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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

A STAFF REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

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U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

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- Study and collect information concerning legal developments constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or in the administration of justice;
- Appraise Federal laws and policies with respect to equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or in the administration of justice;
- Serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to denials of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

A Staff Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights May 1977

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PREFACE

The United States Commission on Civil Rights released on August 24, 1976, its report to the Nation: <u>Fulfilling</u> the <u>Letter and Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools.</u>

The report's findings and recommendations were based upon information gathered during a 10-month school desegregation project. This included four formal hearings (Boston, Massachusetts; Denver, Colorado; Louisville, Kentucky; and Tampa, Florida); four open meetings held by State Advisory Committees (Berkeley, California; Corpus Christi, Texas; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Stamford, Connecticut); a survey of nearly 1,300 local school districts; and 29 case studies of communities which had difficulties with desegregation, had moderate success with desegregation.

Subsequent to the report's release, considerable interest was generated concerning the specifics of the case study findings, which, owing to space limitations in the national report, were limited to a few brief paragraphs. In an effort to comply with public requests for more detailed information, Commission staff have prepared monographs for each of the case studies. These monographs were written from the extensive field notes already collected and supplemented, if needed, with further interviews in each community. They reflect, in detail, the original case study purpose of finding which local policies, practices, and programs in each community surveyed contributed to peaceful desegregation and which ones did not.

It is hoped that the following monograph will serve to further an understanding of the school desegregation process in this Nation.

CONTENTS

		Page
I.	Background	1
II.	Impetus for Desegregation	3
111.	The Desegregation Plan	5
IV.	Findings	16
	Appendix	19

I. BACKGROUND

The desegregation of the Minneapolis, Minnesota, schools (Special School District No. 1) was initiated in 1972, although the process leading to desegregation actually began in 1967 when the board of education adopted its first human relations guidelines and announced a voluntary urban transfer program. In 1970 the State of Minnesota issued desegregation guidelines which set a 30 percent ceiling on minority student enrollments. In April 1971, 17 Minneapolis schools were found out of compliance with State guidelines, and the State ordered the district to develop a desegregation plan. (Transcript, p. 18) 3

In August 1971 a lawsuit was filed in Federal district court charging the school district with the <u>de jure</u> segregation of students and faculty. The court's order of May 4, 1972, found unlawful segregation and required implementation of a plan prepared by the board of education which included provision for semiannual reports to the court on the district's progress.

The 1972 plan has now been virtually completed but the court continues to retain jurisdiction and to require periodic adjustments in the plan to bring the shifting student population of each school into compliance with the court-ordered ceilings on minority enrollment.

Demography

The city of Minneapolis has a population of 432,400 (as estimated by the 1970 census). Of this number, 19,000 persons (or 4.4 percent) are black. The census counted almost 6,700 persons of Hispanic origin (or about 1.5 percent of the local population) living in Minneapolis⁵ and noted that a total of nearly 10,000 Native Americans reside in the Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA, making this one of the highest urban concentrations of its kind in America.⁶ A 1976 profile of the larger Minneapolis-St. Paul region stressed the area's basically homogeneous Northern European ethnic

heritage and the relatively small number of minority citizens and commented:

The population of these middle class cities seems well endowed with the attitudes and attributes that bring material success in the American The 1969 median family income of \$11,680 was well above the \$9,590 median for SMSAs over 200,000 population. Only 4.6 percent of Twin Cities families fall below the 1969 poverty level as opposed to 8.5 percent in all metropolitan areas....Without minimizing the extent of poverty in the Twin Cities, the fact remains that residents are well off economically. The sharp cultural and social gradients that foster tension and conflict in many cities are absent...[thus] producing a metropolis in which social and cultural conflict has rarely attained the proportions it has in other places.7

The School District

The Minneapolis public schools make up Special School District No. 1, which shares boundary limits with the city. The 1975-76 enrollment for the city schools amounted to nearly 55,000, down from the system's peak in 1968 when almost 70,000 students were in attendance. The Minneapolis schools are roughly 21 percent minority in enrollment; for 1975-76, black students made up about 7,500 (13.6 percent) of the total and Native Americans amounted to about 2,800 students (5 percent).8 Other minorities were present in only limited numbers.

The Minneapolis schools are served by a faculty of about 6,600 educators. Of this number, 90 percent are white, and about 8 percent are black. Native Americans hold just over 1 percent of the faculty positions in Minneapolis according to 1975 figures supplied by the schools.9

II. IMPETUS FOR DESEGREGATION

A number of organizations and institutions played a role in the desegregation effort which began in 1972. According to Dr. Robert Williams, associate superintendent for intergroup education for the Minneapolis schools, the action of the Minnesota State Board of Education and the State commission of education in setting a minority enrollment ceiling and then citing Minneapolis for violations of the ceiling led the district to move toward desegregation. Dr. Williams also cited the importance of the Federal court action: "We feel that these interventions and the district court order in 1972 certainly helped to facilitate the school district's implementation of its desegregation program." (Transcript, p. 191) The court action had been initiated by local community organizations including the Committee for Integrated Education and the NAACP. (Transcript, pp. 32, 56)

Early Desegregation History

The Committee for Integrated Education (CIE), a biracial group of citizens, was formed in the late 1960s to convince the school board and school administrators that the desegregation of schools was essential for Minneapolis. (Transcript, p. 29) Leaders of this community organization later pointed out that, although the school board and school administration had been somewhat reluctant to initiate desegregation activities, they later stepped into a leadership role.

Barbara Schwartz of the CIE noted:

I think Minneapolis was very fortunate to have the kind of school administration and school board we had. While there was reluctance and I think slow going in the beginning, I think it's without question that the great burden of providing leadership for desegregation rested with them. (Transcript, pp. 69-70)

Curtis C. Chivers, who served as president of the local NAACP chapter during the early desegregation efforts, recalled:

I think what helped us greatly was the fact that we had a clean atmosphere of fairness in Minneapolis on the part of people who could have given us trouble, the business community and this type of thing. We had lines of communication being kept open; we had people on the school board you could talk with and converse with.

(Transcript, p. 72)

According to John Warder, who served on the school board from February 1964 to January 1969, the business community not only supported desegregation but also provided funds and resources which allowed for greater flexibility in desegregation planning and implementation. The Minneapolis schools have traditionally been able to rely on the business community for financial assistance (and frequently for material contributions such as vehicles or building space). Business support of alternative programs for high school dropouts, special extracurricular activities, and a vocational education program provided valuable aid to the newly desegregated local schools. (Transcript, p. 92) Some funds from business sources supported new educational programs while other funds were used for projects aimed at human relations aspects of the desegregation effort. (Transcript, p. 37)

III. THE DESEGREGATION PLAN

With supportive leadership, the Minneapolis desegregation/integration plan emerged in March 1972. It called for the coordination of the new building program with such activities as the institution of a number of new educational alternatives in the school curriculum, school pairings, implementation of the "middle school" concept, busing, "magnet" programs to attract whites into communities with high minority populations, "clustered" schools, and preparatory as well as ongoing programs for dealing with the social and psychological aspects of desegregation. 10

Most persons testifying at the Minnesota Advisory Committee's open meeting on school desegregation viewed the court order as a necessary catalyst in the desegregation effort. Some persons were of the opinion that it was the single most important element in achieving the degree of desegregation that was accomplished. Many witnesses at the open meeting felt that desegregation, absent the court order, would have been a slower and less complete process. Even with the court order, the school board requested in several of its semiannual reports to the court some relaxation of certain aspects of the plan.

The current acceptable percentage of minorities in any one school site has been increased from 35 percent to 42 percent by the court. 11 Several schools are near this limit, while some exceed it, such as Willard Elementary School at 43 percent minority, Hans Christian Anderson Elementary School (D) at almost 51 percent, Jordan Junior High at about 45.5 percent, and North High School at 48.5 percent. 12 Percentages such as these exceed the State's allowable 30 percent maximum, but the State of Minnesota has deferred jurisdiction over the Minneapolis schools to the Federal court during pendency of the suit. When the court relinquishes jurisdiction over the case at some future date, it is possible that the State may begin to enforce its own guidelines on racial composition.

School Boundaries

The Minneapolis plan called for the enlargement of neighborhood school zones into expanded community school areas. Fifteen of the city's oldest schools were closed. Three expanded community schools were built to serve large attendance areas of 1,000 to 1,800 students, divided into units of 600 pupils each. Additions were built to five elementary schools and one elementary school was replaced with a new building. High school boundary changes were made between contiguous school neighborhoods to improve the racial composition of school enrollments and to relieve crowding at some locations. One high school which had a large minority student enrollment was redeveloped as a magnet school in order to attract students from throughout the city.

Minneapolis still has one or two schools which are all white or very nearly so; several others have very high levels of white enrollment. Finally, some schools have been involved in the desegregation process only to the extent that they are sending white students to other locations in the city.

Effect on School Structure

To accomplish its desegregation/integration plan, Minneapolis redesigned its basic teaching and grade structure. At the elementary level, three basic methods were used to accomplish desegregation: first, expanded community schools were created to serve wider attendance zones; second, schools were clustered or paired to facilitate the development of primary schools (kindergarten through third grade) and intermediate centers (fourth grade through sixth); and third, pilot learning centers were established where students would be involved for short periods in integrated and enriched learning experiences.

At the secondary level, the district employed three basic approaches to achieving a better racial and socioeconomic composition in the schools. Senior high schools were changed from 3-year to 4-year schools in order to allow for the enrichment of the educational program of ninth graders and to place ninth graders in a wider geographic area with opportunities for contact with a wider range of students, both economically and racially. Junior

high schools were reduced to two-grade-level schools for the same reasons.

Curriculum

The original desegregation/integration proposal included plans for new curricular development and specialized programs. A comprehensive kindergarten through 12th grade social studies program was to develop a student awareness of local and national ethnic heritage. Beginning in 1971, Federal funding supported the production of a series of film programs about the Minnesota Indian people. However, curricular revision has come slowly in Minneapolis; desegregation began in the fall of 1972, but it was only in January 1975 that the school district produced its guidelines covering the use of multiethnic, multicultural, and nonsexist learning materials.

Preparation and Implementation of the Plan

Desegregation in Minneapolis brought with it little physical disruption and few outward acts of violence. "These things [desegregation activities] occurred, to the surprise of many, without the violence and without the vandalism that is too often associated with school desegregation, " said Dr. Robert Williams, associate superintendent for intergroup education. (Transcript, p. 188) Although fights and vandalism have occurred in Minneapolis schools during the past years, desegregation has not been the alleged cause. "In every school where I've worked, both here in Minneapolis and in Kansas City, there have been fights as well as vandalism," commented Marvin Trammal, the former west area superintendent of Minneapolis schools. "Violence and vandalism occur in schools, period," Trammal concluded. (Transcript, pp. 287-88) "We had relatively few incidents of violence," said ex-school superintendent Dr. Davis: "While there were lamentable incidents, I do not think they were tied in any way to the effort being made to desegregate the schools." (Transcript, p. 424)

The school district had been preparing both its staff and the community for desegregation 5 years before the court order. Although there was little time between the final court order and the beginning of implementation, the plan adopted by the court had essentially been designed by the district itself in the year preceding the court's order. More than 150 local meetings were held during formulation of the plan and after its final design in order to assist the community in understanding its content. (Transcript, p. 90)

Another contributing factor to the smooth implementation of the plan was the faculty and staff development program that was undertaken. Much of this program was aimed at human relations training which centered on a citywide network of human relations faculty representatives from each school. Communications laboratories were held in the 1971-72 school year and faculty members were placed on special assignment to assist in securing faculty reactions to the desegregation/integration plan. Inservice training programs included a series of workshops on human relations and on institutional racism. (Transcript, pp. 207, 261) This inservice training continues throughout the district.

Local Leadership

There was a high level of support throughout
Minneapolis for the desegregation of the city schools. Dr.
John B. Davis, Jr., who served as superintendent of schools
during early desegregation activities, now remembers a
number of key local leadership roles which included
"remarkably strong citizens' groups standing in support of
the effort to improve the schools." (Transcript, p. 398) Dr.
Davis noted the importance of "outspoken clergymen," and
while some denominations chose not to commit themselves
publicly on the desegregation issue, the local religious
leadership was generally supportive. Some parochial schools
refused to take students leaving newly desegregated schools
and took a strong stand on the moral issue of integration.

The role of local political leadership was generally limited. Minneapolis Mayor Charles Stenvig, who had taken law and order positions in the past and who was opposed to busing for desegregation purposes, did not lead or counsel opposition to court-ordered desegregation and the attendent pupil transportation which was required to implement it. The city council kept a low profile on the issue.

The media evidenced a positive approach to the desegregation process. The media readily reported factual information on the desegregation plan, and there was general editorial support of desegregation. There was a

conscientious effort to report the words and actions of local citizens who voiced opposition to the desegregation plan; many in Minneapolis now cite the local media as having served as a peaceful platform for those in the community who disagreed with the desegregation plan.

The desegregation plan was formulated to gain the support of both white and minority parents. Minneapolis experienced some apprehension regarding desegregation, but many parents appear to have been reassured by what were seen as vast educational improvements which were to be an integral part of the desegregation plan. Key elements of interest to parents included replacing obsolete buildings, forming magnet schools with special programs, clustering of children into schools serving narrower grade ranges, decentralizing the administrative structure, and providing a choice of educational programs.

Opposition

Although elements of the community were cooperating with the desegregation process, the desegregation effort did not go unopposed. Many residents and parents of Minneapolis school children voiced their negative opinions regarding desegregation. Many of these individuals appeared before State legislative hearings, hearings of the Minneapolis School Board, and local community meetings. In one instance, the pairing of Hale and Field Elementary Schools, a lawsuit opposing the action was filed by residents. The lack of violence in Minneapolis, according to Jean Cummings, a parent of four local school children, did not indicate a lack of opposition. Instead, Ms. Cummings commented, the lack of violence resulted from a "law abiding citizenry who really did not care to stand up and start throwing rocks at each other." (Transcript, p. 963)

When the opposition of some neighborhood residents failed to end desegregation activities, many reportedly considered taking their children out of the schools altogether--either by transferring them to private schools or moving to the suburbs. Although the school population dropped in the years following implementation of desegregation, the phenomenon has not been directly attributable to the desegregation effort. It instead appears to be the result of a number of factors, including an overall city population decline, the emergence of smaller family units, and a general trend of moves to the suburbs

that began before desegregation was even envisioned. (Transcript, p. 95)

Some students were removed from the Minneapolis schools because of desegregation (Transcript, p. 525), but a number of these have now returned. (Transcript, p. 572) Lowry Johnson, principal at Field School, which was one of the first schools involved in pairing, noted that at the time of desegregation a number of residents said that they were planning to move, or were "going to run," but, he continued, "I would be willing to say that [now] those that ran are running back in." (Transcript, p. 564) Gladys Anderson, principal of Nathan Hale School, buttressed this statement: "One of the persons who was most against the pairing of Hale and Field now has his child enrolled in Hale." (Transcript, p. 566)

However, a recent newspaper series on why parents move to the suburbs or transfer their children from Minneapolis public schools to private schools offered evidence that there is more expressed dissatisfaction with schools that have busing than with schools on the outer fringe of the city which do not. 13 More than 2,400 students have transferred from Minneapolis public schools to private schools in the last 3 years. However, statistics do indicate that this transfer rate slows after the first 2 years of desegregation in each school and that the initial problems of a desegregated school, including discipline, apparently improve. Reporter Max Nichols, writing in the Minneapolis Star, observed:

Usually there have been difficulties the first year or two, but behavior has improved as students from different backgrounds have become more at ease with each other and as school staff members have learned to deal with the problems. 14

Desegregation and Attitudes

The early opposition to desegregation which was evident among some parents has not been apparent among the students directly affected by the action. Dr. Robert Williams reported that tests of student attitudes have shown that "desegregation has been very positive in the eyes of the children. If we're waiting for the children to be segregationists, we'll be waiting a long time....Children

are handling desegregation very well." (Transcript, pp. 215, 218.)

Principals, teachers, administrators, and students all reported that desegregation was taking place in social contacts among students both in the classroom and in extracurricular activities. (Transcript, pp. 515, 631) Mike O'Donnell, a teacher at Wilder School, reported, "I definitely feel that there is more social interaction between all students and all races in our schools." (Transcript, p. 631) Richard Green, principal at North High School observed:

For some reason, either through desegregation or whatever, the 9th grade class which came to North for the first time last year saw--you saw more pupils sharing, sitting in classrooms and lunchrooms at integrated lunch tables; it was much more prevalent among the 9th graders than it was amongst the 12th graders and the 11th graders. (Transcript, p. 515)

Many observers warned, however, that the Minneapolis schools, while reaching some level of success in desegregation, have failed to reach their goals of integration, and that a good deal of effort was still necessary in this direction. Gloria Randel, director of a junior high school human relations program, observed that "...integration has not been achieved in Minneapolis public schools. Simply desegregation." (Transcript, p. 676)

Minneapolis has always referred to its plan as a desegregation/integration plan in order to emphasize the human relations and integration aspect of its approach. Some witnesses even cautioned against labeling what Minneapolis has done as successful desegregation because of the number of nearly all-white schools still within the district, such as Lowry with a 95 percent white student body, Northeast with a 96 percent white student population, and Edison, where whites constitute 98 percent of all students. Witnesses charged that the failure to recognize predominantly white schools as segregated was a major problem confronting the desegregation effort. (Transcript, p. 297)

Student Achievement

Student achievement under the desegregation plan has not declined as some feared. Some teachers now point to rising test scores since desegregation was initiated. According to Geraldine Johnson, a teacher at Field Elementary School, math and reading scores of both majority and minority students have risen since the school was desegregated. (Transcript, p. 630) Other teachers also noted that the quality of educational programs in the school system has improved in the past 3 years. (Transcript, p. 631) These teachers contend, however, that there is no indication that the rise in test scores is in any way related to desegregation. (Transcript, pp. 213, 628-30)

Many teachers, administrators, and parents maintain that test scores should never be used as a measure of success or failure in the desegregation effort. Charles Quaintance, a parent and an attorney for the 1972 suit against the school board, stressed:

You don't integrate because the kids get higher test scores; you integrate because otherwise people are scarred. The children are scarred and know that they aren't deemed as worthy or as worthwhile as the kids in the white schools. (Transcript, p. 443)

Although academic quality and desegregation are separate issues, many witnesses felt that, if the promise of improved educational quality had not been part of the plan, desegregation would not have been accepted as readily. Geraldine Sell, a parent with children in several different Minneapolis schools, stated:

It was significantly important to many people who were against the pairing because they were willing to trade off the fact that they did not want their children to go to school with black students in return for what they felt was a better program than what they had been in.... (Transcript, p. 863)

John Warder, a former school board member, said:

I doubt if the desegregation or integration portion would have developed as smoothly as it did unless you did have...a better quality education,

something that they felt was better than what they were getting.

Educational Programs, Faculty, and the Plan

The Minneapolis desegregation plan made a conscious effort to combine educational improvements, a school building and upgrading program, and the racial desegregation of schools. According to Dr. Robert Williams, 15 schools were closed and a \$19 million building program was started along with desegregation. (Transcript, pp. 192, 445) Virtually all Minneapolis students are now able to choose one of three different types of learning programs, a choice that was not available to them prior to 1972. Dr. John B. Davis, superintendent of the Minneapolis schools during the desegregation process, commented:

The creation of alternatives, participation and involvement—all I think were generative and positive concurrent developments which put desegregation/integration into a broader perspective. It was a city's commitment to improving education. It was a very important part of the process. (Transcript, p. 401)

As the desegregation plan was being implemented, the school district also undertook a recruitment program for hiring minority teachers. Dr. Joyce Jackson, who served as assistant director of personnel at that time, explained:

The recruiting schedule was drastically changed in terms of the types of the schools where we went. We expanded to many colleges [with] minority students....There is tangible evidence that there was an increase in the number of minority persons employed by the school system....The proportion of minority employees was increased significantly in the Minneapolis schools. (Transcript, p. 473)

This improvement in the early 1970s has not continued, however. School enrollment has declined districtwide in the past 4 years and the proportion of minority students in the district has increased, but the percentage of minority teachers has fallen considerably behind the percentage of minority pupils. In 1975, 21 percent of the pupils were minority, while only 10 percent of the teachers were minority. (See appendix.)

The assignment of faculty was one area in which the court required the district to do more than originally planned. (Transcript, p. 413) According to the court order, the 10 percent minority faculty had to be spread so that there was at least one minority faculty member in each school facility before there could be two minority faculty members in any one facility. Later minimum and maximum percentages were placed on minority faculty at each site. Declining enrollment has also directly affected faculty staffing patterns.

Student Transportation and Desegregation

The Minneapolis plan was formulated with the intention of minimizing problems related to pupil transportation. The school district endeavored to limit travel for those students affected to less than 30 minutes one way. In fact, through the use of pairing, most bus rides average less than 20 minutes. The length of the average bus ride did not increase measurably. More than half of the Minneapolis school district's pupils are bused to school, but only about 11,000 students are transported for desegregation purposes.

Although school officials claimed that the transportation burden has not been placed entirely upon minorities (Transcript, p. 193), many individuals expressed concern over the question. (Transcript, p. 519) Dr. Richard Green, principal of North High, queried:

I think the question of equal burden is an issue in Minneapolis given the number of minorities and the majority group. How far do you want to go in establishing unequal burden on one group in order to accomplish the physical desegregation of a school? (Transcript, p. 520)

Concern regarding the dispersion of minority students in small numbers to schools throughout the city is often raised to counter charges that Minneapolis still has several all-white schools.

Desegregation Costs

In addition to the costs of busing more children, other financial costs related to desegregation in Minneapolis were substantial, according to witnesses. This was partly due to the construction of new facilities. Other costs went for

the inservice teacher training, human relations programs, special liaison personnel to work with the community, etc. The first school pairing, for example, cost more than one-half million dollars, even though no construction was involved. 17 Local school funds and Federal funds covered the cost of the desegregation program.

Minneapolis' desegregation efforts took place at a relatively optimal point in time when State cooperation facilitated new construction, when the Federal Government funded special desegregation projects, and when local businesses contributed financially to projects designed to assist children from the inner-city schools. (Transcript, p. 414) An expressed fear now is that with declining enrollment, the district will be unable financially to support the "extras" necessary to ensure continued progress toward integration. (Transcript, p. 37) As Ann Darby of the Minneapolis Urban League stated, "I don't think we can afford to expect the kind of gains if we are going to have our resources cut away because it takes dollars in order to do it." (Transcript, p. 51)

A Long-Range View

Commenting on the overall outcome of the desegregation process, Barbara Schwartz of the Committee for Integrated Education noted:

I think it's going to take a generation or two to really see some results from all of this. I think what we are seeing finally is the emerging of staff and administration to deal openly with integration. That coming out of hiding, I think, has been a slow process, and I'm not sure we are completely out of it yet. (Transcript, p. 36)

IV. FINDINGS

- The Minneapolis desegregation plan has, in a number of instances, achieved its goal of physical redistribution of students so that no school has more than 42 percent minority enrollment. Some schools in the district, however, have failed to maintain that ceiling and continue to have minority enrollments above the 42 percent figure. The integration portion of the plan has not yet been fully implemented and has not met the original expectations of the plan.
- The Minneapolis school desegregation plan has overlooked the possibility that all-white or nearly all-white schools constitute a segregated situation. Some schools in the district have enrollments of 97 percent or more white students.
- At the time the Minneapolis desegregation plan was implemented, and continuing to the present, there has been vocal opposition expressed by some segments of the community. Incidents of physical disruption and violence were minimal, however, owing to the basic acceptance of law and order by all elements of the community and a belief that opposition to desegregation should be articulated through peaceful means rather than physical violence. The lack of physical violence should not be used as a measure of a lack of opposition to the desegregation plan.
- Various elements of the community--the school board, school administration, school superintendent, teachers, business leaders, religious leaders, some parents, and the media--were supportive of the school desegregation efforts, and most of those elements participated to some extent in the formulation and implementation of the Minneapolis plan.

NOTES

- 1. Minneapolis, Minn., Special School District No. 1, "Statement on Desegregation/Integration" (May 1975) (hereafter cited as "Statement on Desegregation").
- 2. Minnesota State Department of Education, <u>Equal</u>
 <u>Educational Opportunity Policies</u>, <u>Guidelines</u>, <u>and</u>
 <u>Regulations for Minnesota Schools</u>.
- 3. Page numbers in parentheses cited here and hereafter in text refer to statements made to the Minnesota Advisory Committee at its open meeting in Minneapolis, Minn., Apr. 22-24, 1976, as recorded in the transcript of that proceeding. The transcript is on file with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C., and with the Commission's Midwestern Regional Office, Chicago, Ill.
- 4. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn., 1972).
- 5. U.S., Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population.
- 6. U.S., Bureau of the Census, <u>Subject Report: American Indians</u>, 1970 of Population, PC (2)-1F.
- 7. Ronald Abler, et al, <u>The Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis</u>.
- 8. Minneapolis, Minn., Special School District No. 1, "Pupil-Personnel Sight Count As of October 14, 1975" (hereafter cited as "1975 Sight Count").
- 9. 1975 figures reported to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare by the Minneapolis, Minn., Special School District No. 1.
- 10. Minneapolis, Minn., Special School District No. 1, "Desegregation/Integration 1972-75," Mar. 14, 1972.
- 11. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., order of May 7, 1975.
- 12. "October 1976 Enrollment: Sight Count of Pupils."
- 13. Minneapolis Star, May 4, 1976, p. 1A.

- 14. Minneapolis Star, May 6, 1976, p. 8A.
- 15. "Statement on Desegregation."
- 16. "1975 Sight Count."
- 17. Louise Jones, <u>Urban Centers for Quality Integrated Education</u>, Story of the <u>Hale-Field Pairing Project With Suggestions for Implementation by Other School Districts</u> (October 1975).

APPENDIX
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Special School District No. 1

Student Enrollment

	Am. Ind.	Black	Asian Am.	Sp. Sur.	All Others	Total
1968	1,629	5,318	-	-	62,920	69,867
1970	1,993	5,944	329	461	58,207	66,934
1972	2,352	6,542	352	56 7	52,076	61,889
1974	2,676	7,040	423	583	45,439	56,161
1975	2,792	7,492	5 71	598	43,160	54,613

Faculty Composition

	Am. Ind.	Black	Asian Am.	sp. sur.	All Others	Total
1968	25	322	16	12	5,491	5,866
1970	48	3 95	22	16	5,956	6,437
1972	53	514	30	21	6,190	6,808
1974	98	523	31	29	6,138	6,819
1975	87	510	35	25	6,005	6,662

Source: Information given the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights by Dr. Robert Williams, associate superintendent for intergroup education, Minneapolis Public Schools, January 1976.

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