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The United States Commission on Civil Rights

The United States Commission on Civil Rights, first created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and reestablished by the United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, is an independent, bipartisan agency of the Federal Government. By the terms of the 1983 act, the Commission is charged with the following duties pertaining to discrimination or denials of the equal protection of the laws based on race, color, religion, sex, age, handicap, or national origin, or in the administration of justice: investigation of individual discriminatory denials of the right to vote; study of legal developments with respect to discrimination or denials of the equal protection of the law; appraisal of the laws and policies of the United States with respect to discrimination or denials of equal protection of the law; maintenance of a national clearinghouse for information respecting discrimination or denial of equal protection of the law; and investigation of patterns or practices of fraud or discrimination in the conduct of Federal elections. The Commission is also required to submit reports to the President and the Congress at such times as the Commission, the Congress, or the President shall deem desirable.

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An Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights has been established in each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia pursuant to section 105(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and section 6(c) of the United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983. The Advisory Committees are made up of responsible persons who serve without compensation. Their functions under their mandate from the Commission are to: advise the Commission of all relevant information concerning their respective States on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission; advise the Commission on matters of mutual concern in the preparation of reports of the Commission to the President and the Congress; receive reports, suggestions, and recommendations from individuals, public and private organizations, and public officials upon matters pertinent to inquiries conducted by the State Advisory Committee; initiate and forward advice and recommendations to the Commission upon matters in which the Commission shall request the assistance of the State Advisory Committee; and attend, as observers, any open hearing or conference that the Commission may hold within the State.

Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago

**Illinois Advisory Committee to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights**

September 1993

A report of the Illinois Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights prepared for the information and consideration of the Commission. This report will be considered by the Commission and the Commission will make public its reaction. The findings and recommendations of this report should not be attributed to the Commission but only to the Illinois Advisory Committee.

Letter of Transmittal

Illinois Advisory Committee to the
U. S. Commission on Civil Rights

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
Bobby D. Doctor, Acting Staff Director

The Illinois Advisory Committee submits this report, *Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago*, as part of its responsibility to advise the Commission on civil rights issues within the State.

The Advisory Committee held a factfinding meeting on August 28, 1992, to obtain various perspectives and facts on police protection of the African American community in Chicago. Those invited to participate included the police, elected officials, academic researchers, police officers, community leaders, and individuals from the African American community.

Although the report does not reflect an exhaustive analysis of the subject, the Committee hopes the Commission will find it of value in its monitoring of racial, ethnic, and religious tensions nationwide.

Respectfully,



Faye M. Lyon, *Chairperson*
Illinois Advisory Committee

Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1. The Chicago Police Department	3
The 1970s and 1980s: New Police Districts and a New Distribution Formula	4
The 1990s: Proposed Reorganization—Booz•Allen and Hamilton Report	8
Chapter 2. Violence in Chicago's African American Communities	10
Homicides, Crime, and Police Resources	11
Other Forms of Victimization in the African American Community	13
Chapter 3. Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago	15
The Police Districts	17
Special Crime Units of the Chicago Police Department	23
The Chicago Housing Authority Police	25
Other Factors	25
Chapter 4. Perspectives of Police Protection from the African American Community	27
Chapter 5. Racial Composition of the Chicago Police Department	32
Chapter 6. Addendum: Cabrini-Green	36
Chapter 7. Findings	39
Chapter 8. Recommendations	41
Appendices	43
Appendix I. Department Units of the Chicago Police	43
Appendix II. Chicago Police Department District Beat Allocation	44
Appendix III. Response of the Chicago Police Department	47
Tables	
Table 1. Racial and Ethnic Composition of the City of Chicago	1
Table 1.1. 1966 Patrol Strength, District Crime Rankings, and Population	5
Table 1.2. Police Officer Assignments, 1984	7
Table 2.1. Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 and Older, by Type of Crime and Race of Victims	10
Table 2.2. Homicide Victims in Chicago by Race, 1984–1991	11
Table 2.3. Violent Crime Rates in Black Districts versus Citywide Rates	12

Table 3.1. Average Distribution of Police Patrols per 1,000 Residents and Crimes per 1,000 Residents in Police Districts by Race for August and October 1991	15
Table 3.2. Population of Chicago Police Districts by Race	19
Table 3.3. Crimes, Calls for Service, and Patrol Officers by District	20
Table 3.4. Police Deployment Strength by District	21
Table 3.5. Police by District per 100 Crimes	22
Table 3.6. Special Crime Units of the Chicago Police Department	23
Table 3.7. Special Unit Police and Area Assignments	24
Table 3.8. Chicago Public Housing Residents by Race	24
Table 5.1. Chicago Police Department by Race and Bureau	32
Table 5.2. African American Police Districts and Ratios of African American Police Officers and Supervisors	33
Table 5.3. Racial Composition of Detectives	34
Table 5.4. Index Crime Arrests of Persons Under 25 by Percentages	35
Table 6.1. Reports of Major Crime at Cabrini-Green, 1989–1992	37
Table 6.2. Serious Crime Reported at Cabrini-Green, First Quarter 1992, and First Quarter 1993	38
Map 1. Where Blacks Are Concentrated	2
Map 2. City-Wide District	18



Introduction

The Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted an alarming increase of violent crime in the black neighborhoods of Chicago. The Advisory Committee believed that if such levels of violence were occurring in the white communities, resources might be more promptly engaged to control the problem. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee decided to study whether there was an unequal level of resources devoted to protecting the African American community from violent crime.

Information was gathered during field investigations in early 1992, and on August 28, 1992, a factfinding meeting was held. The Chicago Police Department was invited

along with the Chicago Police Board,¹ the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, several city aldermen, researchers, neighborhood watch groups, representatives of community organizations, and members of Chicago's African American community.

The city of Chicago has a population of 2,783,726² (see table 1). Nearly 40 percent of the city's population is African American. Moreover, most of the African Americans living in Chicago reside in highly segregated neighborhoods (see map 1).

The Advisory Committee's analysis of the information gathered focuses on whether the level of police protection afforded to the African American community in Chicago is

TABLE 1
Racial and Ethnic Composition of the City of Chicago

	Population		Change	
	1980	1990	Absolute	Percent
White	1,311,808	1,187,168	-225,760	-19.5%
Black	1,187,168	1,074,471	-112,697	-9.6
Latino	423,357	545,852	112,495	28.9
Asian	70,970	98,777	27,807	39.2
Native American	5,545	4,997	-548	-9.9
Other race	6,230	3,581	-2,649	-42.5
Totals	3,005,078	2,783,726	-221,352	-7.4

Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1990: Public Law 94-171 Data.


1 The Chicago Police Department declined an invitation to attend the factfinding meeting. In a letter, dated Aug. 20, 1992, to the Midwestern Regional Office, John Klein, general counsel, Chicago Police Department, wrote: "The information the City of Chicago has provided . . . , when impartially viewed, makes clear that the deployment of police in the City of Chicago is provided on an equal basis and is a function of crime pattern analysis. . . . Although Supt. Rodriguez will not be able to attend this meeting, the Chicago Police Department already has participated in and continues to cooperate with the recent factfinding efforts conducted by the United States Commission on Civil Rights."

2 1990 census.

unequal to that of the white community in protection from violence. The analysis addresses the current police manpower deployment formulas, current assignments within the department by districts, the levels of crime in the districts, and the impact of those allocations.

This report is the summary statement of the Illinois Advisory Committee as to their findings and conclusions on whether the African American community in Chicago is receiving unequal police protection from the Chicago Police Department.

MAP 1



Source: Northern Illinois University Center for Government Studies, U.S. Census

Chapter 1

The Chicago Police Department

The mission of the police department is set out in the program and budget of the city:

The Department of Police's main function is to preserve law and order. The Department enforces state laws, city ordinances, and orders of the mayor and city council. The department provides a conspicuous police presence, rapid response to emergency calls, public services in medical and noncriminal emergencies, vehicular and pedestrian traffic control and order at all public events.¹

The police department is headed by a superintendent, who is selected by the mayor. The current superintendent of the Chicago Police Department is Matt L. Rodriguez, chosen by Mayor Richard M. Daley in June of 1992. All supervisory positions in the department are merit promotions, except for deputy superintendent positions.

Within the department there are three general types of units. The 25 police districts "provide basic police response to calls for service and conduct aggressive, preventive patrol to detect and deter criminal conduct."² In addition to district patrol units, there are specialized units furnishing the department with administrative support, unique investigative abilities, and special skills.³

Finally, two units, the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) and the Internal Affairs Division (IAD), investigate police misconduct. OPS is a civilian unit within the

police department that investigates allegations of excessive force. IAD investigates all other allegations of police misconduct. Both units make disciplinary recommendations to the superintendent, who is responsible for imposing disciplinary actions on both police officers and civilian employees.

In 1960, responding to a police scandal, Mayor Richard J. Daley appointed Orlando W. Wilson, dean of the school of criminology at the University of California, Berkeley, to be the new superintendent of the Chicago Police Department. Wilson broke the political power governing police promotions by centralizing the process and reducing the number of police districts from 41 to 21. He also instituted a redistribution of patrol resources, placing greater numbers of police in districts with more crime.

The patrol force should be distributed in proportion to the need for patrol service. . . . The following categories are considered suitable for ascertaining the proportional need for called-for services and preventive patrol: Part I crimes, Part II offenses, miscellaneous reports, accidents, arrests. . . . The incidents under consideration, however, are not of equal importance. . . . Weights must be assigned to compensate for these inequalities.⁴

Warren Friedman, executive director of the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, told the Advisory Committee that

1 City of Chicago, *1992 Program and Budget*, 1992, p. 133.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 135

3 A listing of all departmental units is in the appendix.

4 O.W. Wilson, *Police Planning* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1957), pp. 92, 96.

this methodology still forms the basis for present day patrol deployment.

[The police] use a formula to determine a weighted workload which in turn determines how many police [are assigned to a district]. This formula is reflective of the full-service incident-driven philosophy inherited from the 1960s and police superintendent Orlando Wilson. Full service promised to dispatch police cars to all calls for service and thus a formula was used that made cars available to implement this philosophy. The deployment formula . . . was derived by assigning all calls for service to which the department dispatched cars to one of four categories. Dividing each category of calls by the time it took to service them, the department assigned weights to each category.⁵

An analysis of patrol strength in the mid-1960s shows a pattern of police resources in the city being devoted to districts generally proportionate to their crime levels. However, even at that point in time there were concerns in the African American community that fewer police resources were devoted to fighting crime in the black neighborhoods than in the white neighborhoods⁶ (see table 1.1).

The 1970s and 1980s: New Police Districts and a New Distribution Formula

During the 1970s four new districts were added to the police department. In 1975 districts 22 and 23 were created. District 22 was split out of district 6 on the city's far southwest side and district 23 was created

on the north side from parts of districts 19 and 20. In 1978 district 24 was established in the city's most northern sector by again subdividing district 20. In 1981 portions of districts 14 and 15 on the city's far west side were divided to make district 25.

The four new districts were created in predominantly nonblack areas of the city. The 1970 census counted a total of 3,362,947 city residents. Blacks were one-third of the population with 1,102,620 citizens. The newly created police districts encompassed a population of 547,347, of which just 60,326 (11 percent) were black. Moreover, more than 40,000 of the black residents in the new police districts were concentrated in district 22.

The 1970 population figures for the new districts were:

District	Population	Blacks
22	117,529	41,452
23	114,864	986
24	126,244	851
25	188,710	17,037

John Dineen, president of the Chicago Fraternal Order of Police, told the Advisory Committee how manpower was shifted to the new districts:

[When] they opened up a new district, the 24th district, they just bled manpower from other districts. . . . When they opened up the Rogers Park district, what they did was take certain beats out of the Foster Avenue district and they just said how many men do we have there now? How many

5 Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL, Aug. 28, 1992, Transcript, pp. 62-63 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

6 In 1967 a citizens committee studied police-community relations in Chicago. The study expressed concern of unequal police protection in the minority communities:

"It is . . . the sense of this committee that, although the inhabitants of the [minority] communities are concerned over police brutality, they are much more concerned with the inadequacy, numerically, of police protection. There is no doubt that the greater concern is for more and fairer police protection in the ghetto. . . . Ghetto residents feel, with justification in most cities, that the police department seeks to contain crime to minority neighborhoods and tolerates criminal conduct in the ghetto that would be eliminated in a moment if it ever served to stun the sensibility of white middle class neighborhoods." Source: Citizens's Committee to Study Police-Community Relations in the City of Chicago, *Police and Public: A Critique and a Program*, 1967, p. 73.

TABLE 1.1
1966 Patrol Strength, District Crime Rankings, and Population

District	Population	Population rank	Crime rank	Patrolmen
1	14,118	21	19	294
2	154,831	14	1	437
3	179,608	7	3	405
4	165,540	12	18	196
5	173,388	9	12	222
6	162,503	13	17	183
7	154,806	15	5	379
8	234,374	2	14	193
9	174,758	8	13	238
10	169,549	11	8	325
11	124,133	20	2	321
12	125,824	19	10	320
13	141,077	16	7	291
14	181,293	6	16	201
15	196,747	5	15	201
16	205,661	3	21	183
17	169,934	10	20	135
18	133,355	17	6	377
19	202,484	4	11	243
20	288,814	1	4	293
21	128,135	18	9	284

Source: *Police and Public: A Critique and a Program*, May 22, 1967, p. 70.

do we need? [Then] added up the additional manpower data for administrative desk, . . . clerical work, and moved them over.⁷

In addition to the new boundaries, the police department also developed new formulas for deploying patrol officers. The new policy weighted serious crimes, lesser crimes, non-criminal calls for service, population, and area in determining the number of patrol of-

ficers assigned to a district. *The Chicago Reporter*, a monthly newsletter that focuses on racial issues in metropolitan Chicago, reported that "black" districts were underserved by the new formulas proportionate to the level of crime in those areas.

Black districts have the highest crime rates and the most police per capita in the city. But patrol officers there also have the highest workloads in the city. Thus, residents of black districts may

⁷ Transcript, pp. 103-04.

wait longer when no car is available to respond to their calls. And officers must spend less time on calls.⁸

The article set out the following statistics:⁹

Districts	Police per population	Calls per officer	Crimes per officer
White	20.4	117.3	20.9
Black	25.4	152.5	26.5
Latino	25.5	130.6	21.9
Mixed	21.2	135.5	22.7

The Chicago Reporter concluded:

- The police department accepts the higher workloads in high-crime, black districts as a given, resulting in unequal police service.
- The department shifts personnel from district to district based on percentage increases or decreases in 911 calls, not on the level of crime. This works for low-crime districts, where any increase in crime is proportionately high, and against high-crime districts. . . .
- The department, in effect, places greater emphasis on property crime than violent crime.
- The formula's reliance on 911 calls, rather than crime rates, does not take into account the reluctance of minorities to call the police to report crime. Nor does it consider the language

barriers that hinder Latinos from reporting crime.

- The 1981 restructuring of district and beat boundaries was based on 1970 U.S. Census Bureau data. This over counts white population, which dropped by a third in the 1970s and underestimates black and Latino population, which increased.¹⁰

In response both to *The Chicago Reporter's* story and community pressure, the department revised its formulas for assigning patrol officers to the districts. Under the new formula, four categories were weighted: violent indexed crimes, nonviolent indexed crimes, nonindexed crimes, and calls for service. Friedman explained:

In 1985, when the police . . . conducted a major redeployment of personnel, . . . the department assigned weights to each category: 15 points for violent crimes, 10 for indexed property crimes, 8 for nonindexed crimes and 6 for noncriminal calls for service. For deployment purposes, each non-crime had 40 percent of the weight attributed to a violent crime and each nonindexed crime had roughly 53 percent of the weight attributed to a violent crime. . . .¹¹

The average district patrol allocation under the redeployment plan would be 131 officers. Moreover, districts 3, 7, 8, and 11, districts almost exclusively African American, were slated for the highest number of officers. Districts 1, 20, and 22 were to have the fewest officers. The scheduled changes are shown in table 1.2.¹²

8 Laura Washington, "Black Districts Lose Out in Police Deployment Policy," *The Chicago Reporter*, September 1983, p. 1.

9 *The Chicago Reporter*, September 1983, p. 1.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

11 Transcript, pp. 62, 63, and 64. Indexed crimes refer to those compiled by the department for the uniform crime report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

12 *The Chicago Police Department District Beat Allocation* manual from 1985 that specifies manpower deployment is included in the appendix to this report.

TABLE 1.2
Police Officer Assignments, 1984

District	Officers assigned to district/sector cars	Officers assigned after redeployment
1	75	99
2	156	158
3	131	163
4	137	150
5	79	114
6	114	141
7	159	171
8	146	162
9	133	143
10	125	139
11	138	171
12	73	105
13	114	114
14	161	161
15	96	110
16	117	124
17	112	112
18	123	144
19	132	122*
20	120	99*
21	119	119
22	67	93
23	87	116*
24	81	110
25	101	141
Total	2,896	3,281

*Manpower adjusted due to a change in district boundaries.

Source: Chicago Police Department, Bureau of Administration Services, Research and Development Section, *District Beat Allocation* (1984).

Dennis Nowicki, executive director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, told the Advisory Committee that the concept of a weighted workload is now considered obsolete. There are more effective and efficient means of allocating police resources.

As far as weighted workload, it is obsolete . . . as the sole means of allocating resources. . . . Weighted workload looks at calls for service and looks at reported crime. Those are two separate bits of information. . . . Less than 20 percent of the calls for service to the police involve crime.

So, the majority of police officer's time is spent on noncriminal activities. . . . Because weighted workload is a reactive allocation, it does not take into consideration proactive policing activities. . . .¹³

We have learned that the old methods of policing are ineffective. Some things that we have learned through research are that increasing [the] number of police officers does not directly translate to a decrease in the crime rate, or to an increase in the proportion of crimes solved. We also learn from research that random patrol in vehicles is not an effective means of preventing crime or catching offenders and that saturating a

¹³ Transcript, pp. 56-57. In addition to being the executive director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Nowicki spent 25 years with the Chicago Police Department, rising to the rank of deputy superintendent. He was the lead deputy superintendent at the time the last manpower allocation was done in 1985 by the Chicago Police Department.

neighborhood with police personnel does not reduce crime, it merely displaces it. . . . Police leaders are learning from research . . . and are realizing that it is time to reestablish the partnership that must exist between the police department and all segments of the community.¹⁴

Vance Kimber, a sergeant with the Chicago Police Department,¹⁵ concurred with Nowicki that simply having more police does not solve the crime problem. He told the Advisory Committee:

We can increase the police department as much as we want to. [But] as long as we take law enforcement just as law enforcement . . . there will be no solutions. The problem is not only law enforcement, it is education and unemployment. And as long as you have people that are not educated properly, they cannot find jobs; they are going to turn to crime. And what we need to have is a network of not only the police department working in hand with . . . the court, but law enforcement working with the corporations and the educational system.¹⁶

The 1990s: Proposed Reorganization—Booz•Allen & Hamilton Report

At the direction of the mayor, and in coordination with the police department, Booz•Allen & Hamilton, Inc., completed a comprehensive review of patrol operations of the Chicago Police Department in August 1992. The objective of the study was “to de-

fine how the department can deliver better police service to the citizens of Chicago.”¹⁷ The report made recommendations in terms of district consolidation, restructuring, and resources.

The report found “significant variation in calls for service across the city’s 276 geographic beats . . . [recommending that] the geographic beat structure be modified to reduce the disparity in workload across primary beat cars.”¹⁸ Patrol officers, though, would still be assigned to districts.

Within the districts, some patrol officers are recommended for assignment to sectors and some officers to beats. The new system of patrol deployment would be a neighborhood based strategy. Under the new organization, patrol officers are either beat officers or sector car officers.¹⁹ Beat officers “respond primarily to non-emergency calls . . . [and] sector cars respond to emergency calls.”²⁰ The projected breakdown of activity is:²¹

	Beat officers	Sector cars
Calls for service	45%	70%
Analytics	20%	0
Community	20%	15%
Admin/Other	15%	15%

The Booz•Allen report specifically rejects the concept of a weighted workload to determine district patrol allocation, advising that both beat and sector patrols be

14 Ibid., pp. 48–49.

15 Kimber is a 20-year veteran of the Chicago Police Department. He has worked as a beat officer in various districts and public housing, as well as working in communications, labor relations, and labor affairs for the CPD. He is a member of the Guardian Police, the oldest black police organization in the city.

16 Transcript, pp. 352–53.

17 Booz•Allen & Hamilton, Inc., *Improving Police Service: Patrol Operations and Strategy*, vol. I, Chicago, IL, 1992, p. A-1.

18 Ibid., vol. I, pp. D-5, D-6.

19 Ibid., vol. II, p. 21.

20 Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

21 Ibid., p. 21.

determined by “past call patterns . . . [and] . . . an average analysis. . . .”²² It suggests that in the place of weighted workloads, total calls for service be used to determine police allocation in a district.

Calls for service are used as a proxy for workload; as . . . calls for service are closely correlated with the department’s measure of workload. . . .²³

Friedman described what he expected these changes to have for policing in the different districts:

As a result of Booz•Allen’s recommendations . . . the beat will become the central unit of crime control and cars will be much more securely anchored to these beats than in the past. Beat boundaries and beat manpower levels will be modified every year or two. . . . The proposed reforms also include a new dispatch policy that modifies the old full-service policy. Instead of sending a car to every call, the department will differentiate, sending cars to some immediately and some after delay. . . . These changes should be accompanied by the replacement of dispatched calls as the basis for weighted workload.²⁴

Dineen expressed reservations about the feasibility of the proposals. He commented on other cities’ experiences with community-oriented policing.

One of the failures in Houston was they took 40 percent of their patrol force and put them in com-

munity policing and left only 60 percent to handle 100 percent of the calls that they were handling the period before. . . . They started to institute [a community oriented policing] program in Joliet and calls for service did go down in their target community . . . but the Chicago Police Department has less police officers now than [it did] in 1975.²⁵

On February 2, 1993, the *Chicago Sun-Times* reported that experiments of community-oriented policing as set out in the Booz•Allen report would be tried in five districts. The chosen districts were Rogers Park, Austin, Marquette, Englewood, and Morgan Park. According to the article:

- Each pilot district will have 40 additional officers freed up for the community oriented policing program. . . . They did not come from other districts, but were made available through new hires, civilianization, and reorganization.
- To maintain police presence, patrol cars in the pilot districts will be assigned to steady beats, while rapid response teams handle emergencies. . . .
- Working with area residents, police will develop a unique crime-fighting strategy for each neighborhood.²⁶

The racial composition of the five districts is shown below:

District	Population	White	Black	Other
Austin [PD 15]	63,956	2,445	60,458	1,053
Englewood [PD 7]	108,819	799	107,146	874
Marquette [PD 10]	131,516	7,257	47,024	77,235
Morgan Park [PD 22]	117,190	44,369	71,041	1,780
Rogers Park [PD 24]	139,479	80,107	22,209	37,163

²² Ibid., p. 24.

²³ Ibid., vol. I, p. D-6.

²⁴ Transcript, pp. 64–65.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 99–100.

²⁶ Fran Spielman, “Cops to Hit Street in 5-District Test,” *Chicago Sun-Times*, Feb. 2, 1993, p. 10.

Chapter 2

Violence in Chicago's African American Communities

Studies of the U.S. Department of Justice show minorities, particularly African Americans, suffer a greater proportion of crimes than nonminorities. The national crime victimization survey report issued in February 1992 showed that there were 104 crimes per 1,000 African American adults, while the rate for white adults was 92 crimes for every 1,000 individuals.

The differences in violent crime were even more pronounced. For every 1,000 African Americans age 12 and over, 40 were victims of violent crime. There were 28 victims of violent crime in the white community for every 1,000 persons¹ (see table 2.1).

Mary Powers, executive director for Citizens Alert, a community organization that monitors police brutality, talked about violence and police service in the African Amer-

ican community in Chicago. She told the Advisory Committee that the black community does not believe that it is adequately protected. There may be a police presence, but that presence does not translate into service.

Across the board, the people of color with whom we have dealt have felt that their communities have been overpoliced and underprotected. There may be a large police presence and you may see cars going by, . . . but when it comes right down to dealing with the safety of the community and dealing with specific problems that they bring to the police, there is definite dissatisfaction with that degree of service.²

Alderman William Beavers, 7th ward, city of Chicago, echoed similar sentiments. When asked directly by the Advisory Committee whether there was equal police protection

TABLE 2.1

Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 and Older, by Type of Crime and Race of Victims

Type of crime	Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 and over		
	White	Black	Other
<i>All personal crimes</i>	91.9	103.7	96.7
Crimes of violence	28.2	39.7	28.1

Racial categories for this survey are white, black, and other. The "other" category is composed mainly of Asians and American Indians. The race of the head of household is used in determining the race of the household for computing household crime demographics.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, *Criminal Victimization in the United States*, 1990, 1992, p. 24.

1 U.S. Department of Justice, *Criminal Victimization in the United States*, 1990, 1992, p. 24.

2 Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL, Aug. 28, 1992, transcript p. 20 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

TABLE 2.2
Homicide Victims in Chicago By Race, 1984-1991

Year	White	Black	Asian	Hispanic	Indian
1984	142	508	2	87	2
1985	100	456	3	10	0
1986	98	525	6	11	0
1987	99	487	6	95	4
1988	115	466	9	89	1
1989	78	525	5	133	1
1990	77	639	9	123	3
1991	86	704	5	132	0

Source: Illinois State Police, *Crime in Illinois*, 1992.

for African Americans in Chicago, he replied, "No, there's not."³ Moreover, he felt that the central problem of escalating violence was drugs, and until that problem was solved, the African American community would continue to suffer disproportionate levels of violence.

The real problem is drugs . . . If the [African American community] doesn't have these [drug] problems, [it] doesn't need [the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights] to . . . tell it that it isn't getting the proper protection. . . . I don't know any minorities that own the ships, boats, planes, or trains that bring the drugs in. . . .

[The African American community] is not getting the proper protection. . . . Most people think black people are hoodlums and criminals [but] black people are more concerned about law enforcement than any other ethnic group that I know of. They want to be able to go to the store, walk the street. They worked hard all their lives, that is why they are dependent on this [level of violence] changing.⁴

Homicides, Crime, and Police Resources

In 1991 there were 927 homicides in the city of Chicago. African Americans comprised 806 of those murdered. By contrast, just 86 of the 927 homicide victims were white. Blacks, who are 40 percent of the city's population, were 87 percent of the murder victims.


Moreover, the disproportionate black victimization has been a constant pattern for the last 8 years. From 1984 through 1991, there have been 6,042 homicides, and 4,338 (72 percent)¹ of the victims were black or black-Hispanics (see table 2.2).

In the nineties, the number of African American homicides has sharply increased. Between 1984 and 1989, murders of blacks averaged 494 each year in the city of Chicago. In 1990 and 1991, those numbers increased to 639 and 704 annual black homicides. An African American living in the city of Chicago is now **seven** times more likely to be murdered than a white. In 1992, roughly 1 of every 500 black males living in the city between the ages of 14 and 30 was murdered.

³ Ibid., p. 230.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 222-23.

TABLE 2.3
Violent Crime Rates in Black Districts Versus Citywide Rates



Group 1 represents the seven predominantly black police districts.
 Group 2 represents citywide violent crime: population ratios.

General criminal activity and violent crime have also increased in Chicago in the last 8 years. Total crime has increased from 284,803 incidents in 1984 to 313,026 incidents in 1991, an increase of 10 percent.⁵ The numbers of violent crimes, however, have increased 35 percent, from 61,159 incidents in 1984 to 82,388 in 1991.

Moreover, in the seven police districts where the black population exceeds 90 percent of the district's population, there were 38,769 violent crimes. This was 47 percent of all violent crime in 1991. Yet these districts contain only 20 percent of the city's population⁶ (see table 2.3).

Resources to fight crime over the last 18 years have declined. This has occurred

during a period of sharply increasing crime rates. Nowicki, citing *Trends and Issues*, the annual report of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, told the Advisory Committee:

In Chicago, the number of calls for service rose 15 percent from 1976 to 1988 while the overall constant dollar expenditures for the Chicago Police Department declined by 8 percent in the same period. Worse yet, federal monies that for so many years supported local law enforcement have diminished greatly.

Federal block grants, that in the heyday of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided considerable resources. [For instance] in 1977, \$88 million [went] to the State of Illinois to

⁵ Illinois State Police, *Crime in Illinois*, 1992.

⁶ The district populations and racial compositions are detailed in chap. 3 of this report.

assist local law enforcement. [These grants] were all but eliminated by 1985. While there has been a recent infusion of anti-drug abuse funds to the State, overall federal assistance to State law enforcement remains relatively inconsequential.⁷

Nowicki added that "Sufficient funding . . . is paramount if local police agencies are to be adequately staffed. . . ."⁸ And since the middle seventies, the manpower of the Chicago Police Department has declined. John Dineen told the Advisory Committee that today the city of Chicago has fewer police officers fighting higher crime levels.

The Chicago Police Department has less police officers now than in 1975. Almost 2,000 less police officers than 15 years ago. This is an economic reality. . . . In this period [there has been] a 15 percent increase in crime and a corresponding 15 percent decrease in manpower.⁹

In the last 7 years, however, real dollar expenditures to fight crime in Chicago have increased at virtually the same rate as violent crime. In 1984 the annual budget for the Chicago Police Department was \$487,720,420. In 1991 the police budget in real dollars was \$629,473,433.¹⁰

Other Forms of Victimization in the African American Community

Robert T. Starks, Ph.D., associate professor of sociology at Northeastern University, Chicago, told the Advisory Committee that there are other ways the African American community is being victimized than just dis-

proportionate crime levels. This includes higher levels of police brutality.

In the white community, police protection is protection primarily of people. In the African American community, police protection is protection of property and containment of people. There is a fundamental difference there. And the thing that explains the fundamental difference is the overwhelming police brutality that occurs in the African American community.¹¹

There has not been one single white policeman that has been indicted and convicted for brutalizing an African American citizen in the city of Chicago in the history of this city, not one single one. There have been some suspensions here and there, but no criminal convictions.¹²

Kevin Lee, president of the Cook County Bar Association, supported Professor Starks' assertion that police abuse of the black population was inextricably bound to unequal police protection. This abuse is not just physical, it also includes a selective enforcement of the law.

The selective enforcement . . . causes a disproportionate number of minority youth to be brought into the criminal justice system. Currently one in four African American males under the age of 30 is somehow part of the criminal justice system. . . . A recent [Chicago] *Sun-Times* series dealing with the horrors of the juvenile justice system substantiated a longstanding . . . premise . . . [that] white children picked up for minor infractions of laws were diverted from the juvenile justice system through the use of station adjustments [while] less than 1 percent of minority

7 Transcript, pp. 39-40.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 100. "The number of [Chicago police] officers declined 13 percent between 1973 and 1989. The 11,284 sworn Chicago police officers employed in 1989 was the lowest figure in the last 21 years. This reduction in personnel led the Chicago police to cut the number of authorized patrol beats by almost one-quarter between 1979 [1,329] and 1985 [1,018]." Source: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, *Trends and Issues*, 1990, p. 11.

10 Illinois State Police, *Crime in Illinois*, 1992.

11 Transcript, p. 167.

12 Ibid., p. 163.

youth in similar situations were permitted this opportunity.¹³

The training of police officers in this country directly contributes to this problem. . . . Officers are brought into a paramilitary unit and indoctrinated into an "us against them mentality". . . . Once categorized as part of a [trouble] group, the [member] is no longer entitled to the human courtesies and dignities that the officer would award to those like him. It necessarily follows that no discretion will be exercised in favor of a member of that group and . . . brutality will be inflicted upon the people in that group.¹⁴

Starks also intimated that the level of police corruption in the predominantly black districts contributes to the high crime levels observed in the African American community.

You could double, triple, quadruple the number of policemen in the seventh district and you would

still have the same amount of crime, unless you root out the collaboration between the drug dealers and the police . . . and unless and until you root out discrimination within the police department.¹⁵

Alderman Beavers was asked directly by the Advisory Committee whether he believed that there was collusion of police officers in the drug trade. He responded firmly that that was not the case. He also told the Advisory Committee that in his capacity as chairman of the city's police and fire commission, there have been no cases brought before him of police corruption in terms of drug dealing.

Most police officers involved in drugs are drug users, not sellers. Most firemen that are involved in drugs are users. Most school teachers, most doctors that are involved in drugs are users. Few in the distribution . . . very few, maybe one or two.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid., pp. 70-71.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 220.

Chapter 3

Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago

Barry Rundquist, Ph.D., assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois-Chicago, researched the question of manpower deployment by the Chicago Police Department. His research showed the inequality in the number of patrols between white and black districts in relation to violent crime to be 3 to 1.

Rundquist "conducted a multivariate analysis of the distribution of police patrols among the [Chicago] police districts."¹ The study was based on actual police patrol data from two different days in August and October 1991 (see table 3.1).

The author concluded:

The best predictor of police patrols is the number of serious or index crimes and total crimes per

district. . . . The analysis does not suggest that patrols are distributed directly on the basis of race. However, in that black districts with higher violent crime rates evidence fewer policed patrols than is warranted by their number of violent crime rates, it seems possible to conclude that the distribution of patrols indirectly deprives black police districts.²

. . . We find no discrimination in the distribution of police patrols against black citizens either in absolute numbers of patrols or per capita. And only slight biases occur in the distribution of patrols vis a vis serious and total crimes in black and Hispanic districts. But because the weighted calls for service model for allocating police activities does not distinguish violent from other serious crimes, black districts end up receiving unequal numbers of police patrols per 1000 violent

TABLE 3.1

Average Distribution of Police Patrols per 1,000 Residents and Crimes per 1,000 Residents in Police Districts by Race for August and October 1991

	Black districts	White districts	Hispanic districts	Mixed districts
Number of patrols	279.0	253.2	274.0	306.8
Patrols per 1,000	3.07	1.98	2.08	3.10
<i>Crimes per 1,000 residents</i>				
Violent	69.0	14.1	32.5	34.8
Index	161.8	78.5	96.4	140.3
Total	274.6	135.1	159.1	223.4
<i>Patrols per 1,000 crimes</i>				
Violent	47.5	140.2	64.6	95.9
Index	19.3	25.5	21.7	21.9
Total	11.3	14.7	13.1	13.6

Source: B. Rundquist, "Exploring the Distribution of Police Patrols Among Police Districts in Chicago," Office of Social Science Research, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1992, p. 26.

1 Barry Rundquist and Jungho Rhee, "Exploring the Distribution of Police Patrols Among Police Districts in Chicago," Office of Social Science Research, University of Illinois-Chicago, 1992, p. 17.

2 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

crimes. Thus . . . in not considering the violence of the crimes typically reported in each district, the police department appears to indirectly discriminate against black and Hispanic police districts when it allocates police patrols.³

The study noted that neither the potential effectiveness of additional police patrols nor the assignments of special unit police were considered in the analysis. Rundquist summarized his findings for the Advisory Committee:

The major finding of [my] study is that predominantly white police districts where violent crime is lowest averaged nearly three times as many police officers per 1,000 violent crimes as do predominantly African American police districts. . . . Specifically, we found that there were 140.2 police officers for every 1,000 violent crimes in predominantly white districts compared with 47.5 officers per 1,000 violent crimes in mainly African American districts.⁴

The logic is that there are more patrols in areas that have more indexed crime and more total crime, but not more violent crime. . . . And if one of our concerns of policing is to do something about the violent crime epidemic, then that should be a question. . . .⁵

There was disagreement, however, whether additional police in a given location offered added protection from violent crime. Nowicki told the Advisory Committee:

It is very easy to accept the premise that violent crime, because it is more serious in nature, should be the major factor in determining man-

power allocation. But if you look at it, and look at it in a way that makes the best effective use of police resources, that may not necessarily be the case.⁶

Thomas Regulus, Ph.D., associate professor of criminal justice at Loyola University, Chicago, made similar remarks:

One of the concerns is the notion of inequality and the distribution of services and the notion of effectiveness. . . . I am not sure that anyone, particularly in Chicago, has really looked at the issue of manpower patrol distribution relative to the effectiveness in terms of crime deterrence . . . but that is a critical issue.⁷

Friedman agreed in part, saying that some violent crime is not deterred by police resources in a community. But he added that deployment is still an important component to the successful mission of the police.

I agree that violent crime should not drive [deployment decisions] because the question has to be asked, what kinds of violent crimes are police effective in doing something about? Such as domestic [crime].⁸

[But] the police are supposed to patrol and prevent crime and thus deployment should be relative to a mission. Within reasonable bounds, police levels should relate positively to crime levels.⁹

Barbara Pillows, a Chicago police officer and member of the African American Police League, felt that there were insufficient resources devoted to the black community. She

3 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

4 Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL, Aug. 28., 1992, transcript, p. 143 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

5 Ibid., pp. 167-68.

6 Ibid., p. 80.

7 Ibid., p. 17.

8 Ibid., p. 81.

9 Ibid., p. 61.

asserted, though, that more resources were not the only answer to the crime problem in the African American community.

Our position is that the [African American] community is underprotected, but not [just] in the sense of manpower. We are looking at the quality of police protection. . . . We are looking at the quality of service that is presented to the citizens, and we feel that it is lacking.¹⁰

And as far as what I personally believe in certain areas, no, we do not have enough police to deliver service. We are just overwhelmed by the calls and by the types of calls that we receive. . . . Everyone, especially in the district where I work [Englewood], complains that there are not enough physical bodies there to handle the workload . . . the type of calls that we have are far more serious than anywhere in the city.¹¹

The Police Districts

The first line of police protection to the community in Chicago is the police district. There are 25 police districts in Chicago. Each district is administered by a commander. The actual police work in the district is carried out by three types of officers: beat patrol officer, special assignment officers, and evidence technician officers.

District 1 is essentially the central business area of the city (i.e., "the loop"). Districts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21, and 22 cover the southern part of the city. Districts 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15 serve Chicago's west side. Districts 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, and 25 operate on the north side of the city. A map of the Chicago police districts is on the following page.

The population of the 25 districts ranges from a high of 209,875 in the 8th district to a low of 18,205 in the 1st district. There are seven police districts where the black population exceeds 90 percent of the district's

population (see table 3.2). Those districts are:

District 2	99%
District 3	94%
District 5	94%
District 6	99%
District 7	98%
District 11	92%
District 15	95%

Three districts have particularly high concentrations of white residents. Those districts are:

District 8	72%
District 16	92%
District 18	77%

The Chicago Police Department publishes an annual report on crime levels, victims, and resources. Crime data for 1990, along with the number of patrol officers, are listed in table 3.3 for each district. Patrol officer strength includes patrol officers, special assignment officers, and evidence technicians assigned to the district.

Violent crime includes homicide, rape, robbery, and serious battery. Property crime includes burglary, theft, and auto theft. Non-indexed crime includes simple battery, assault, forgery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, vice complaints, weapons violations, willful damage to property, and other miscellaneous criminal conduct. Noncriminal service calls include calls for service that require a police response but are not of a criminal nature, e.g., injured person, sick removal, traffic accidents.

The deployment formula of the Chicago Police Department was tested with the above data. A weighted least squares regression was run with patrol officers as the dependent variable. The results of the

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 96 and 127.

CITY-WIDE DISTRICT




TABLE 3.2
Population of Chicago Police Districts by Race

District	Total	Black	White	Other	Nonwhite
1	18,205	6,179	10,526	1,500	7,679
2	63,618	63,087	178	353	63,440
3	90,405	85,296	3,761	1,348	86,644
4	148,264	91,656	26,593	30,015	121,671
5	99,897	94,357	2,377	3,163	97,520
6	108,405	107,172	600	633	107,805
7	108,819	107,146	799	874	108,020
8	209,875	22,523	150,823	36,529	59,052
9	141,677	28,044	58,835	54,798	82,842
10	131,516	47,024	7,257	77,235	124,259
11	98,554	90,371	1,858	6,325	96,696
12	70,580	21,116	9,753	39,711	60,827
13	64,319	13,501	17,041	33,777	47,278
14	129,539	10,466	32,279	86,794	97,260
15	63,956	60,458	2,445	1,053	61,511
16	187,764	659	172,603	14,502	15,161
17	131,626	2,099	76,644	52,883	54,982
18	98,736	16,970	75,840	5,926	22,896
19	100,994	3,921	66,120	30,953	34,874
20	102,711	13,115	53,339	36,257	49,372
21	78,895	49,139	18,836	10,920	60,059
22	117,190	71,041	44,369	1,780	72,821
23	101,240	14,274	67,467	19,499	33,773
24	139,479	22,209	80,107	37,163	59,372
25	177,462	32,648	75,598	69,216	101,864
Total	2,783,726	1,074,471	1,056,048	653,207	1,727,678

The category "other" includes Hispanics, Asians, American Indians, and other nonwhite and nonblack races
 Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, based on 1990 census data.

TABLE 3.3
Crimes, Calls for Service, and Patrol Officers by District

District	Violent crime	Property crime	Nonindex crimes	Calls for service	Patrol officers
1	940	12,980	5,308	56,369	362
2	7,809	8,473	17,455	94,944	284
3	4,552	8,625	12,301	97,285	278
4	3,841	11,537	14,553	97,071	291
5	4,052	7,883	13,451	75,790	239
6	4,178	10,548	11,998	94,356	274
7	5,916	9,069	17,141	107,201	297
8	1,850	13,542	13,020	97,515	303
9	3,453	11,346	16,298	108,989	284
10	4,247	7,588	11,412	86,276	223
11	7,882	9,203	14,192	101,323	283
12	3,288	7,396	9,642	68,906	282
13	2,622	5,636	6,779	60,881	185
14	3,695	9,490	11,647	104,520	242
15	4,380	5,874	8,775	64,989	218
16	914	8,709	8,140	70,016	235
17	1,638	8,874	8,145	74,574	218
18	1,870	15,002	8,926	92,279	429
19	1,352	8,796	7,397	82,840	241
20	1,561	6,280	7,415	65,139	213
21	2,932	8,811	8,010	62,097	209
22	1,610	6,562	7,935	62,671	223
23	1,902	7,563	8,291	71,169	232
24	1,865	8,606	8,682	79,303	221
25	4,379	13,042	12,775	105,113	262

Source: Chicago Police Department 1990 Annual Report and CPD Sex and Racial Composition Report Based On Operational Strength File By Bureau, Unit, and Title (7/9/92).

TABLE 3.4
Police Deployment Strength by District

Dependent variable is patrol officer
Number of observations: 25

Variable	Coefficient	Std. error	t-stat.
C	117.35	28.7751	4.078
Population	-0.0006	0.0001	0.003
Violent crime	-0.0003	0.0004	0.465
Property crime	0.0018	0.0003	6.026
Nonindex crime	0.0052	0.0004	0.303
Service calls	2.7840	0.0001	0.828

Mean of dep. var = 261.12

r-squared = 0.82

regression are shown in table 3.4.¹² The analysis shows only the weighted category of property crime as a significant predictor of police deployment. Weighted levels of violent crime, weighted indexes of nonindexed crime, and calls for service are all insignificant predictors of police patrol strength.

The analysis shows the 2nd and 11th districts with much higher levels of violent crime than the other districts. These two districts had 7,809 and 7,882 incidents of violent crime. Yet these districts rank sixth and eighth in the number of patrol officers assigned to their areas.

There is only a weak correlation between the number of police assigned to a district and the total number of crimes in that district. The correlation is 0.5, significant at the 0.05 level.¹³

Finally, districts 1 and 18 are significant outliers from the other districts in terms of police strength and the level of crime in those districts (see table 3.5). The absolute number of patrol officers in districts 1 and

18 is nearly double that of the other districts.

Average number of police officers per district: 216

Police officers assigned to the first district: 362

Police officers assigned to the 18th district: 429


District 1 is the primary commercial district of the city. District 18, however, is close to average in terms of population, has a small area, and has relatively low levels of crime. But it is also predominantly white and the wealthiest police district.

Friedman responded to the Advisory Committee's questions on the pending allocation of patrol officers recommended by the Booz•Allen report. He stated that the study (1) offers a plan for putting an additional 1,600 to 2,300 officers on the street, (2) is unclear as to how patrol officers will be allocated to the districts, and (3) does address the topic of new district maps.

¹² The weighted least squares (WLS) procedure formed a matrix for the regression by multiplying the incidents of crime in each district by the weight for that particular category and then dividing the variable by total crime in the district. WLS was employed instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) in an attempt to control for variance among high and low crime districts in the reporting of less serious criminal offenses.

¹³ The correlation is 0.5. A test for linear relationship does show a significant level of association, $z = 2.5$ at 0.05 level.

TABLE 3.5
Police by District per 100 Crimes



Source: U.S Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from data in Chicago Police Department 1990 Annual Report and CPD Sex and Racial Composition Report Based On Operational Strength File By Bureau, Unit, and Title (7/9/92).

When they [Booz•Allen, and Hamilton] examined the department, . . . [they] concluded that through streamlining, between 1,600 and 2,300 officers could be freed up over several years to implement the “neighborhood based strategy” recommended in the report. . . . In effect, “Improving Police

Service” provides a plan by which the CPD, without hiring additional sworn personnel, can allocate more officers to street level work and match them more precisely to the activity police are mandated to have an impact on.¹⁴

¹⁴ Warren Friedman to the Illinois Advisory Committee, Sept. 30, 1992, Midwestern Regional Office, USCCR, files (written response to questions posed to him on Aug. 28, 1992, at the factfinding meeting on police protection of the African American community in Chicago).

TABLE 3.6
Special Crime Units of the Chicago Police
Department

Unit	Police officers
Bomb and arson	46
Marine unit	32
Public transportation	193
Gang crimes south	110
Public housing south	43
Gang crimes west	91
Gang crimes north	100
Public housing north	41
Youth division:	
Area 1	36
Area 2	40
Area 3	37
Area 4	40
Area 5	38
Area 6	36
Narcotics	144
Vice control	58
School security	
Area 1	25
Area 2	44
Area 3	37
Area 4	41
Area 5	32
Area 6	29
Central auto theft	53
Property and violent crimes	
Area 1	112
Area 2	97
Area 3	94
Area 4	122
Area 5	108
Area 6	117

Note: The term "police officers" excludes all supervisory positions in the unit and includes working detectives.
Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from "Chicago Police Department Sex and Racial Composition Report Based on Operational Strength File by Bureau, Unit, and Title," July 2, 1992.

However, the report fails to make clear what the definition of activity or "demand for services" will be used in allocating officers to different districts. Department spokesmen have indicated on one occasion that they will use index crime, on another weighted workload, on another that this is department business and is not information that the public has a right to. . . .

If the department continues to use a weighted workload, the crucial question is the weights assigned to the categories that compose the formulas. If they persist in using the old "15-10-8-6" formula and historical dispatch patterns, the department will, by assigning excess weight to non-crime calls for service, continue to discriminate against the residents, disproportionately people of color, living in high crime neighborhoods.¹⁵

The department is under considerable pressure to draw its new map, allocate resources, and start the five "neighborhood based strategy" prototypes. . . . At a meeting between the department and the community policing task force, participants were told that the department's research and development division had thus far developed eight different 18 district maps. The final map is scheduled for release sometime in November 1992.¹⁶

Special Crime Units of the Chicago Police Department

Patrol officers are only the first line of public protection for the citizens of Chicago. Other resources, both internal and external, are available to the community. Apart from district patrol officers, there are 15 divisions in the police department providing direct protection and criminal apprehension service to the community (see table 3.6).

Kimber explained that the philosophy of the special units is that they are assigned where particular problems are noted. He added, though, that police management need to be accountable and responsible for the fair delivery of these services.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

We have areas where we make [special] deployment. We have a gang crimes unit, we have a narcotics unit. . . . We have different neighborhoods with different organizations. . . . As we see crime go up, we may bring the gang crime unit in. We may bring the narcotics unit in if we see crime in a certain neighborhood. [But] it is important that you have the right management and that they are responsible . . . and accountable to the people in charge.¹⁷

The geographic assignments of the public transportation, public housing, gang, narcotics, and vice units were not available to the Advisory Committee. An analysis of the youth, school, property, and violent crime units was conducted by area.

In Chicago, there are six police areas. Area 1 contains districts 1, 2, 3, and 21. Area 2 includes districts 4, 5, 6, and 22. Area 3 has districts 7, 8, and 9. Area 4 controls districts 10, 11, 12, and 13. Area 5 encompasses districts 14, 15, 16, 17, and 25. Area 6 comprises districts 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24.¹⁸ The total populations in each area, the percentage of African Americans, the 1990 level of violent crime, and the special unit police assigned to the police area are shown in table 3.7.

Area 4, a racially mixed community, has the highest number of youth, school, property, and violent crime officers. Moreover, the number of these special unit officers is significantly higher than the other five police districts. This racially diverse section of the city also has the highest number of violent crimes despite being the second least populated area.

Otherwise, the districts are virtually the same in the number of additional police offered to the area. However, this equal

TABLE 3.7
Special Unit Police and Area Assignments

Area	Population	Violent crimes	% Black	Total
1	251,123	16,233	81	173
2	473,756	13,681	77	181
3	460,371	11,219	34	168
4	364,969	18,039	47	203
5	690,347	15,016	15	178
6	543,160	8,550	13	182

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from 1990 census data, 1991 annual police report, and CPD Sex and Racial Composition Report (7/9/92).

TABLE 3.8
Chicago Public Housing Residents by Race

Racial occupancy	
Family program	76,223
African American	91.2%
White	2.1%
Hispanic	2.0%
Asian and Native Am.	0.2%
Senior program	10,324
African American	65.7%
White	24.2%
Hispanic	2.5%
Asian and Native Am.	4.5%

Source: Chicago Housing Authority, 1991 Annual Report (1992).

assignment of additional police occurs even in area 6, where the level of violent crime is

¹⁷ Transcript, p. 347.

¹⁸ Tables 3.2 and 3.4 list each police district by number and include the population, the racial composition, the crime levels, and the number of patrol officers. Area statistics cited in this section are tabulations of those numbers.

significantly lower than in the other areas. Area 6, situated on the city's far northside, is a predominantly white section of the city.

The Chicago Housing Authority Police

The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) operates 1,479 buildings in Chicago.¹⁹ The official number of residents in CHA is listed as 86,547. This number is based on data from August 1991. However, by the CHA's own admission, that "figure does not include the tens of thousands of people living illegally in the CHA developments"²⁰

A number of the CHA housing units are clusters of high rises in which hundreds of residents live. Cabrini-Green, Robert Taylor Homes, and Stateway Gardens are three of the more well-known units.

Public housing occupants in Chicago are predominantly African American. Nearly 90 percent of the "official" residents are black. Table 3.8 shows the racial composition.

In addition to the Chicago Police Department public housing units, the CHA also has an additional police force that patrols its properties. The Illinois legislature initially authorized such a force in 1989.

In 1992, there were 322 full-time CHA police officers.²¹ These officers have been trained at the Chicago police academy and have arrest and detention powers on all public housing property. The officers work out of several base stations located on the grounds of selected CHA developments conducting both foot and car patrols.

Other Factors

Nowicki told the Advisory Committee that a credible assessment of unequal police protection of African Americans in Chicago required a full understanding of the impact of several interrelated variables.

There is no easy answer because of the complexity of police resource allocation and the number of critical factors that influence . . . the qualities of [police] performance. Among the factors that are to be considered are funding and resources, composition of the officer corps, education and training, law enforcement leadership, community response and responsibility, and the philosophy of policing.²²

. . . No review of issues affecting the quality of policing can exclude the topic of leadership. Leadership from public policymakers, from the community, from the media, and from the chief law enforcement executive is a critical factor in equal policing. . . .²³

. . . [I]ssues affecting equal policing [are] not limited solely to police issues. . . . Law enforcement agencies do not do their work alone. They work . . . within the community, and their relationship to that community clearly is a two way street. . . . For a variety of reasons, neighborhoods often actively fight against police intervention or involvement. Other neighborhoods organize to work with the police. . . .²⁴

Regulus also addressed factors complicating an examination of the issue of police protection.

19 The Chicago Housing Authority, 1991 Annual Report, 1992, inside cover.

20 Ibid.

21 Katie Wells, CHA external affairs supervisor, interview in Chicago with USCCR staff, Illinois, Sept. 25, 1992.

22 Transcript, p. 38.

23 Transcript, pp. 43-44.

24 Ibid., pp. 46-47.

Part of the issue has to be not simply managing numbers; how many police are allocated, but really doing some good management strategically. . . . I suspect that policing minority communities, low-income communities, is a different phenomenon than policing whites or middle-class

communities. . . . I am cautious of making a judgment based upon an empirical count of patrols as compared to looking at the quality of what's going on. My major concern . . . is more with the quality and strategy of patrolling . . . than with the numbers.²⁵

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 24 and 33–34.

Chapter 4

Perspectives of Police Protection from the African American Community

Representatives of community organizations and individuals from the African American community in Chicago discussed police protection with the Advisory Committee. They asserted that there was a lower level of protection afforded blacks than whites in Chicago and that the type of police service offered was often more brutal and more hostile.

Some spoke of the distrust that the African American community had of the Chicago police. A number of speakers said that a different type of policing was needed; a police force composed of more sensitive police officers, a police force with more blacks, especially in the ranks of supervisors and detectives, and a police force in touch with the community.

Marilyn Speaks, a resident of Chicago, related her frustrations with police service following the shooting of her daughter on the night of her high school prom. It summarized the frustrations of so many in the black community. She told the Advisory Committee:

My daughter was an innocent bystander between two gangbangers. [She] was shot in her leg . . . going to her prom. We were videotaping and she was going out the front door. . . . While the police were there my daughter was bleeding from her leg. . . . The police did not [make] a report or anything so the next day I called the police and they told me that it would take from 3 to 5 working days before a detective would be assigned to the case.

I kept calling the detective and leaving my number for him to call back. He never returned my call. . . . As far as I got was to the desk sergeant, and he would get smart with me at times and tell me that they have other cases to handle and that the detective was gone on vacation. . . . It will be 3 months [next week since the shooting] and I have not heard anything from the police department, nothing. . . . Nobody ever came to the house to take fingerprints.

My daughter is not in a gang, I know, just like the mother of the young fellow who busted through my door [and did the shooting] was saying how she had put him out because he had stolen her car and she had tried to get in contact with the juvenile authorities to have something done about that, and the police told her there was nothing that could be done. So she just put her son out.

I am real nervous sitting here right now telling this, but I mean, I am getting letters from my insurance company where they paid for the bill but they are telling me that if I come into some money that they want to be reimbursed. I mean, I am in a situation where, what is it, what am I supposed to do? The police are not doing anything. What am I supposed to do? Who do I go to?¹

Janette Wilson, national executive director of Operation PUSH, repeated the complaint that there was unequal protection in the black community.

The response time, if you check police records for zones in our community, are far longer than in [other] communities. . . . When I lived in the "gold coast," the response time for the police was 99

¹ Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL, Aug. 28, 1992, transcript pp. 354-59 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

percent faster than where I live now in the 17th ward.²

The assignments are controlled by the Fraternal Order of Police, not the superintendent. So it does not matter if the head [of the department] is African American or now Hispanic [because] he does not have the power to assign the supervisors to the districts who have the cultural sensitivity and relationship to be effective.³

We have watched the police sit by and watch crimes in progress, and they waited until someone is injured. [Then] they scoop them up like animals, take them to the county morgue or to jail. But there is no prevention initiative in the mind of the police.⁴

Marion Stamps, an executive officer with the Tranquility Marksman Organization,⁵ also declared that there was unequal police protection of the African American community.

There is more visibility of the police in our community. There is more of a presence. . . . [But] they have not done anything. I do not see anything that has happened that has decreased the shooting, and that is my concern. My concern is about the bullets going in the window with the babies in the house getting shot. . . . See, I do not understand if we know where the shooting is coming from and we have told the police where the shooting is coming from and they have increased the police in the community, then why are they

still shooting? That is the stuff I do not understand.⁶

Others reiterated the refrain on unequal police protection of African Americans in Chicago. Bruce Jones, a resident of Chicago, told the Advisory Committee, "If you are talking about protection being unequal, . . . there is no real protection. Not only of minority community people, but there is no protection of anybody by the police."⁷

Audwin Short, a teenage resident of the Englewood area on the south side of Chicago, reported the ultimate end result of limited police protection. "Being a black male, I am more likely to go out into the world and lose my life than any other ethnic minority. . . . I have seen friends die. I have friends who have known friends who have died."⁸

Several speakers alleged that the reason for a lower level of police protection in the African American community is a different police philosophy for that community. Doreathear Washington, the chief investigator in the legal department for the Chicago Housing Authority, told the Advisory Committee:

There has always been, to the best of my knowledge, a philosophy that has emanated throughout the police department as a whole that property in the African American community is more important than people because of several factors. That in the African American community most likely

2 The "gold coast" is part of police district 18. It was referred to in chap. 3 of this report as having a much higher level of police officers than other residential districts despite having lower levels of crime.

3 Transcript, p. 271.

4 Ibid., p. 272.

5 Marion Stamps described the Tranquility Marksman Organization as "a 20-year community-based organization located on the near north side, Cabrini-Green community. Our mission is education of racial and self-determination pending revolution. What we do is to work with young people, families, elders in our community to instill a sense of self-determination."

6 Transcript, pp. 301-02.

7 Ibid., p. 322.

8 Ibid., pp. 364-65.

the store down the street, the business down the street is not owned by a black person, . . . and so there is a reverse feeling about what is important.⁹

Standish Willis, an attorney whose main practice involves filing Federal lawsuits against the police, supported the view that the police view the African American community differently:

The police, in our community, see themselves as an occupying force. As a matter of fact, the last superintendent used to use terms that suggest the war zone. He would refer to patrolmen as his men, and he would refer to our community at war. . . . So it is no wonder that police, when they come into our community, they come in as combat troops.¹⁰

Wilson echoed this sentiment, "The police presence in our community is hostile, it is not for protection."¹¹ Stamps went so far as to assert that "the police are part of a mass conspiracy to destroy black people."¹²

Finona Briard, a community activist in Chicago, testified that "between 1975 and 1990, 103,771 complaints [of police excessive force were] filed with OPS (Office of Professional Standards).¹³ [Only] 2,223 [complaints] were sustained by OPS."¹⁴ That is a rate of 2 percent. Willis picked up on this information, arguing that there is no effective disciplining of police in Chicago. Without such discipline, it "tends to encourage the segment of the police force that would

tend to be psychotic to behave the way that they behave."¹⁵

Syd Finley, director, Chicago Southside chapter of the NAACP, told the Advisory Committee that this "us versus them" attitude and the excessive force that results prevents equal and effective policing in the African American communities. These actions and this mentality build a wall of distrust between the black community and the police officers serving in those communities.

An initial assessment is that there is a towering wall of distrust between African American citizens and the police built in large measure by historical mistreatment of African Americans by the police. . . . Hearings consistently and disturbingly find a police attitude of it is "us against them."¹⁶

According to those addressing the Advisory Committee, what is needed for equal police protection in the African American community to occur is an equal level of resources and a police force that is racially and ethnically sensitive, with more black detectives and more police involvement in the community.

Wilson noted that police resources were not being fairly provided to the African American communities. She recommended that the United States Department of Justice formally be requested to investigate this disparity.

I would ask for the United States Justice Department to conduct [an] investigation [of] the Chicago Police Department in terms of its

9 Ibid., pp. 266-67.

10 Ibid., p. 290.

11 Ibid., p. 269.

12 Ibid., p. 282.

13 The Office of Professional Standards is identified in chap. 1 of this report as a civilian unit within the Chicago Police Department that investigates allegations of excessive force.

14 Transcript, p. 332.

15 Ibid., p. 292.

16 Ibid., p. 194.

disproportionate assignment of resources to the African American community versus the white community. I cannot fathom how [the police] could decline to appear [at this factfinding meeting].¹⁷

Short, the black teenager from Englewood, gave a specific example of how police, not knowing and being a part of the community, have difficulty policing an area.

I have never been in a gang in my life. I may know gang members, but I do not associate with them. I do not stay with them, I do not hang around with them. But, if I was on a corner with a group of my friends who are not gang members, a police car could roll by, they can stop, they can question us, they can arrest us. . . . And only because they saw a group of black males or black people together and assumed. . . I would like for the police officers to go into the community, get to know the people, ask them questions, know how things are around there. . . . Get to know the people in their area. . . . If [you] go along stereotypes, then brutality happens and innocent people get hurt by police officers.¹⁸

Finley supported the idea of the police being more involved in the community and also talked about the need for greater sensitivity training for police officers. He also stressed that there was an urgent need for more black detectives.

Closer rapport of police with community residents would [create] a better trust between both parties. Mandatory, meaningful human relations training for police officers [and] a more stringent psychological evaluation and screening to weed out perspective employees and periodically screen those on duty [would also help].

There should be more racial, ethnic, and sexual diversity on and throughout the Chicago Police Department. . . . I might point out the . . . tremendous need for additional black detectives. When Eugene Sawyer stopped being the mayor of the city of Chicago there was an insignificant number of blacks, somewhere in the neighborhood of less than 10 out of a total number of detectives that registered somewhere in the neighborhood of 220.¹⁹

Among things mentioned as needed for improvement of police protection in the African American community was an improved communications system. Alderman Beavers reported to the Advisory Committee:

In my investigation [of police response time] I found out [the problem] came from the zone operator, not from the police officer. The [officer] never received the call. [The operators] in the 2nd district and the 3rd district, and some parts of district 21 and parts of 9 always had a slow response time. They would always hold the calls and take their time in issuing them out. This is where your number one problem is, in the communications center.²⁰

Kimber made a final point for the Advisory Committee. He said that in many instances, the police officer serving the black community is working in a devastated area. This calls for the officer to have knowledge of social services available because often the police officer is the only social agency residents are aware of.

The police department is the final net when you go to a socioeconomic neighborhood that is at the bottom of the ladder. The police officer in these neighborhoods tends to be everything for the

17 Ibid., pp. 276-77.

18 Ibid., pp. 307-08.

19 Ibid., pp. 192-93.

20 Ibid., p. 214.

community. And what has happened, in my opinion, is that the police officer is not everything for the community because he is not wellinformed, does not have enough information or does not have the tools in which to fight the crime.²¹

The beat officer that works the street, that deals directly with crime needs to be informed. He needs to have direct contact with someone in the

education department, the welfare department, the utilities support and that counterpart needs to have just as much authority as he does. . . . You would be surprised at the number of people that call and the reason they call the police is because their electricity is off. . . . You need to have the authority, as the police officer, to take that extra step.²²

21 Ibid., p. 336.

22 Ibid., 337-38.

Chapter 5

Racial Composition of the Chicago Police Department

The Chicago Police Department has over 13,000 sworn officers. That police force serves a population that is 40 percent African American. Nowicki explained that effective law enforcement in a multicultural society requires diversity within the ranks of law enforcement officers.

Looking at who fills the ranks of our police agencies is another important issue. . . . Simply stated, inequalities in the makeup of the work force can certainly spill over to problems on the street. . . . In order to provide equal and effective law enforcement, agencies need to provide balanced representation of all segments of society.¹

Historically, the Chicago Police Department has been a predominantly white establishment (see table 5.1). In 1956 "there were fewer than 1,000 blacks and only 10 Hispanics on a force of some 9,700 police officers."² To break the racially disproportionate hiring of the Chicago Police Department, United States District Judge Prentice H. Marshall, in the 1970s, imposed affirmative action requirements on the city in its hiring of policemen. "According to his formula, 42 percent of all new officers had to be black or Hispanic. . . ." ³ By 1992, 65 percent of the 13,196 Chicago police officers were white, while just a little over 25 percent of the Chicago police force, 3,524, were African American.

TABLE 5.1
Chicago Police Department by Race and Bureau

Bureau	Total	Whites	Blacks	Other
Admin. Dept.	361	194	129	38
Admin. Serv.	153	57	92	4
Tech. Serv.	715	391	277	47
Investig.	1,919	1,487	338	94
Opertn. Svc.	10,048	6,448	2,688	912
Total	13,196	8,577	3,524	1095

Source: Chicago Police Department Sex and Racial Composition Report, DPOL8159-48; July 2, 1992.

1 Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL Aug. 28, 1992, transcript pp. 40-41 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

2 Jeff Lyon and Jerry Thornton, "Uneasy Partners," *Sunday, The Chicago Tribune Magazine*, Sept. 16, 1984, p. 14.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

TABLE 5.2**African American Police Districts and Ratios of African American Police Officers and Supervisors**

District	African American % of district population	African American % of district police	African American % of police supervisors
2	99%	75%	62%
3	94	86	70
5	94	59	52
6	98	77	51
7	98	52	62
11	91	38	26
15	94	38	16

Source: Chicago Police Department Sex and Racial Composition Report, DPOL8159-48, July 2, 1992

In Chicago there are seven police districts where the resident population is more than 90 percent African American. In five of those districts both the majority of police officers and the majority of supervisory officers⁴ are African American. In districts 11 and 15, however, only 38 percent of the police officers and 21 percent of the supervisory officers are African American (see table 5.2).

The two police districts with the highest number of police officers, district 1 (Central) and district 18 (East Chicago) are policed predominantly by white officers.

District 1 ("the loop") has 362 patrol officers and 40 supervisory officers; 286 of the 362 patrol officers (80 percent) and 33 of the 40 supervisory officers (82 percent) are white. District 18, which encompasses both the "gold coast" and the Cabrini-Green public housing development, has a total of 467 police officers assigned to the district; 350 of the 429 patrol officers (82 percent) and 36 of the 38 supervisory officers (95 percent) are white.

Overall, there is a high correlation between the percentage of African American officers in a district and the district's racial composition. Moreover, there are no districts in the city without African American police officers. However, five districts, 14, 16, 17, 20, and 21, have no African American supervisory officers.

Detectives in the department are responsible for investigating reported crimes. There are five detective headquarters, each with a property crimes unit and a violent crimes unit. Each detective headquarters is responsible for certain police districts within the city.

Most police officers are promoted to detective through competitive examination. According to the department's 1992 EEO report, there are 854 detectives; 778 of the detectives (91 percent) are white (see table 5.3).

In 1992 the city proposed an affirmative action clause to the police contract to increase the number of minority officers in the "D2" rank—which includes detective, youth

⁴ Supervisory officers are sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and commanders.

TABLE 5.3
Racial Composition of Detectives

Race and sex	Number	Percent
White male	741	87.0
White female	37	4.0
African American male	44	5.0
African American female	13	1.5
Hispanic male	12	1.5
Hispanic female	3	0.5
Asian male	3	0.5
American Indian male	1	0.1

Source: Chicago Police Department Sex and Racial Composition Report, DPOL8159-48, July 2, 1992.

officers, and gang crimes officers. The Fraternal Order of Police opposed the motion and an arbitrator rejected it.

Rutherford Wilson, an African American who is a retired Chicago police detective,

was quoted in the *Chicago Sun Times* on the importance of minority detectives in providing police protection to the minority communities. He said minority detectives may be able to obtain information unavailable to the white detectives.

They need more minority [detectives] out there because there is certain information they may be able to get that maybe the people who are not from that community will not be able to find.⁵


The increase in violent crime in the city in the past decade has been partly attributed to escalating crime by youth. In 1990, 19 percent of those arrested for murder were under the age of 18 and 58 percent were under the age of 24 (see table 5.4).

Similar to the detective ranks, the youth officers and the gang crime officers of the Chicago Police Department tend to be white. There are 331 officers assigned to these two divisions; of those, 254 (77 percent) are white.⁶ These units and officers are centralized, working out of police headquarters.

⁵ Lee Bey, "Crime War Hit By Gap in Minority Detectives," *Chicago Sun Times*, Mar. 21, 1993, p. 3. See a similar sentiment expressed to the Committee by Audwin Short, p. 30.

⁶ Chicago Police Department, DPOL8159-48, July 2, 1992.

TABLE 5.4
Index Crime Arrests of Persons Under 25 by Percentages



Source: Chicago Police Department, *Annual Report 1990*, p. 8.

Chapter 6

Addendum: Cabrini-Green

In October 1991, the *Chicago Tribune* reported on the study by Barry Rundquist that showed that there were fewer police officers per violent crime in the black neighborhoods of Chicago than in the white neighborhoods.¹ Accompanying the article were quotes from several law enforcement officials. Their comments questioned "how much effect additional officers [could] have in preventing the most violent crimes."²

Ed Bishop, deputy chief of patrol for the Pullman Area, was quoted, "It has been proven if you saturate an area with police officers, you are going to decrease the violent crime. But what usually happens is you displace it. It goes somewhere else."³ Dennis Nowicki, also quoted, expressed similar sentiments, "More police officers just performing the same activities will have a limited impact. The more appropriate approach is to take those officers and have them identify problems and develop solutions."⁴

Three events occurred shortly after the factfinding meeting that focused on the issue of whether additional police resources would lead to a decrease in serious crime in the African American community. On October

13, 1992, Dantrell Davis, a 7-year-old living in the Cabrini-Green public housing development, was shot and killed by a high-powered rifle as he walked to school. Davis was the *third child* from his elementary school to be shot and killed since March 1992.

"Isaac Micab Ziegler was a fifth-grader sitting on his porch on October 1 when he was shot twice in the head. Isaac was 9 years old. On October 3, a bullet slammed into the skull of Teniya Booker as the car she rode in with her mom got caught in the cross fire of a gang-bangers gun battle . . . as they went for hamburgers. Teniya was just 3."⁵

Cabrini-Green is a public housing development on the near north side. The development comprises 31 high-rises and houses 6,935 residents,⁶ of whom 99 percent are African American. It borders the city's wealthiest residential area.⁷ In 1991 there were 624 reports of major crimes at Cabrini-Green (see table 6.1).

Steven Lynn, president of the Cabrini-Green Coalition, spoke about police protection at Cabrini-Green to the Advisory Committee:

1 That study was summarized in this report in chap. 3.

2 Sharman Stein and William Recktenwald, "Violent Areas Shorted On Cops, Study Finds," the *Chicago Tribune*, May 5, 1992, sec. 2, p. 7.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. These sentiments were also expressed to the Advisory Committee. See chap. 1 of this report.

5 Dennis A. Britton, "7-Year-Old's Death at Cabrini Requires Action," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Oct., 15, 1992, p. 1.

6 Chicago Housing Authority, Office of External Affairs, based on data from one day in August 1991. The official number does not include individuals living illegally in the CHA development.

7 Chicago's lower *gold coast*, defined as roughly between Division, Walton, State, and the lake, is one of the neighborhoods bordering Cabrini-Green. The *gold coast* has a per capita income of \$82,169. The per capita income of Cabrini-Green is \$2,739. Source: Andrew Herman, "Where Wealth Is-And Isn't," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Jan. 27, 1993, p. 5.

TABLE 6.1
Reports of Major Crime at Cabrini-Green,
1989-1992

1989	429
1990	587
1991	624
1992	717

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from Chicago Housing authority data.

I cannot tell you how many countless times that there have been shootings. . . . They are shooting every single day, and I am not exaggerating whatsoever. . . . We are not just talking about at night like in the old days when . . . gangs started becoming prevalent at night time. . . . Now it is during the day. . . . So all times are chaotic.

Rarely, rarely do you see police driving through. . . . Rarely do you see police get out of their cars. . . . They will stop, bring some people over, yell over the speaker on top of the car to break it up, and drive off. That is not breaking up anything [because the criminals] move away for a minute, go around the building and come back and start shooting. . . . [There are] several instances [where the police] have never even shown up after a shooting.

But if you go across [Michigan Avenue into the gold coast] and you are an African American male, and you grab one of the lady's purses, they will have you. They will come into your building and get you. . . . If you go over there and break into someone's house or stick them up, they will apprehend three or four black youths and make them tell who did it. But if something happens in our community, there is no investigation. . . . You see the person that shot at you walking around the next day. . . .⁸

Reacting to public outcry over the shooting of Dantrell Davis and the continuing violence in the public housing developments, Mayor Richard M. Daley announced at a press conference on October 19 the following actions that would be taken by the city to protect Cabrini-Green and other public housing residents. They included:

- vacating and sealing four low occupancy highrises at Cabrini-Green,
- emptying and closing off ground floor apartments of all other CHA highrises to keep guns out of the buildings,
- police sweeps of all Cabrini-Green highrises,
- sweeping all other CHA buildings over the next several months,
- installing one way turnstiles at all rear exits of Cabrini-Green buildings and placing metal detectors at the front entrances,
- permanently stationing police officers and armed security guards in building lobbies and on patrol and beginning a resident identification program,
- expanding the tenant patrol program and forming resident management corporations at CHA buildings, and
- upgrading the lighting at the CHA complexes.⁹

On the morning of October 20, police began sweeps of the Cabrini-Green highrises. Simultaneously, other aspects of the mayor's program were put into place. Ten days later the *Chicago Sun-Times* reported:

All 31 highrise building lobbies [in Cabrini-Green] have been secured and metal detectors installed, private security guards have been replaced by CHA guards and Chicago police have nearly doubled their Cabrini force.¹⁰

⁸ Testimony before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, factfinding meeting, Chicago, IL, Aug. 28., 1992, transcript pp. 175-77 (hereafter cited as Transcript).

⁹ As reported in the *Chicago Sun-Times*, Oct. 20, 1992, p. 1.

¹⁰ Tom Seibel, *Chicago Sun-Times*, Nov. 1, 1992, p. 3.

Commander Robert Guthrie, head of the public housing police, said that as a result, "Crime in Cabrini has plummeted during the last two weeks. There hasn't even been a shooting."¹¹ But Frances Sandoval, president of the Chicago chapter of Mothers Against Gangs, told a reporter:

We acknowledge the mayor's efforts. But eventually the sweep is going to be gone. Two weeks are going to pass and it is going to be open season again. What we need is [this] 365 days a year.¹²

Evidence of serious crime at Cabrini-Green shows the results that police attention can have on safety. In the first quarter of 1992, there were 103 reported murders, assaults, thefts, robberies, and burglaries at Cabrini-Green. With the increased police presence, there were 65 similar incidents for the first quarter of 1993—a decrease of nearly 60 percent (see table 6.2).

The *Chicago Sun-Times* reported that the residents feel safer since the additional protective measures were instituted.

Six months after the furor over the killing of first-grader Dantrell Davis, who was shot by a sniper while walking to school, the streets of Cabrini are noticeably safer, residents and police said. There have been no killings at the complex since Dantrell's death on Oct. 7 and only two shootings since Oct. 20, according to police. . . . In the months before Dantrell's death, residents complained of almost nightly gunfire. . . . [Now] incidents of sniper shootings, such as the one that killed Dantrell, have been nearly eliminated.¹³

In February 1993, crime statistics for serious crime were released by the city for 1992.

TABLE 6.2
Serious Crime Reported at Cabrini-Green, First Quarter, 1992, and First Quarter, 1993

	1st qtr. 1992	1st qtr. 1993
Murder	1	0
Assault	35	22
Theft	31	30
Robbery	21	5
Burglary	15	8

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from *Chicago Sun-Times* data.

It showed serious crime in 1992 dropped to a 5-year low in Chicago Housing Authority developments. CHA was reported as giving "credit for the decrease to the sweeps, in which law enforcement and CHA administrators canvass a building, kick out those who do not belong, then beef up security and maintenance services."¹⁴ It was also reported:

Significant decrease in crime occurred in several developments where the agency has focused concerted efforts on security. They include Ida B. Wells, the model for the federal "Weed and Seed" program that brought a CHA police station and social services to the development last year. Having a police station in the development also helped decrease crime in Madden Park and Robert Taylor Homes, one of the more troubled developments.¹⁵

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² *Chicago Sun-Times*, Oct. 20, 1992, p. 17.

¹³ Lee Bey, "Dantrell's Legacy—A Cabrini Cease-Fire," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Apr. 25, 1993, p. 3.

¹⁴ Maudlyne Iherjirika, "CHA Crime Drops," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Feb. 12, 1993, p. 26.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Chapter 7

Findings

1. African American residents of Chicago are the victims of serious crime at a significantly higher rate than white residents. African Americans, 39 percent of the city's population, were 87 percent of the homicide victims in 1991. Half of all the violent crime in Chicago occurs in the seven police districts that are over 90 percent African American. Yet these seven districts are only 20 percent of the city's population.

2. The African American community perceives itself to be isolated and unprotected. This sentiment comes from political leaders, community activists, and residents. Moreover, this is not a new lament. A mayoral citizens' committee, in 1967, studying the issue of police and race relations in Chicago, made the same observation.

3. There is a drug war raging in the African American neighborhoods. This pestilence is the cause of much of the violence in the black community. Killings and shootings are directly attributable to factions fighting over "selling turfs." Robberies are linked to users of illegal drugs seeking resources to feed their habit.

4. The Chicago Police Department is not providing the same level of protection from violent crime to African Americans that it is providing to the white community. *The Chicago Reporter* reported the disparity of police patrols in predominantly black districts in proportion to the level of violent crime in 1983. Eight years later, a similar study showed the same pattern: police districts that are predominantly African American have significantly fewer police patrols per violent crime than other police districts.

The new police districts created by the city in the 1970s and 1980s were established in predominantly white residential areas of the city. Officers in these districts and in other "lower crime" districts have more time to handle calls and are available for immediate response to calls for service.

5. The Chicago Police Department does not routinely reassess its district deployment with respect to its established formula. The current beat deployment allocation has not been revised in 7 years, nor is there evidence of any studies by the police department analyzing manpower patrol distribution relative to the effectiveness of crime deterrence in Chicago.

The Booz•Allen study is the first analysis of police strategy in decades. Although conducted in cooperation with the police department, it is an external study. The division of research and statistics within the department has no public record of doing any similar research.

6. The presence of police does deter crime. Additional police presence may displace crime, as argued by some researchers, but it also deters crime. The additional police activity in Cabrini-Green in late 1992 with a resultant drop in serious crime and the decreasing crime levels in CHA developments following the provision of supplementary police resources are testaments to this fact.

7. Police services are only part of total services that provide protection for city residents. The majority of a patrol officer's time is spent in noncriminal activities. A significant social contribution can be made by police officers in this capacity.

8. The city has accepted a concept of community policing and is beginning to implement such a program. The new policing policy is based on the Booz•Allen report and is intended to involve patrol officers more intimately in the neighborhoods they serve, thereby preventing crime instead of reacting to crime.

Under the proposed system, the weighted workload, as now used by the Chicago Police Department to assign patrol officers, will be abandoned. Instead, calls for service will be the basis for beat deployment. This methodology has the potential for perpetuating proportionately less protection for African American communities against violent crime. Individuals in high-crime areas tend to call police less and police response to violent crime takes more patrol time than responses to calls for noncrime service.

Five pilot programs have been initiated by the city and extra police resources are being allocated to these areas. Two of the pilot districts are high-crime neighborhoods in the African American community. Another district has a mixed racial composition.

9. The police department is often secretive and closed to the community about its policies, programs, and efforts. The police department refused an invitation to discuss the topic of police protection of the African American community with this

Advisory Committee. There are incessant complaints of no access and no response to calls for service from the African American community.

Moreover, the Chicago Police Department has data on victimization by race and response time that are maintained but have not been made public.¹ This restriction of information by the police department abets feelings of isolation and distrust within the African American community.

10. Effective police protection of the African American community is intrinsically bound to a diverse police force. Such diversity is important at all levels and in all positions. Currently, the African American community is 39 percent of the city's population. After 20 years of court-ordered affirmative action, the African American composition of the Chicago Police Department is just 25 percent.

Furthermore, police units with great impact on the safety of the African American community are severely underrepresented in terms of minorities. These units include the detective positions, the youth officers, and the gang crimes unit. Given the segregation of the city and the racial and cultural diversity, the serious underrepresentation in these units in itself makes equal police protection for African Americans virtually unachievable.

¹ CPD-11.380 (rev. 8/31), General Offense Case Report, is the reporting form used by patrol officers. It lists the victim's race.

Chapter 8

Recommendations

Rising crime levels, shrinking resources, widespread drug use, personal danger, overcrowded jails, backlogged courts, and a public that expects everything immediately make police work in Chicago in the 1990s arduous and frustrating. Nevertheless, despite such difficulties it is the responsibility of the Chicago Police Department to provide equal protection to all citizens regardless of race or neighborhood. Equal police protection entails:

- equal response to similar calls for service,
- equal preventive protection measures,
- similar courtesy and respect for all citizens, and
- a police force representative of the population served.

1. The Advisory Committee recommends that the Chicago Police Department begin to build bridges of trust between itself and the African American community. These bridges must be more than a dialogue between the police and the community. They must include a sharing of information by the police about victimization, response time, resources, and policing strategy. The vast majority of individuals living and working within the African American community desire police protection and are eager to work with the police department to protect their neighborhoods.

Communication must be a two-way street and the mechanism for cooperation and communication between the Chicago Police Department and the Chicago African American community must also be strengthened and mechanisms established for periodic community review of the effectiveness of the local policy. The policing community must show reasonable progress towards effective,

positive change in response time, resources, policing strategy, and alleviation of victimization within the African American community.

2. The dispatching of police to calls for service needs PUBLIC scrutiny. Many individuals living and working within the African American community accept that calls for service will either not be responded to or will receive a slow response.

The Advisory Committee recommends that the Governor of Illinois, either through executive order or legislative requirement, cause a continuing audit of police dispatching in cities over 500,000 to be implemented through the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority or otherwise. Such audit should be designed by geographic area and by race, religion, and ethnicity.

A public audit of dispatching by the police department will either confirm these suspicions and generate a correction of this problem or set forth the factual basis to dispute allegations of disproportionate response time. The citizens have a right to know how their police force is using its resources to serve and protect.

3. The persistent pattern of underrepresentation in the police force as a whole and in the detective ranks in particular must be alleviated. In light of prolonged failure to integrate the police force by existing methods, we urge consideration of the possibility of increased weight being given to pro-integrative factors such as the following in hiring and promotion in addition to other factors which have historically been considered:

- a. residence, past and present, in high crime areas, and/or

- b. contacts within high-crime areas, and/or
- c. detailed knowledge of high-crime areas.

4. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has the duty to study discrimination in the administration of justice because of race.¹ **The Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concludes that African Americans in the city of Chicago are suffering discrimination in the administration of justice. We recommend that the United States**

Department of Justice be requested to investigate whether or not action is appropriate in light of what appears to be a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most fundamental sense of personal security.

5. We recommend the assistance of the Congress of the United States and the legislature of the State of Illinois in supplying additional police resources to provide equal response time and servicing to minority and majority communities alike.

¹ Pub. L. 98-183, 97 Stat. 1301 (1983).

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT UNITS

032	Alternate Response Program (Call Back)	171	Central Detention Section
044	Recruit Training	172	Equipment and Supplies Section
045	District Reinstatements	173	Motor Maintenance Division
050	Airport Law Enforcement Unit-North	174	Electronics Maintenance Division
055	Mounted Unit	175	Communications Division-Administration
057	Detail Unit	176	Communication Operations Section
058	Canine Unit	177	Crime Laboratory Division
059	Marine Unit	178	Property Management Division
071	Youth Division Area 1	179	Reproduction and Graphic Arts section
072	Youth Division Area 2	180	Investigative Services-Administration
073	Youth Division Area 3	184	Youth Division-Administration
074	Youth Division Area 4	188	Organized Crime Division-Administration
075	Youth Division Area 5	189	Narcotics Section-Administration
076	Youth Division Area 6	192	Vice Control Section
091	Narcotics Special Enforcement	193	Intelligence Section
092	Narcotics General Enforcement	251	Crime Lab Federal Grant
093	Narcotic Street Level Enforcement	271	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 1
094	Nuisance Abatement	272	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 2
101	Police Board	273	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 3
111	Department-Administration	274	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 4
113	Office of Professional Standards	275	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 5
120	Administrative Services-Administration	276	Youth School Patrol Unit, Area 6
121	Internal Affairs Division	284	Youth School Patrol Unit-Administration
122	Finance Division	541	Fraternal Order of Police Staff
123	Personnel Division	542	Government Security Detail
124	Training Group	543	Detached Services-Miscellaneous Detail
125	Data Systems Division	601	Detective Division-Administration
126	Auditing and Internal Control Division	602	Auto Theft Section
127	Research and Development Division	603	Bomb and Arson Section
128	Professional Counseling Services	606	Detective Division Miscellaneous Detail
129	Management and Labor Affairs Section	610	Detective Division, Area 1 Administration
132	Neighborhood Relations Division	611	Area 1 Property Crimes
133	Preventive Programs Division	612	Area 1 Violent Crimes
140	Operational Services-Administration	620	Detective Division, Area 2 Administration
141	Special Functions Division	621	Area 2 Property Crimes
142	Patrol Division-Administration	622	Area 2 Violent Crimes
145	Traffic Group-Administration	630	Detective Division, Area 3 Administration
146	Major Accident Investigation Unit	631	Area 3 Property Crimes
148	Traffic Court/Records Unit	632	Area 3 Violent Crimes
151	Traffic Enforcement Unit	640	Detective Division, Area 4 Administration
152	Loop Traffic Unit	641	Area 4 Property Crimes
154	Traffic Safety and Training Unit	642	Area 4 Violent Crimes
156	Gang Crime Section-Administration	650	Detective Division, Area 5 Administration
157	Public Housing Section-Administration	651	Area 5 Property Crimes
159	Gun Registration Section	652	Area 5 Violent Crimes
160	Technical Services-Administration	660	Detective Division, Area 6 Administration
161	General Support Division-Administration	661	Area 6 Property Crimes
162	Records Division-Administration	662	Area 6 Violent Crimes
163	Records Inquiry Section	701	Public Transportation Section (M.T.S.)
164	Records Processing Section	702	CTA Security
165	Field Inquiry Section	710	Gang Crime Unit-South
166	Identification Section	715	Public Housing Unit-South
167	Evidence and Recovered Property Section	740	Gang Crime Unit-West
168	Automotive Pounds Section	760	Gang Crime Unit-North
169	Police Document Services Section	765	Public Housing Unit-North

Appendix II

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT



**DISTRICT
BEAT ALLOCATION**

I. METHODOLOGY

The Department allocates beats to the Patrol Division in sufficient number to provide for both preventive patrol and the handling of citizens' calls for service.

The beat allocation plan, which took more than 18 months to develop represents considerable research and analysis of workload, documentation, geographic and operational considerations and police and citizen input. Each police district is apportioned a percentage of the patrol force based on its workload. The plan provides for allocating police resources through a method that addresses the needs of all the citizens of the City of Chicago and the resources of the Department.

II. DEPLOYMENT FORMULA - WEIGHTED BY VERIFIED CRIME

The district beat deployment formula apportions a percentage of the patrol force based on city-wide workload experience. The beat deployment formula establishes a basic primary and sector beat structure utilizing certain factors which assist in making this determination.

The following weighting factors were used in making the existing determination:

PART I INDEX VIOLENT CRIME

... Weight of 15

Part I Index Violent Crime include:

Homicide, Rape, Robbery and Serious Battery.

PART I INDEX PROPERTY CRIME

... Weight of 10

Part I Index Property Crime include:

Burglary, Theft and Auto Theft

PART II CRIME

... Weight of 8

Part II Crimes include:

Simple Battery and Assault, Forgery, Counterfeiting, Embezzlement, Vice Complaints, Weapons Violations, Willful Damage to Property and other Miscellaneous Criminal Conduct.

... Weight of 6

Other incidents include those calls for service that require police response, but are not of a criminal nature, for example injured person, sick removal/confinement.

III. ELEMENTS DETERMINING THE WEIGHTING PROCESS

The weights for each verified crime category are determined by dividing the total number of incidents by the amount of time necessary to complete the assignment, then divided by a common denominator to complete the final weight for each incident.

IV. ALLOCATION OF PRIMARY AND SECTOR BEATS

The districts are apportioned a percentage of the patrol force by relating their percentage of the city-wide weighted workload to the total number of units available for the City. To add to the validity of the allocation of units determined by weighted workload factors consideration is also given to the number of calls for service received by each district.

The weighted workload for each district is then divided by the number of beats available for that district to determine the average workload of each beat. Sector beats are established for the second and third watches to handle the increased activity during this time. The primary and sector beats are designed, to the extent possible, to equalize officer workload.

V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Command and Citizen Input
- Emerging or recognized high-crime areas
- Airports and other major transportation transfer points
- District Land Areas and Population
- Major Shopping or Recreational Facilities.

Appendix III

Response of the Chicago Police Department

Pursuant to Commission administrative procedure, a draft report of *Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago* was sent to the Chicago police department on April 30, 1993, for review and comment. The enclosed May 28, 1993, letter from superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez is in response to the draft report.

Response to the May 28, 1993, letter:

page 1, paragraph 2

The changes in deployment refer to the community oriented policing strategy recommended by the Booz·Allen & Hamilton study and summarized in chapter 1. As of midnight, April 28, 1993, 5 of the 25 Chicago police districts began a limited experiment with community oriented policing. The deployment practices studied in this report are not out of date. The past practices of manpower allocation remain in force for 80 percent of the Chicago police districts and the change in the five "community oriented policing" districts is primarily a change in strategy, not a change in allocation.

page 1, paragraph 3

The original proposition of the Advisory Committee was to study whether there was unequal police protection of the African American community in Chicago. The title of the study and of this report is *Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago*.

page 1, paragraph 4

No specific disagreement is noted between the police department and the Advisory Committee on the facts and data contained in the report.

page 2, paragraph 3


The Advisory Committee made several requests to the Chicago police department for the deployment of special non-patrol units. These requests were denied and the police department declined to appear at the factfinding meeting to discuss such deployment. This prompted the Advisory Committee to study the deployment of these special non-patrol units by area, as summarized in chapter 3.

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Richard M. Daley, Mayor
Matt L. Rodriguez, Superintendent of Police

May 28, 1993

Constance M. Davis, Regional Director
United States Commission on Civil Rights
Midwestern Regional Office
Xerox Centre, Suite 410
55 West Monroe Street
Chicago, IL 60603

Dear Ms. Davis:

Thank you for the draft of *Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago*. I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report. However, because I was not provided with a complete copy of the report, including the Advisory Committee's findings and recommendations, I am hampered in my ability to provide a full response.

As you are aware, during the past year the Chicago Police Department has participated fully in the fact-finding efforts of both the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the Midwestern Regional Office. The Department provided thousands of documents and pages of written testimony. However, the Department chose not to present oral testimony at your hearings last summer because we were in the midst of making significant changes directly impacting many of the issues which are addressed in your report. At that time, we suggested that the hearings might be postponed to allow a reasonable time to assess the effects of these changes. Nonetheless, the Commission decided to proceed, focusing on past deployment practices. The Advisory Committee's report, therefore, is already out of date.

I am also concerned that the report contains statements and opinions of a select few community members. While I agree that it is useful to listen to the opinions of different people and to discern what perceptions may be present in our communities, it is inappropriate for the Committee to base its findings on anecdotal information. The very title of your summer hearings, *Unequal Police Protection of the African American Community in Chicago*, suggests that the Committee had reached its conclusions before listening to any evidence or reviewing all of the facts. At a time of dynamic change — and opportunity — in the City of Chicago, it is critical that our criminal justice policies be based on empirical evidence, and not opinion, conjecture and emotion. This is particularly important in a matter as sensitive as the deployment of police resources.

Responding in great detail to the information presented in the report would be to focus unnecessary attention on disagreements we might have about past history. Other than

Ms. Constance M. Davis
May 28, 1993
Page 2

generally addressing a few of the report's key points, this letter concentrates on the dramatic changes the Department is making both now and in the future — changes that directly impact and, I believe, improve the quality of police protection for all of Chicago's citizens.

The Deployment of Police Resources

The effective and equitable deployment of police resources is of great concern to the Department. It is my firm belief that our deployment methods have been, and continue to be, reasonable and equitable. The deployment of police resources within the City is based on numerous factors, but *the racial and ethnic composition of the communities we serve has not been, is not presently, nor will it ever be a factor in our deployment decisions*. In fact, many of the studies and testimony cited in your report state unequivocally that police patrols are not distributed on the basis of race.

Deploying police resources to maximize their effectiveness is a complex process, and an issue on which few police experts and academicians agree. Your report, however, tends to take a rather narrow and simplistic view of this very complex issue. For example, it looks only at the issue of violent crime rates in suggesting appropriate police deployment, when most experts agree that a more comprehensive set of factors needs to be considered. To base allocation of police personnel solely on violent crime is to ignore fully 75% of the service calls to which police officers respond. These calls, including many that are non-criminal in nature (domestic disturbances, arguments over traffic accidents, loud parties, etc.), have tremendous *potential* for turning violent. By deploying personnel to respond to these incidents, the police are providing a meaningful form of proactive, preventive policing.

Furthermore, your report draws conclusions based on incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information. For example, while your report describes the special non-patrol units of the Department, it appears that the deployment studies you rely on examine only Patrol Division resources. These studies fail to take into account the varied and extensive non-patrol resources that the Department maintains, including gang crimes, detective, narcotics, public housing, auto theft, youth, bomb and arson, intelligence, vice control, preventive programs, neighborhood relations and public transportation. These non-patrol resources account for nearly one-third of the department's sworn officers, and much of their activity is focused on districts experiencing significant levels of violent crime. Additionally, the Chicago Housing Authority's Police Department, another significant factor in the overall deployment of police resources, is mentioned only in passing in the report.

Researchers and criminal justice practitioners generally agree that merely increasing the number of police officers does not directly translate to a decrease in the crime rate or an increase in the proportion of crimes solved. It is true that as demands on the Department have increased in recent years, our resources have not kept pace. But as a Department moving to more community-oriented approaches to policing, we are concentrating on not only how many police officers we have, but also how effectively these officers are used in the communities they serve.

Recognizing a Need for Change

Like the rest of the nation, Chicago is experiencing an era of spiraling crime and a criminal justice system that is extremely overburdened. We are arresting more offenders than ever before, but our courts, jails and prisons are filled to capacity. At times, it seems that as quickly as we apprehend and process offenders, they are back on the streets again. We are also witness to increased violence, racial and ethnic polarization, and intolerance. In this environment, it is easy to understand why all of us — public officials and citizens alike — are so frustrated about the problems of crime, violence and neighborhood disorder.

Crime statistics tend to feed the frustration. Last year in Chicago, more than 84,000 violent crimes were reported to the police, and thousands more went unreported. More recent statistics offer some signs of hope. Reports of violent crime declined 6% between 1991 and 1992, and Chicago's homicide rate for the first four months of this year is running behind last year's rate. We are cautiously optimistic this is the beginning of a trend, but we are resolute in our belief that the violent crime rate in Chicago is still too high.

As high as these Citywide totals are, we know that victimization rates are tragically higher in Chicago's African-American and Hispanic communities. African Americans represent approximately 39% of Chicago's population, according to the 1990 census. But African Americans accounted for more than 66% of the homicide victims in 1992. And historically, African American and Hispanic men — particularly *young* African American and Hispanic men — have suffered the highest murder rates of all racial and ethnic groups.

It is important to understand that these trends are not unique to the City of Chicago. Nationwide, according to the National Centers for Disease Control and Injury Prevention, African American males are seven times more likely to die from homicide than white males. And homicide remains the leading cause of death among young African American males in our country.

It is impossible to isolate any single cause or even a set of causes behind the unacceptably high level of violence we are experiencing in Chicago and nationwide. The answer lies in a complex mix of factors, some of which the criminal justice system is equipped to address, some of which it is not. However, as the Centers for Disease Control concluded in its recent study of violence, we need not — indeed we *should not* — wait to take action on the problem of violence until we have solved these large-scale social problems. The Department is not waiting for society to solve the problems of poverty, educational failure, unemployment and substance abuse. We have taken the initiative, using a variety of new and hopeful strategies, to deal with the problems of crime and violence in our communities.

A Renewed Mission

At the nucleus of these strategies are several fundamental philosophical and policy changes that the Department made in the last year. The cornerstone of these changes is our recently revised mission statement, which reads:

Ms. Constance M. Davis
May 28, 1993
Page 4

The Chicago Police Department, as a part of, and empowered by the community, is committed to protect the lives, property and rights of all people, to maintain order, and to enforce the law impartially. We will provide quality police service in partnership with other members of the community. To fulfill our mission, we will strive to attain the highest degree of ethical behavior and professional conduct at all times.

Additionally, last July the Department consolidated and significantly expanded our existing policies on human rights into a strong and cohesive 47-page general order on human rights and human resources. This policy recognizes the distinctive cultures, lifestyles, customs and concerns of the people who live and work in our City. At the same time, it emphasizes the common need of all citizens for protection and service through objective and impartial law enforcement.

Community Policing: Changing the Direction of Policing in Chicago

To implement these philosophical and policy changes, the Department has embraced a new model of policing — the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, or CAPS.

For the last 30 years, Chicago, like most major city police departments in the country, employed a policing strategy that was reactive, deploying police resources to respond to 911 calls. Law enforcement agencies attempted to prevent crimes by quickly responding to citizens calls and arresting and incarcerating offenders. While this approach may temporarily remove certain offenders from the community, it does little to alter underlying problems of crime and disorder. In addition, this traditional approach has become very expensive, not just in terms of police expenditures but also for the rising costs of courts, jails and prisons.

As demand for police services skyrocketed, and real funding for police stayed the same or even declined, police departments found themselves almost totally incident-driven. Because officers were dispatched from call to call, there was no time to examine the causes underlying these calls for service. Ironically, it has been the very technological improvements designed to make the police more efficient (radios, computers and squad cars) that have isolated the police from the communities they are charged with serving and protecting. The Chicago Police Department is committed to breaking down the barriers between the community and the police. The implementation of CAPS is a major step in that direction.

Last month the Department launched CAPS in five prototype police districts: the Englewood and Morgan Park Districts on the south side; the Marquette and Austin Districts on the west side; and the Rogers Park District on the north side. These districts represent the racial, ethnic and socio-economic diversity within the City. The program is undergoing a thorough evaluation by the Department and a consortium of six major Chicago-area universities. The information being gathered and analyzed will provide empirical information about the strategy's effectiveness, in anticipation of Citywide implementation next year. (A sampling of recent news clippings about CAPS is enclosed.)

To implement the program, each of the prototype districts has been allocated an additional 40 officers. Specially designated rapid response teams have been created to respond to emergencies in the district. This gives beat officers opportunity to work

with the community on issues of concern to them. CAPS represents a dramatic shift in what is expected of individual beat officers. It relies on their initiative, their ingenuity and their ability to recognize and mobilize resources to solve neighborhood conditions which may give rise to serious and violent crime. CAPS also represents a dramatic shift in what is expected of individual citizens. It relies on citizens learning to work with the police in new ways. Vigorous law enforcement, crime prevention and public safety remain the primary focus of the Police Department, now coupled with a greater partnership with the community.

We all know that crime is not just a police matter but a community problem as well. That is the message that I took earlier this month to the Law Enforcement Officials Hearing at the NAACP's Illinois Chapter. The panel members asked me specifically, "How can the community help?" The most obvious answer is to join with us as a true partner in identifying, prioritizing and solving the problems of crime and disorder that impact the quality of life in our neighborhoods. This is the essence of our CAPS model.

Other Innovative Programs

In addition to CAPS, the Department is using other new programs to deal with crime and violence in our community. These include operational programs as well as improved training and employee recruitment and development.

Police "peace keeping" — early police intervention (often accompanied by a social service response) in non-criminal and less serious criminal incidents — is critical because these calls frequently result in violent incidents. Last year, for example, the Department launched an innovative program targeting domestic violence and spousal homicides in the largely African American Grand Crossing Police District. In recent years, this district has had a homicide rate from domestic violence that is three times the Citywide average. The Department provided all officers in the district with advanced training in domestic violence issues. Officers are working with local domestic violence counselors to form mobile crisis intervention teams. Using a computer system that identifies high-risk households with a history of domestic disturbances, these teams attempt to intervene in the cycle of domestic violence.

Another recent program targets gang-related violence in the largely Hispanic parts of the Marquette District. This program attempts to mobilize the community and the criminal justice system to diminish the influence of street gangs. Aggressive enforcement is combined with gang outreach teams and intensive probation services for known gang members.

As part of another innovative program, a computerized crime analysis system is being used to identify specific locales at risk for increased gang violence. Police in Area 4 are using this early warning system to address street gang activity and crime.

Education and Training

To respond to the changing demands on police officers, training in the Department is also changing. Our training emphasizes proactive approaches to policing in addition

to reactive techniques. This change in philosophy is best characterized by three recent training efforts that the Department has sponsored.

Beginning in April of this year, the 1,750 police officers and supervisors from the CAPS prototype districts took part in a four-day training program taught by civilians and police. Community representatives from each of the five prototype districts also participated. Designed to improve communication, community alliance building, goal setting, and problem solving skills, the training emphasized officer participation and interaction. Sergeants and lieutenants from these districts received an additional day's training in leadership.

In addition to the leadership training of supervisors in the prototype districts, all lieutenants, captains and exempt personnel in the Department have recently attended a five-day executive development program at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Sergeants are currently receiving the same training, which should be completed by January 1994. The focus of this training is change management, problem solving and cultural awareness.

In recognition of the critical importance of effective communication between the police and Chicago's diverse citizenry, the Department instituted a formal sensitivity training program last fall. More than 4,000 police officers have already completed this two-day training course. An additional 5,000 officers are scheduled to receive the training.

Recruiting a More Diverse Workforce

Historically, law enforcement officers in Illinois have been predominantly white males. In Chicago, 88.6% of police officers are white, and 32.7% are African American and Hispanic. Males represent 76.8% of the sworn workforce.

It should be recognized that the City has been hiring and promoting minorities on an affirmative action basis since 1975, at first pursuant to court order and later voluntarily. Since 1980, the City's affirmative action efforts have been fought in court and elsewhere by the Fraternal Order of Police and groups of white officers. There are currently six federal lawsuits with multiple plaintiffs challenging affirmative action in the promotional ranks.

Despite this barrage of reverse discrimination lawsuits, the City has not backed away from its efforts to remedy the underrepresentation of minorities throughout the Department. Most recently, as noted by the Advisory Committee's report, the City has attempted to change the police contract to allow for greater minority representation in the D-2 rank, which includes detectives, youth officers and gang crime specialists.

The Department is committed to recruiting a more diverse workforce, and recent efforts to provide a more balanced representation of women and minorities have shown promise. Approximately 62% of the 1991 list of recruit candidates were female or minority. The Department is engaging in an aggressive campaign to encourage more minority and female candidates to apply for police officer positions. Additionally, for the first time, we are reaching out to the gay and lesbian community for the same purpose.


Ms. Constance M. Davis
May 28, 1993
Page 7

An Era of Challenge and Change

This is a time of challenge and change for the Chicago Police Department and the entire City. Crime remains serious and often deadly. The fight against crime is one of our common bonds.

Through the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy and other innovative, community-based programs, the Department is taking a leadership role in trying to foster this spirit of trust and unity. We are shifting from a reactive approach to policing to one that emphasizes proactive strategies in partnership with the community. We are concentrating on the *quality* of our police officers and the police services they provide. I believe these significant changes in philosophy and policy will ensure quality police protection for every citizen of Chicago.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matt L. Rodriguez". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Matt L. Rodriguez
Superintendent of Police

MLR/bbm

Enclosures