



Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues

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Summary

The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, along with attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas.

The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat environments. The Department of State currently maintains a presence in locations faced with security conditions that previously would likely have led State to evacuate personnel and close the post.

Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered approach to security, including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional, U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard detachments (whose principal role is securing sensitive information).

The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in the high-risk environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of State's capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), while simultaneously placing unprecedented burdens on DS's capability to carry out this mission successfully there and in other challenging locations. With greater focus on these frontline states, funds for other U.S. facilities could be strained.

Most of the funding for the protection of about 285 missions abroad is provided through Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) within the State Department's Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP) account and through Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) within the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The total security funding requested for FY2012 was about \$2.9 billion, and the amount enacted was about \$2.6 billion.

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Introduction

The United States maintains about 285 diplomatic facilities worldwide.¹ Attacks on such facilities, and on U.S. diplomatic personnel, are not isolated instances. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were killed in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, after armed individuals attacked and burned buildings on the main mission compound and subsequently attacked a second annex site where U.S. personnel had been evacuated.

Five other U.S. ambassadors have died by violent acts in the line of duty, although none since 1979.² In addition to this total, 38 U.S. diplomats who were not ambassadors have been killed in the past 30 years.³ There were 39 attacks against U.S. embassies and consulates and official U.S. personnel overseas between 1998 and 2008, excluding regular attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.⁴

These events, along with recent attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission.

Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered approach to security, including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional, U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard detachments (whose principal role is securing sensitive information).

The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has led some observers to question the deployment of personnel in high-threat environments. The Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, testifying in November 2009, underlined that "the Department currently operates diplomatic missions in locations where, in the past, we might have closed the post and evacuated all personnel when faced with similar threats."⁵

¹ See "Frequently Asked Questions: Diplomatic Security," at the Department of State's website: <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/faq/index.htm>.

² Two additional U.S. ambassadors died in plane crashes: Arnold L. Raphel, in Pakistan, 1988, and Laurence A. Steinhardt, in Canada, 1950. See U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Frequently Asked Questions, <http://www.history.state.gov/about/faq/ambassadors-and-chiefs-of-mission>.

³ Joe Davidson, "Foreign Service workers know risks come with job," *The Washington Post*, September 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/foreign-service-workers-know-risks-come-with-job/2012/09/24/4027e0c6-0675-11e2-aff-d6c7f20a83bf_print.html.

⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review*, GAO-10-156, November 2009, p. 53, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10156.pdf>.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State, before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, *The Diplomat's Shield: Diplomatic Security in Today's World*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 9, 2009.

The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in the high-risk environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of State's capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The challenges of providing security in these war-related areas may have also strained DS's capability to provide security for deployed diplomats in other hardship posts around the world.

Observers have suggested that funding for embassy security follows a "boom and bust" cycle, in which major attacks are followed by a sudden influx of resources that may be difficult to expend in a well-planned manner. An influx of security-related resources in the 1980s was followed by a lull in the 1990s, when diplomatic security funding was greatly reduced prior to the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. The subsequent State Department Accountability Review Board suggested that the preceding years of reduced spending for embassy security were a contributing factor to the vulnerability of the targeted embassies.⁶

This report provides background information on the authorities, regulations, and procedures in place at the Department of State regarding diplomatic security. It also describes several areas of potential congressional interest, including the Accountability Review Board process, whose conclusions the Secretary of State is required to report to Congress, and discussion of embassy security funding trends. It may be updated to reflect ongoing developments.

⁶ See Scott Stewart, *Diplomatic Security in Light of Benghazi*, Stratfor, September 27, 2012, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/diplomatic-security-light-benghazi>, and Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, *Counterterrorism Funding: Old Fears and Cyclical Lulls*, Stratfor, March 18, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090318_counterterrorism_funding_old_fears_and_cyclical_lulls.

Embassy Security and the Benghazi Attack⁷

Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. officials were killed in an attack on U.S. offices in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012. The State Department has stated that U.S.-provided security was robust, consistent with other small missions in similar environments, and that Libyan guards fought the attackers alongside U.S. personnel.⁸ Ongoing congressional inquiries have focused on a number of questions, including whether sufficient resources were provided to protect the facilities and personnel in the context of an increasingly threatening security situation that led to the closure of the British consulate in Benghazi, among other international facilities.

According to DS Bureau documents, a DS team was deployed to Benghazi in 2011 to establish a diplomatic presence there after the embassy in Tripoli had closed due to deteriorating security. The team first established a temporary location; after subsequently identifying a more secure location, DS moved department personnel to a large villa compound which, according to DS, “significantly enhanced the security of all U.S. personnel in Benghazi.”⁹

Congressional testimony and media reporting have suggested that the temporary U.S. facilities in Benghazi had, in the months preceding the attack, been reinforced with higher walls, better lighting, and sandbagged emplacements and guard booths, among other measures; however, it remains unclear whether these or additional measures contemplated by department officials prior to the attack would have significantly hindered the September 11, 2012, assault.

On the night of the attack, the Benghazi facilities were reportedly protected by an unarmed, contracted local guard force; a local militia; and armed DS agents. A U.S. Marine detachment had not been posted there, a situation that is not unusual for smaller posts at which classified information is not produced. The compound’s security posture included:

- locally hired unarmed guards were provided under contract with a British private security firm named Blue Mountain. The contract, which took effect in March, reportedly was worth \$387,413 over one year. Among the tasks of the guards were the operation of a metal detector and inspection of visitors’ bags. While armed security contractors protect many State Department facilities in high-threat locations, Libyan political sensitivities ruled out the use of private security companies; the local contracted guard force was therefore unarmed. There were reportedly four unarmed Blue Mountain guards at the facilities on the night of the attack.
- armed members of the February 17 Brigade, a local militia that participated in the anti-Qaddafi uprising. Given the lack of centralized Libyan governmental capacity to discharge its responsibilities as host nation to protect the U.S. facilities under the Vienna Convention (as described below), this function was provided by the Brigade, which trained with U.S. officials for this role. Its members, who were reportedly expected to provide their own weapons and ammunition, were paid \$28 per day, what one press account describes as a “relatively standard wage.”¹⁰ DS officials have testified that on the night of the attack, three February 17 Brigade personnel were present at the U.S. facilities.

U.S. security personnel at the facilities on the night of the attack included five armed Diplomatic Security agents (three who were assigned to Benghazi, and two travelling with the ambassador), according to testimony by a senior Diplomatic Security official. The compound could also call on a “well-trained U.S. quick reaction security team” stationed at an annex two kilometers away.¹¹

⁷ Information regarding the Benghazi attack is based on initial open source reporting and may not reflect additional details that may emerge subsequent to the date of this report. For additional information on Libya and analysis of the September 11, 2012, attack, see CRS Report RL33142, *Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard. For more information on other attacks on U.S. facilities and interests in Muslim countries, see CRS Report R42743, *Recent Protests in Muslim Countries: Background and Issues for Congress*, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.

⁸ The State Department has provided a detailed account of the attack and its aftermath in a background briefing on October 9, 2012, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/198791.htm>.

⁹ U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Tested in Times of Transition: 2011 Year in Review*, Annual Report, May 2012, p. 9, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/189611.pdf>.

¹⁰ Michael Birnbaum, “Sensitive documents left behind at U.S. diplomatic post in Libya,” *The Washington Post*, October 3, 2012.

¹¹ Testimony provided by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charlene Lamb, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *The Security Failures of Benghazi*, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., October 10, 2012.

Further complicating the U.S. security picture in Benghazi, news reports on November 2, 2012, indicated that the annex was a classified CIA installation and that the quick-reaction team mentioned above was part of the CIA presence. Personnel in Benghazi reportedly included a security force of approximately 10 individuals, who had on previous occasions shielded Ambassador Stephens when he left the U.S. facility. Members of this force were reportedly among those responding directly to the September 11 attack.¹²

Host Nation Responsibility Under the Vienna Conventions

Under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations¹³ and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,¹⁴ nearly all countries around the world participate in reciprocal obligations regarding the diplomatic facilities of other countries in their territory. The United States is a state party to these conventions.¹⁵

Section 3 of Article 31 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, “Inviolability of the consular premises,” states that, other than in the case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action, “the receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consular post or impairment of its dignity.” Article 40 of the same Convention further states that “the receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity.”

An attack on an ambassador is also covered under Article 29 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states, “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”

The grounds of diplomatic missions are protected under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 22 (Section 1-3) of the Convention states

1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.

¹² Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Margaret Coker, “CIA Takes Heat for Role in Libya,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 2, 2012.

¹³ The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations can be accessed at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf.

¹⁴ The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations can be accessed at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.

¹⁵ The conventions are nearly universally adopted; for example, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are also states party.

U.S. Responsibilities and Posture

The protection of U.S. government employees and facilities under Chief of Mission (COM) authority overseas from terrorist, criminal, or technical attack is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, as designated under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.¹⁶

The act specifies that the Secretary of State must develop and implement (in consultation with the heads of other federal agencies having personnel or missions abroad where appropriate and within the scope of the resources made available) policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide for the security of U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature and foreign government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United States.

Within the department, the Secretary has delegated these responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security (DS).¹⁷ The current Assistant Secretary is Eric J. Boswell; he has been in the position since July 2008.¹⁸ The Assistant Secretary, who heads the Bureau for Diplomatic Security, is responsible for, among other tasks:

- establishing and operating post security and protective functions abroad;
- emergency planning abroad;
- establishing and operating local guard services abroad;
- supervising the U.S. Marine Corps security guard program;
- liaising with U.S. private-sector security interests abroad;
- developing and coordinating counterterrorism planning, emergency action planning abroad, threat analysis programs, and liaison with other federal agencies to carry out these functions; and
- developing and implementing technical and physical security programs, including security-related construction, radio, and personnel security communications, armored vehicles, computer and communications security, and research programs necessary to develop such measures.¹⁹

The mission of developing and implementing security policies and programs that provide for the protection of all U.S. government personnel (including accompanying dependents) on official duty abroad is executed through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), also established by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.²⁰

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) provides protection to personnel, information, and facilities at over 285 embassies and consulates, and over 100 domestic Department of State

¹⁶ 22 U.S.C. §4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.

¹⁷ See “Diplomatic Security Senior Leadership” at <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/bio/index.htm>.

¹⁸ A biography of Assistant Secretary Boswell is available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/106593.htm>.

¹⁹ See 1 FAM 260 Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84179.pdf>.

²⁰ 22 U.S.C. §4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.

locations.²¹ According to its website, “every diplomatic mission in the world operates under a security program designed and maintained by Diplomatic Security.”²²

The bureau is staffed by more than 34,000 employees worldwide—with roughly 90% of them contractors. Out of a total force of special agents of approximately 2,000, DS has nearly 800 special agents posted in regional security offices at over 250 posts worldwide. Its reach to diplomatic missions in 157 countries makes it the most widely represented American security and law enforcement organization around the world, according to its website.

When serving abroad, DS special agents are referred to as regional security officers (RSOs). RSOs’ responsibilities include not only managing security programs and formulating emergency contingency plans, but also providing the first line of defense for U.S. personnel and dependents, as well as facilities and sensitive information. RSOs are the primary advisor to the Chief of Mission (usually the ambassador) on all security matters.

In performing their functions, RSOs work closely with other groups, including Marine Security Guards, surveillance detection teams, local guards, cleared American guards, local investigators, and host government officials. DS also provides Mobile Security Teams, dispatched from Washington, DC, to high-threat posts to conduct training for embassy personnel, their dependents, and local guards in protective tactics, as well as providing emergency security support, including protective security for COMs, surveillance detection operations, and assistance with post evacuations. DS also provides specially trained agents to lead contractor-provided personal protection teams and guard services in areas of ongoing conflict, where the host nation is unable or unwilling to provide the required level of security. In extreme situations, U.S. military assistance can be provided to the RSOs in the form of combat-equipped Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST) provided by regional commanders.

Assessing the Threat

The security posture of each U.S. diplomatic facility varies based on the Department of State’s assessment of local conditions.²³ Regular reviews of threats to posts are conducted by the State Department. Senior officials recently stated that all posts were required to review their security posture in advance of the 9/11 anniversary. In the wake of the attack on the U.S. interim facilities in Benghazi, Libya, all diplomatic posts were again ordered to review their security posture and to take all necessary steps to enhance it if necessary.²⁴

The process of resource allocation to specific posts is based on a set of security standards called the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). The list is mentioned in 22 U.S.C. Section 4865, “Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities,” which requires that such a list

²¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts*, GAO-11-780T, June 29, 2011, p. 1, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-780T>.

²² See “Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/index.htm>.

²³ Transcript, Department of State Press Briefing, September 13, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197729.htm>.

²⁴ Transcript, State Department Briefing to Update on Recent Events in Libya, September 12, 2012, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/09/20120912135895.html>.

shall contain a section that addresses potential acts of international terrorism against United States diplomatic facilities based on threat identification criteria that emphasize the threat of transnational terrorism and include the local security environment, host government support, and other relevant factors such as cultural realities. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated every six months.

Based on the SETL, DS, in consultation with other agencies, assigns threat levels to each post. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), six threat categories inform the SETL: international terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, human intelligence, and technical threat. A rating is then assigned for each category, on a four-level scale.

- Critical: grave impact on American diplomats
- High: serious impact on American diplomats
- Medium: moderate impact on American diplomats
- Low: minor impact on American diplomats

The protective measures for each post are dictated by the post's overall threat level.²⁵

State Department FY2013 budget documents state that “DS is reexamining the process for assigning threat ratings in the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). This is an effort to accurately determine the ratio between threat and vulnerability at diplomatic facilities overseas.”²⁶ The documents further state that DS increasingly provides security support at greater distances from capital cities and traditional embassy platforms, “often in places and situations where the Security Environment Threat List and the security standards did not foresee today’s realities.” DS is therefore “developing guidelines whereby diplomatic facilities in contingency zones and other non-traditional platforms can be recognized as ‘critical plus,’” which would require innovative security solutions or waivers of existing standards.²⁷

In an average year, DS receives over 1,000 threats and incidents against U.S. interests overseas.²⁸

Physical Security at U.S. Diplomatic Facilities

While security arrangements for specific locations or individuals are not made public by the Department of State, diplomatic facilities typically rely on a combination of an outer layer of host nation-provided and/or contract guard forces, physical perimeter security, and State Department agents or contractors. These arrangements are overseen by the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and the deployed Regional Security Officer (RSO).

Reporting to the Director of Diplomatic Security, the U.S. Marine Security Guard currently posts detachments to 152 U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world; Marine Corps guards are thus

²⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review*, GAO-10-156, December 7, 2009, pp. 7-8, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/298354.html>.

²⁶ State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 417.

²⁷ State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 66.

²⁸ See <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9006.htm>.

present at many, but not all, such facilities.²⁹ As of March 2010, there were over 1,300 Marine Corps guards deployed worldwide.³⁰ The primary mission of these specially trained Marines is to prevent the compromise of classified U.S. government information and equipment. A secondary role is the protection of U.S. citizens at those facilities during crises. The detachments, when deployed, are under civilian authority at all times, under a chain of command that includes the RSO and ultimately the Chief of Mission.³¹

Some observers have suggested that while any number of physical threats are taken into consideration by State Department planners, the threat of mob violence over a sustained time period is one that no facility, no matter how well fortified, can defeat in the absence of protection from the host nation's security forces.³²

Embassy Security Construction

The coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 attacks spurred a period of intense congressional scrutiny of embassy construction, leading to a funding program codified in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA).³³

Among the provisions of the SECCA were the following:

- The authorization of five years of funding at \$900 million each year for Worldwide Security in the State Department's Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance Account (ESCM), as well as additional funds for Worldwide Security in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account covering security upgrades at posts, such as improved doors and windows, computer and software security improvements, purchase of secure vehicles, and other items.
- A requirement that the Secretary of State submit to Congress each year a prioritized list identifying each diplomatic facility or diplomatic or consular post and compound in need of replacement or for any major security enhancements.
- A requirement that embassy emergency action plans address the threat of large explosive attacks from vehicles, and a requirement that new sites be large enough to co-locate all non-military U.S. government personnel. In addition, any new facility was required to be no less than 100 feet from the embassy or consulate compound's perimeter.

²⁹ U.S. Marine Corps information provided to CRS, September 14, 2012.

³⁰ See "United States Marine Security Guards: Safeguarding Missions Around the World," U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security Public Affairs, March 2010, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138440.pdf>.

³¹ 10 U.S.C. 5983 authorizes the assignment of Navy personnel to Foreign Service posts under the direct operational control of the chiefs of diplomatic missions or principal officers, or their designees, and provides the basic authority for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated August 1, 1967, between the Department of State and Department of Defense, which authorizes the Department of State and the U.S. Marine Corps to develop, execute, and issue such policy instructions as may be required from time to time to implement their joint responsibilities in support of the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program. The MOA dated January 9, 2001, between the Department of State and the U.S. Marine Corps delineates authorities, responsibilities, and other terms between the Marine Corps and the Department in support of the MSG Program.

³² Scott Stewart, *U.S. Diplomatic Security in Iraq After the Withdrawal*, Stratfor, December 22, 2011, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/us-diplomatic-security-iraq-after-withdrawal>.

³³ H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.

This additional funding stream and heightened priority led the State Department to elevate what had been an Office of Foreign Buildings Operations to the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), led by an Assistant Secretary-equivalent Director/Chief Operating Officer reporting directly to the Under Secretary for Management. OBO's responsibility is to direct the worldwide overseas building programs for all federal employees serving under the authority of the Chief of Mission in a country. With the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, OBO determines the security priority status of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world and the steps needed to bring the facilities into compliance with State Department security standards.

To bring the many diplomatic facilities up to security standards quickly, in 2001 OBO instituted the Standard Embassy Design (SED) initiative to standardize new chanceries and consulates.³⁴ SED divided new embassy projects into three categories: small, medium, and large facilities, each with a pre-engineered design featuring high fences and 100-foot setbacks. The SED provided plans for the site, the main office building, annex buildings, perimeter protection, warehouse, shops, utility buildings, recreation centers, and Marine Security Guard quarters. With pre-engineered plans, OBO contended that costs were lower, construction was faster, and the quality was enhanced because of the inclusion of security and construction best practices in SED designs.

The SED designs were responsive to the concerns of the 1998 Accountability Review Board, which strongly emphasized security; its report asserts that “when choosing embassy sites, safety and security concerns should guide our considerations more than whether a location may be convenient or of historic, symbolic importance.... We must face this fact and do more to provide security or we will continue to see our people killed, our embassies blown away, and the reputation of the United States overseas eroded.”³⁵ However, critics of the SED designs suggested that the highly secure facilities present a closed, unwelcoming, fortress image of the United States. These critics also argued that the security requirements such as co-location and required distance of buildings from perimeters force embassies away from central locations, making it more difficult for diplomats to do their work.

In 2010, OBO moved away from the Standard Embassy Design concept, and introduced a new building initiative called Design Excellence. Rather than security and uniformity, this new program emphasizes site-specific architectural features and environmental considerations. Rather than placing U.S. facilities outside of cities in order to achieve appropriate setbacks, embassies and consulates would, by their location in urban areas, “contribute to the civic and urban fabric of host cities.” Designs would be “welcoming,” responsive to local culture, and would use “contextually appropriate and durable materials.”³⁶ The impact of the recent attacks on the Department of State's Design Excellence concept remains to be seen.

The State Department claims that OBO's efforts have, since 2000, “moved over 25,840 people out of vulnerable locations and into more secure, safe and functional facilities—vastly improving the protection of both employees and sensitive U.S. government information,” according to budget documents.³⁷

³⁴ The Department of State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations website, <http://www.state.gov/obo/c13075.htm>.

³⁵ January 1999 ARB report, *op cit.*, p. 2.

³⁶ See “Design Excellence: Overview,” Department of State Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, May 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164725.pdf>.

³⁷ State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 470.

Incident Response

In the aftermath of a major security incident, a number of measures are at the disposal of U.S. officials, ranging from the temporary evacuation of Americans (personnel, their dependents, and U.S. citizens as a whole) to closing a post.

Temporary U.S. Personnel and/or Citizen Evacuation

The State Department, depending on local conditions, may recommend that diplomatic staff or dependents, or all U.S. citizens, leave the foreign country.

Should local situations become unpredictable or unmanageable, a Chief of Mission may, upon the approval of the Under Secretary of State for Management, order an “Authorized Departure” for a given post. It allows families of post employees and/or non-essential staff to depart on a voluntary basis. This step provides some flexibility in determining which employees or groups of employees may depart.

Authorized Departure is an intermediate step in the events leading up to an Ordered Departure, or drawdown, of diplomatic mission personnel and their dependents. Ordered Departure is initiated in extraordinary circumstances when the embassy or consulate is no longer confident of the security of its personnel and families. Implementation of this status mandates the departure of all non-emergency mission staff and employees. Such a step may be initiated by the Chief of Mission or the Secretary of State.³⁸

For U.S. citizen evacuations, the department may, in certain exceptional cases, provide departure assistance.³⁹ The department encourages the use of existing commercial transportation options whenever possible and provides U.S. citizens with information on these options. Where the local transportation infrastructure is compromised, the department tries to arrange chartered or non-commercial transportation for U.S. citizens to evacuate. Involvement of the U.S. military in any evacuation is, the department emphasizes, a last resort; most evacuations employ commercial means and local infrastructure.⁴⁰ The cost of any assistance is, by law, required to be provided “on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable.”⁴¹ This means that evacuation costs are generally the responsibility of the U.S. citizen evacuated, who is asked to commit in writing to repayment of the U.S. government. Emergency financial assistance may be available for destitute evacuees.

³⁸ See <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ResourceLibraryDetails.aspx?cid=3262> and 3 FAM 3770 at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/85108.pdf>.

³⁹ See “Emergencies and Crises” at http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/emergencies/emergencies_1212.html.

⁴⁰ Instances in which the U.S. military contributes to an evacuation of U.S. citizens are termed noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) by the Department of Defense (DOD). In an NEO, DOD personnel assist the Department of State in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated host nation and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. During NEOs, the US ambassador, not the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, is the senior USG authority for the evacuation. See United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, Joint Publication 3-68, December 23, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf.

⁴¹ 22 U.S.C. §2671(b) (2) (A).

Changing the Status of a Foreign Post

The recent attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities have raised questions as to whether the Administration might decide to close specific posts. Department of State's regulations explain that a decision to open, close, or change the status of an embassy is made by the President; for lower-level representations such as consulates, the State Department's Under Secretary for Management may determine its status. Proposals to modify the status of a post are usually made by the Assistant Secretary of the regional bureau concerned.⁴²

Accountability Review Boards

The Accountability Review Board (ARB) process was first recommended by the 1985 Advisory Panel of Overseas Security led by Admiral Inman, which recommended that "Foreign Service Regulations be promulgated to require the Secretary of State to convene a Board of Inquiry with powers of establishing accountability in all cases involving terrorism or security related attacks that result in significant damage and/or casualties to United States personnel or property."⁴³ This recommendation was codified by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.⁴⁴

The act requires the Secretary of State to convene an Accountability Review Board after a security-related incident, defined by the act as "any case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or related to a U.S. Government mission abroad, or a case of a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities or a foreign government directed at a U.S. mission abroad (other than a facility or installation subject to the control of a U.S. area military commander)."⁴⁵ Exceptions are made for incidents determined by the Secretary of State as not relating to security, and for facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The objective of such Boards, according to State's regulations, is "to foster more effective security of U.S. missions and personnel abroad by ensuring a thorough and independent review of security-related incidents ... the Board seeks to determine accountability and promote and encourage improved security programs and practices."⁴⁶ Subsequent attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel, such as the August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, or the deaths of three Defense Department personnel serving in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan in February 2010, prompted the Secretary of State to convene Accountability Review Boards.⁴⁷

⁴² 2 FAM 400, "Opening, Closing or Changing the Status of a Foreign Post," <http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/02fam/0400/index.htm>.

⁴³ Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the Inman Report), http://www.state.gov/www/publications/1985inman_report/inman2.html#accountability.

⁴⁴ 22 U.S.C. §4831.

⁴⁵ 22 U.S.C. §4831(a)(1).

⁴⁶ See U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 12 - Diplomatic Security, 12 FAM 030, Accountability Review Board (ARB), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88323.pdf>.

⁴⁷ A CRS search of the *Federal Register* shows 11 Accountability Review Boards convened by the Secretary of State since 1995 (prior to the current ARB studying the Benghazi attack).

Past Reviews of Diplomatic Security: The 1985 Inman Report and 1998 ARB

In the wake of the 1983-1984 bombings of U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, the Department of State formed an Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. The panel, chaired by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, is often referred to as the Inman Commission.⁴⁸ Its June 1985 security recommendations included the creation of the Bureau for Diplomatic Security; improvements in State's protective intelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures; improvements in training for Foreign Service personnel and dependents; improvements in contingency planning at posts; assigning Marine Security Guard detachments to all highly sensitive posts; revising the Diplomatic Security Service physical security standards; pursuing a substantial building program to correct security deficiencies, in particular regarding perimeter security; and initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons. The panel also offered a number of classified recommendations. The Advisory Panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security. The Inman standards added a "security premium" to the cost of embassy construction and refurbishment in the range of 10%-15%, according to a State Department official.⁴⁹

The Accountability Review Board established in October 1998 to investigate the coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was chaired by Admiral William Crowe, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to the United Kingdom.⁵⁰ The ARB affirmed that security provisions at the attacked posts had been appropriate for the level of the assessed threat; the embassy in Nairobi was considered a moderate-risk post, while the embassy in Dar es Salaam was considered a low-risk post. The ARB concluded that the bombings had been successful in part because insufficient appropriations had been made to implement the earlier Inman Commission recommendations; Admiral Crowe estimated that 80% of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world still did not meet the Inman Commission standards.⁵¹ Among the board's recommendations were bringing U.S. overseas facilities up to the Inman standards and boosting funding for security at U.S. overseas facilities to approximately \$1.4 billion per year over an approximate 10-year period.

The act specifies that a Board is to be convened not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident, although the Secretary can extend this for an additional 60 days if she determines that the additional period is necessary for the convening of the Board. A written decision by the Secretary of State to convene the Board, specifying its membership and duration, as well as its purposes and jurisdiction, is published in the *Federal Register*, or other similar document, if deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

On forming a Board, the Secretary is also required to promptly inform the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the Board has been convened, the membership of the Board, and other appropriate information about the Board.

The written findings of an ARB are to include

- the extent to which the incident or incidents with respect to which the Board was convened was security related;

⁴⁸ The unclassified elements of the report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the 'Inman panel') are available at http://www.state.gov/www/publications/1985inman_report/inman1.html.

⁴⁹ As quoted in Shaun Waterman, "Benghazi attack followed deep cuts in State Department security budget," *The Washington Times*, September 27, 2012, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/27/benghazi-attack-followed-deep-cuts-in-state-depart/?page=all>.

⁵⁰ While there were two boards established, the boards submitted a combined report with similar conclusions about the bombings and recommendations; this report therefore treats the two boards as one. While ARB reports have generally not been released to the public, the unclassified elements of the Crowe ARB's combined report is available on the Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_report.html.

⁵¹ Admiral William Crowe, as quoted in transcript, PBS NewsHour, January 8, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june99/bombings_1-8.html.

- whether the security systems and security procedures at that mission were adequate;
- whether the security systems and security procedures were properly implemented;
- the impact of intelligence and information availability; and
- such other facts and circumstances that may be relevant to the appropriate security management of United States missions abroad.⁵²

The recommendations of previous Boards appear not to have been made public, other than the unclassified version of the Crowe ARB empanelled to study the 1998 embassy attacks. The ARBs do not report directly to Congress. However, executive branch officials are required to report to Congress the recommendations of the ARB as follows:

- any recommendations made by the Board to the Secretary of State to improve the security and efficiency of any program or operation which the Board has reviewed must be reported by the Secretary to Congress no later than 90 days after the receipt of such recommendations, including any action taken with respect to that recommendation.
- should the Board find any breach of duty by U.S. personnel, the Board notifies the head of the appropriate federal agency or instrumentality, who shall, not later than 30 days after the receipt of that finding, transmit to Congress a report specifying the nature of the case and a summary of the evidence transmitted by the Board; and the decision by the federal agency or instrumentality to take disciplinary or other appropriate action against that individual or the reasons for deciding not to take disciplinary or other action with respect to that individual.⁵³

Accountability Review Board in the Wake of the Benghazi Attack

On September 20, 2012, Secretary of State Clinton confirmed her intent to form an Accountability Review Board to investigate the Benghazi attacks; the Board is chaired by former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering. The panel includes five members, four of which are designated by the Secretary of State and one by the intelligence community. The members of the board are Admiral Michael Mullen (Ret.), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard Shinnick, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who served as interim Director for the Department of State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in 2008; Catherine Bertini, a Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and former Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Program; and Hugh Turner, a former deputy director of the CIA's Directorate of Operations.

In her October 2, 2012, letter to the chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Secretary of State stated that the Board is "charged with determining whether our security systems and procedures in Benghazi were adequate, whether those systems and procedures were properly implemented, and any lessons that may be relevant to our work around the world." She further asserted her intent to share the Board's findings and the Department's response with Congress.⁵⁴

⁵² 22 U.S.C. §4834.

⁵³ 22 U.S.C. §4834.

⁵⁴ Josh Rogin, "Clinton promises answers on Benghazi attack," *Foreignpolicy.com*, October 2, 2012, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/02/clinton_promises_answers_on_benghazi_attack.

Secretary Clinton gave the Board 60 days from its first meeting to submit its conclusions and recommendations to her, “unless the Chair determines a need for additional time,” according to the Department’s *Federal Register* notice. The notice also states the Department’s pledge to report to Congress on all recommendations made by the Board and any actions undertaken in response to those recommendations “within the timeframe required by statute following receipt of the report.”⁵⁵

Oversight and Funding

The Benghazi attack prompted renewed congressional focus on diplomatic security issues, in particular on ensuring that relevant lessons are learned and applied to the protection of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. Areas of scrutiny include the management of risk in deploying diplomatic personnel to high-threat areas; threat assessment processes and procedures; the acquisition and sharing of intelligence; physical protection measures at U.S. facilities; interagency coordination in crisis response; and decision-making processes by the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies with presence abroad.

The appropriation of funds for embassy security is one area in which Congress is particularly active. Title I, Section 2 (k) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 states that the Secretary of State “may use funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Secretary to provide maximum physical security in Government-owned and leased properties and vehicles abroad.”

The original authorization to use appropriated funds designated for embassy security in the Department of State’s Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account is derived from the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999.⁵⁶ The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 increased the authorization levels of the original legislation.⁵⁷ Because Congress has not passed subsequent foreign relations authorization legislation, the authorization of appropriations for embassy security purposes is derived from appropriating funds for “Worldwide Security Upgrade” in the Department of State, Foreign Operations appropriations legislation and in provisions in the same act stating that “Funds appropriated by this Act ... may be obligated and expended notwithstanding” provisions in the Department of State Basic Authorities Act of 1956 requiring an authorization of funding before appropriations can be obligated or expended.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ See “Convening of an Accountability Review Board To Examine the Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of Personnel Assigned in Support of the U.S. Government Mission to Libya in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012,” Notice by the Department of State, *Federal Register*, October 4, 2012, <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/10/04/2012-24504/convening-of-an-accountability-review-board-to-examine-the-circumstances-surrounding-the-deaths-of>.

⁵⁶ Sec. 604 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113; 22 U.S.C. 4865 note).

⁵⁷ Sec. 111(3)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228).

⁵⁸ Sec. 15 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act prohibits appropriated funds from being obligated or expended unless the appropriation has been authorized by law (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. 2680). In the case of the FY2010 appropriations in the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010 (Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010; [P.L. 111-117]), the authorization waiver is Sec. 7023.

Funding Data

Within the Department of State budget, virtually all of the embassy and diplomatic security funding is within five subaccounts: Worldwide Security Protection (WSP); Worldwide Security Upgrades within the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account; Diplomatic Security (DS); Counterterrorism within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP); and Diplomatic Security within Border Security Program (BSP).

- WSP, the largest component of security-related funding within the Department of State, provides for a safe and secure environment overseas for personnel promoting the interests of the United States. It provides for the security of life, property, and information. WSP supports numerous security programs including a worldwide guard force protecting overseas diplomatic missions and residences, as well as domestic facilities.
- The Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) within ESCM provides funding for bricks-and-mortar type of security needs. It funds the Department of State's portion of the Capital Security Cost Sharing that combines with funds from other agencies represented overseas for planning, design, and construction of secure new embassy compounds. It also funds ongoing security activities and security-related maintenance.
- The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) funded under D&CP is the law enforcement and security arm of the Department of State. DS protects people, property, and information. It conducts international investigations, provides threat analysis, and focuses on cyber security, counterterrorism, personnel security, and security technology.
- The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) funded within D&CP leads the U.S. government in counterterrorism diplomacy and provides an on-call capability to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.
- The Diplomatic Security subaccount within the Border Security Program (BSP) guards domestic consular affairs facilities. It also coordinates and investigates security issues related to U.S. visas and passports.

Table 1 below provides base funding (also referred to as regular appropriations or core) and total security funding requested and enacted for the five security-related accounts from FY2007 to FY2013. Total security includes the base funding plus supplemental and/or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for diplomatic security. Supplemental funds were requested and enacted for FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. OCO funds were requested and enacted for FY2012 and requested for FY2013. Supplemental and OCO security funding has been largely for war-related security measures in the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The base total is for diplomatic security activities in the rest of the 285-plus U.S. facilities around the world, but may also include some ongoing security funding for the three frontline states.

Recent-Year Funding Observations

Following are some observations derived from the data in **Table 1**:

- In recent years, FY2010 and FY2011 were the only years that did not include supplemental or OCO funding.

- At \$2.8 billion, FY2010 was the peak year for State Department total base security *requests*. The highest level of base diplomatic security funding *enacted* by Congress (\$2.7 billion) also was in FY2010.
- At \$3.1 billion, FY2013 is the peak year for *requested* total security funds including additional funds for the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The peak year for total funding *enacted* by Congress was in FY2009 when Congress provided about \$3.5 billion, one-third of which was supplemental funding. (The U.S. Embassy in Iraq opened in January 2009.)
- For total base security funding, Congress enacted less than was requested every year since FY2007. For total security that includes supplementals and OCO, Congress enacted more (\$925.3 million) than requested only in FY2009, with FY2007 amounts virtually the same as requested.
- The largest gap between requested and enacted funds occurred in FY2012, \$240.4 million less in base security enacted vs. requested funds and \$251.1 million less in total security enacted versus requested funds.
- *Requests* for base security funding increased by 38% from FY2007 to FY2012, while *enacted* funding increased by 27% over those years.
- The State Department's base *request* for security activities in FY2013 is \$245 million less than was requested in FY2012, and about \$5 million less than was *enacted* in FY2012.
- The Administration *requested* about \$230 million more for total security in FY2013 than it requested in FY2012 and \$481 million more than Congress *enacted* for that year.
- Total security *requests* as a percent of Administration of Foreign Affairs funding requests trended up from FY2007 to FY2009, but declined each year between FY2010 and FY2012. The FY2013 request shows an increase. *Enacted* total security funding has generally declined after the peak of 32% in FY2009.
- From FY2007 to FY2009, total security funding ranged between 19% and 22% of total State Department funding. Since FY2010, it has hovered around 15% of all State Department funding. The FY2013 request represents 17% of the total State Department request.
- The largest year-to-year decrease in *enacted base security funding* was from FY2011 to FY2012 when it declined by 6.1%. The largest year-to-year *enacted* increase was from FY2008 to FY2009 at 25%.

Funding Issues for Congress

As Congress examines whether enough funding has been provided or more is needed for properly securing American personnel, embassies, and information around the world, it will do so in a climate of shrinking budgets; any proposed funding increases are likely to be met with calls for offsetting cuts elsewhere.

Also of near-term concern is the possible effect that the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25) sequestration could have on diplomatic security funding. If across-the-board spending reductions occur as scheduled on January 2, 2013, currently estimated at about 8.2% of funding,

security funding could be reduced as well. Those who consider embassy security funding to be insufficient would find the problem exacerbated by sequestration. The combined effects of a sequestration in 2013 and a half-year continuing resolution that ends in March 2013 could generate concerns about diplomatic security funding in the months and years ahead.

Some foreign policy experts are concerned that, with limited available dollars for foreign affairs overall, war-related costs in frontline states may be drawing funds away from needs in the rest of the 285-plus U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world. With the recent Arab Spring uprisings, for example, U.S. personnel located in those countries may be more vulnerable than those located in the frontline states where the embassies were built and heavily fortified recently. Some observers wonder if the rapidly evolving changes in Arab Spring countries may have contributed to difficulties in achieving and maintaining adequate diplomatic security there. Possibly adding to the difficulty is the unpredictability in the timing of funding bills being passed by Congress. Fiscal years may not be in sync with new increasing needs or with contracts. Furthermore, when Congress is unable to pass funding bills until well into the new fiscal year, or passes continuing resolutions in place of spending bills for the remainder of the fiscal year, the agency is left to guess what annual funding they can expect and has fewer months to spend the funds once received.

Another, perhaps longer-term related aspect of the funding debate is whether the United States can afford to maintain facilities and adequate security everywhere, especially in nascent democracies that are often unstable and unpredictable. If embassy security is the responsibility of the local government, but that government does not have the capability required to keep American personnel safe, the U.S. government must weigh the security risks of keeping a U.S. presence in such environments.

Table I. State Department Funds for Embassy and Diplomatic Security, FY2007-FY2013 Request

(In millions of current U.S. \$)

	FY2007		FY2008		FY2009		FY2010		FY2011		FY2012		FY2013	
	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted	Req.	Enacted
WSP base	\$795.0	\$766.0	\$964.8	\$974.8	\$1,162.8	\$1,117.0	\$1,648.0	\$1,586.2	\$1,560.7	\$1,500.0	\$1,453.7	\$1,355.0	\$1,428.5	n.a.
Supplemental/OCO	\$67.2	\$96.5	\$162.4	\$210.4	\$193.8	\$224.8	—	—	—	—	\$246.9	\$236.2	\$721.5	n.a.
ESCM WSU base	\$899.4	\$897.0	\$806.9	\$676.0	\$948.4	\$905.2	\$938.2	\$847.3	\$824.2	\$795.0	\$938.2	\$775.0	\$688.8	n.a.
Supplemental/OCO	—	—	—	\$76.7	—	\$921.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Diplomatic Security (DS)	\$194.0	\$196.6	\$188.5	\$169.6	\$187.1	\$255.9	\$190.6	\$214.9	\$193.0	\$224.9	\$215.6	\$220.5	\$226.3	n.a.
D&CP Counterterrorism	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	\$3.2	—	16.6	\$19.0	n.a.
Border Security DS	\$14.4	\$15.2	\$15.2	\$24.0	\$37.3	\$30.3	\$35.2	\$35.2	\$42.8	\$15.3	\$15.3	\$15.3	\$15.3	n.a.
Total base	\$1,902.8	\$1,874.8	\$1,975.4	\$1,844.4	\$2,335.6	\$2,308.4	\$2,812.0	\$2,683.6	\$2,620.7	\$2,538.4	\$2,622.8	\$2,382.4	\$2,377.9	n.a.
Total Security^a	\$1,970.0	\$1,971.3	\$2,137.8	\$2,131.5	\$2,529.4	\$3,454.7	\$2,812.0	\$2,683.6	\$2,620.7	\$2,538.4	\$2,869.7	\$2,618.6	\$3,099.4	n.a.
Admin of Foreign Affairs ^a	\$6,932.4	\$7,422.1	\$7,317.1	\$8,991.2	\$8,217.5	\$10,932.8	\$12,069.5	\$12,357.2	\$12,377.4	\$11,226.0	\$14,748.4	\$13,371.9	\$13,950.5	n.a.
Total Security as % of Admin of Foreign Affairs	28%	27%	29%	24%	31%	32%	23%	22%	21%	23%	19%	20%	22%	n.a.
State Dept 150 function ^a	\$10,327.8	\$10,150.2	\$10,708.8	\$12,501.4	\$11,345.6	\$15,825.7	\$16,256.3	\$17,367.5	\$17,104.3	\$15,625.3	\$19,349.8	\$17,695.3	\$18,508.3	n.a.
Total Security as % of State Dept 150	19%	19%	19%	17%	22%	22%	17%	15%	15%	16%	15%	15%	17%	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, Fiscal years FY2007 – FY2013, communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, legislation, and CRS calculations.

Notes: WSP=Worldwide Security Protection; ESCM=Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance; WSU=Worldwide Security Upgrades; OCO=Overseas Contingency Operations; Diplomatic Security=DS; D&CP=Diplomatic and Consular Programs.

a. Includes supplemental and OCO funds.

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