contrary to the Federal Constitution in that it delegated legislative power to an agency without formulating a definite and intelligible standard. Noting that the type of discriminatory treatment found in the assessment practices were deep-seated and of long standing, the Court gave the defendant up to 1 year to comply with the mandate of the opinion.
B. Intradistrict School Disparities.

While the recent school finance cases are likely to produce radical changes in the disparities of educational funds available among school districts, it should be emphasized that these cases do not affect inequities that may exist within particular school districts. One notable demonstration of intradistrict disparities was Hobson v. Hansen, 381/ a case involving the District of Columbia School System. Judge J. Skelly Wright found that in a variety of ways children from lower-income families had less educational resources available to them than children from higher-income families. Similarly, a New York City Court found that fewer regularly licensed teachers were assigned to the schools in Harlem than to schools in more affluent sections of the city. 382/

Intradistrict disparities have also been identified in Denver. In Keyes v. District Number One, Denver, Colorado 383/ - a case currently pending before the Supreme Court - it was demonstrated that in the schools predominantly attended by black and Mexican American students, 23.9 percent


384/ Cert. granted, 40 L.W. 3335 (1972).
of the teachers had had no previous experience in the Denver public schools and 48.16 percent of the faculty held probationary appointments. 385/ By contrast, in 20 schools not populated mainly by minority students, only 9.8 percent of the faculty had had no previous experience and only 25.6 percent held probationary appointments. 386/

It generally is believed that intradistrict disparities are a wide-scale problem.

There is empirical evidence that school districts allocate substantially fewer dollars to schools in poor and black neighborhoods; indeed, within-district disparities may be as significant as disparities in a given state. 387/

Although cases concerning intradistrict disparities involve difficult and expensive matters of proof 388/ there is ample legal precedent to support litigation in this area. 389/ Once interdistrict differentials are removed, further pursuit of equality may well focus on intradistrict disparities.

386/ Id.
387/ Kirp and Yudof, op. cit. supra note 326 at 146. See also Statement of Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity Hearings, pt. 16B at 6862, 6866, Schoettle, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1360-62.
# Appendix A

Current expenditure per pupil in ADA, public elementary and secondary schools, by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>$1,429</td>
<td>170.3</td>
<td>156.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>163.3</td>
<td>134.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>210.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>1,050</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>214.4</td>
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<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>119.7</td>
<td>160.1</td>
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<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>118.8</td>
<td>117.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>131.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>131.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>105.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>125.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>124.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>111.7</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>935</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>104.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>110.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Washington</td>
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<td>104.1</td>
<td>103.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>99.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>101.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>101.7</td>
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<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>107.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>85.7</td>
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<td>800</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>190.9</td>
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<td>California</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>74.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>92.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Florida</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>138.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>150.2</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>116.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>86.9</td>
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<td>713</td>
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<td>83.7</td>
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<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
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<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>185.2</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>102.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>76.5</td>
<td>164.4</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>75.6</td>
<td>148.6</td>
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<td>605</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>89.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>70.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>590</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>152.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>578</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>141.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>521</td>
<td>62.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| United States | 839                                   | 100.0                           | 113.5                  |

1 Includes expenditures for area vocational schools and junior colleges.


This table is taken from Berke and Callahan, "Inequities in School Finance" 46 (1971) a paper presented at the 1971 Annual Convention of the American Academy for the Advancement of Science and reprinted by the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, United States Senate, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972).
### INTRASTATE DISPARITIES IN PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES, 1969-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Minimum (High)</th>
<th>Maximum (Low)</th>
<th>Index between high/low</th>
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<td>581</td>
<td>314</td>
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<td>480</td>
<td>3.771</td>
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<td>2,723</td>
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<td>343</td>
<td>1.936</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>4.243</td>
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<tr>
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<td>444</td>
<td>6.309</td>
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<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>2.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>736</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>2.519</td>
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<td>391</td>
<td>5.879</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>2.159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<td>592</td>
<td>1.971</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,831</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>4.323</td>
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<tr>
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<td>885</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>2.472</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>897</td>
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<td>6.790</td>
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<td>1,037</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>1.633</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>2.497</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,364</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2.778</td>
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<td>370</td>
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<td>283</td>
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<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>4.977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montana (Averages)</td>
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<td>3.184</td>
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<tr>
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<td>311</td>
<td>3.830</td>
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<tr>
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<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<td>477</td>
<td>2.680</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,167</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1.827</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1.570</td>
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<td>North Dakota (County averages)</td>
<td>1,627</td>
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<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>7.503</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>3.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>2.895</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>2.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>1.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>5,334</td>
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<td>20.205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
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<td>Vermont</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>14,554</td>
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<td>23.533</td>
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</table>

For New Jersey data are for fiscal year 1969 since fiscal year 1970 data were not yet available.
For Alaska data represent revenue per pupil.
For Montana and Nebraska data are high and low of average for districts grouped by size.
For North Dakota data are averages of expenditures of all districts within a county.
Data are not fully comparable between States since they are based entirely on what data the individual State included in their expenditure per pupil analysis.

Source: State reports and verbal contacts with State officials.

Hawaii is the only State that finances education on a statewide basis and consequently does not have the inequities associated with local financing.

Appendix C

COMPARISON OF SELECTED TAX RATES AND EXPENDITURE LEVELS IN SELECTED COUNTIES
1968-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Assessed Value Per ADA</th>
<th>Tax Rate ADA</th>
<th>Expenditure per ADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emery Unified</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>$100,187</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark Unified</td>
<td>8,638</td>
<td>6,048</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalinga Unified</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>$33,244</td>
<td>$2.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clovis Unified</td>
<td>8,144</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>4.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kern</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Bravo Elementary</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>$136,271</td>
<td>$1.05</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lamont Elementary</td>
<td>1,847</td>
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<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverly Hills Unified</td>
<td>5,542</td>
<td>$50,885</td>
<td>$2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin Park Unified</td>
<td>13,108</td>
<td>3,706</td>
<td>5.48</td>
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</table>

Source: Serrano v. Priest op. cit. supra note 10, at 600.
## Appendix D

### THE RELATIONSHIP OF DISTRICT WEALTH AND HIGHEST TAX EFFORT

**Texas School Districts Categorized by Equalized Property Value and Tax Rate Required to Generate Highest Yield in All Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Tax Rate Needed to Equal Highest Yield</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>$ .64 per $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10 Districts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000-$50,000</td>
<td>$ 1.49 per $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26 Districts)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$30,000</td>
<td>$ 2.53 per $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30 Districts)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000-$10,000</td>
<td>$ 4.88 per $100</td>
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<tr>
<td>(40 Districts)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below $10,000</td>
<td>$12.83 per $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 Districts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Policy Institute, Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York
Appendix E

COMPARISON OF PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO IN SELECTED CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBS, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City and suburb</th>
<th>Pupil/teacher ratio</th>
<th>Per pupil expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<td>$601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverly Hills</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palo Alto</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
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\[\text{This table is taken from Berke and Kelly, op. cit. supra note 20 at 10.} \]
null